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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis puts forward a problematization of key assumptions within the field of 
organizational memory and develops a phenomenology-infused theory of 
organizational memory as a practice. The aim of the research is to depart from existing 
theoretical preconceptions of organizational memory in order to observe what 
organizational memory means, and looks like, to practitioners as they engage with it in 
their daily practice.  
 
Data collected during a 15-month long ethnography of architectural work is used to call 
into question an existing, broadly anthropocentric, understanding of organizational 
memory in favour of one where organizational memory is seen as distinct from practice 
memory (following Schatzki, 2006) and proceeds as an emergent, episodic 
accomplishment bound by local material arrangements and dynamics of organizational 
power.  
 
A new theoretical framework for classifying the literature is proposed alongside an 
emergence/submergence model of organizational memory as a practice (for illustrative 
purposes), implications for industry and further research, and a methodological 
approach to the study of such temporally-sensitive phenomena. 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  
1.1. TOWARDS A PRACTICE-BASED UNDERSTANDING OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY 
  
The aim of this chapter is to set out the initial outline for understanding organizational 
memory from the perspective of practice theory. The ensuing discussion is substantiated 
by data from 15 months of ethnographic research in an architectural firm, as well as in 
over two years of iterative analysis and an expansive literature review. Primary findings 
are collated into an illustrative conceptual model where I conceptualize organizational 
memory as a two types of processes, one broadly related to ‘memorization’, and another 
to ‘remembering’, as colloquially understood. Four main contributions follow, three to 
the study of organizational memory and one to the development of practice-based 
research methods. The first three are: 1) an in-depth empirical appraisal of Schatzki’s 
(2006) proposed definitions of organizational and practice memory; 2) a different way 
of positioning the relevant literature along the lines of orientation and scope of 
organizational memory; and, 3) an illustrative model of organizational memory as a 
practice. An additional methodological contribution is offered in form of a guide to study 
long-term, intangible and indirect organizational processes, such as organizational 
memory, through the practice theory lens but with an emphasis on the experiences of 
individual practitioners. Smaller/more localized contributions also follow throughout 
the chapters and are indicated where applicable.    
  
Organizational memory is a field of management and organization studies broadly 
concerned with examining those aspects of organization, which account for the 
continuity of collective knowledge, practices, and outputs through time. Indeed, many of 
these aspects reveal themselves critical to organizational analysis. For instance, 
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questions such as: why do groups of otherwise unrelated individuals, some of whom may 
not even engage in conversation all that frequently, manage to consistently produce work 
in a particular kind of way through time? Or, more puzzling still, why is it that when some 
of organizational members leave, the specific ways in which the work is performed 
remains the same? Different answers to these questions have been considered by various 
organizational scholars throughout the years, but a number of now canonical works in 
organizational theory (e.g. Levitt and March, 1988; March and Simon, 1958; Weick, 1979) 
reasoned that, since organizations display various information-processing properties, 
there ought to be a role for a memory-like capability within them too. This line of 
research, which has been going strong for just under 30 years, resulted in a number of 
influential reviews (e.g. Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Rowlinson et al., 2010) and productive 
interdisciplinary work (e.g. Olick and Roberts, 1998). Much of this work focused on the 
effects organizational memory has on the organization, whether in the form of 
organizational learning, innovation, efficiency or commercial effectiveness.  
 
I am not going to focus on the effects of organizational memory in this thesis; much has 
been written about this before. Instead, I am going to develop an empirically guided 
account of organizational memory from the perspective of the practice view of 
organization (Chapter 3). Organizational memory is not something explicit or objective, 
but rather a fundamentally complex mesh of sociomaterial processes and practices. Thus, 
the aim of this introduction is to provide a stepping stone for an empirical 
reconsideration of organizational memory as a practice, performed by practitioners.   
 
 
1.2. PROBLEMATIZATION OF EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP ON ORGANIZATIONAL 
MEMORY 
  
A significant limitation of the current scholarship on organizational memory is that the 
vast majority of relevant research is restricted to two or three definitions of the concept. 
These definitions suggest that 1) organizational memory is contained in some sort of an 
organizational repository (Walsh and Ungson, 1991), 2) that information and knowledge 
is encoded into the repository in order to be disseminated through time and space (Levitt 
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and March, 1988), and 3), that organizational memory is a mechanism by which groups 
of people understand their place in the social environment (Halbwachs, 1980). 
Interestingly, these three definitional streams are of purely conceptual origin. While 
accidental correlations with what people in organizations do exist, neither one of the 
three core definitions of organizational memory has been arrived at through empirical 
study of what organizational memory is - they are all, without exception, statements of 
what organizational memory ought to be. Because so much of inquiry into organizational 
memory is thus heavily based on theoretical assumptions about what organizational 
memory is or how it is meant to work (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011, 2013), it is hardly 
surprising that so much work operates following cognitive metaphors and analogies.  
  
Within management scholarship as categorised by Rowlinson et al. (2010), for example, 
organizational memory is that aspect of organization, which allows organizational 
members the capacity to retrieve specific information and knowledge from the past for 
the benefit of work in the present.  Information and knowledge is expected to be found in 
memory because it has been learned, recorded, or experienced either by local groups of 
individuals or by the organization itself (on a collective level). A recurrent theme in 
management literature suggests that what has been memorized (and what is being 
remembered on an organizational level), is memorized with the explicit purpose of 
improving efficiency; usually by cutting waste or duplication. Accordingly, management 
literature generally depicts organizational memory as a way of improving efficiency 
through the reduction in the needs of organizational members to “reinvent the wheel” or 
to repeat previously unsuccessful courses of action. 
  
Various metaphors other than organizational memory are employed to explain 
organizational continuity. A sub-field of literature on memory loss, variously termed as 
either ‘corporate amnesia’ (Kransdorff, 1998), ‘organizational forgetting’ (de Holan and 
Phillips, 2004) or ‘project amnesia’ (Schindler and Eppler, 2003), largely follows suit in 
omitting questions about what organizational memory is in favour of what it is supposed 
to do and why it may not be doing that. Thus, preoccupation with the ought, rather than 
with the is of organizational memory is pervasive. Even the more recent research, such 
as studies by Anteby and Molnar (2012), Langenmayr (2016) or Harvey (2012), 
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continues to focus on either what organizational memory ought to be or on what it is 
supposed to do for the organization in terms of functional consequences. While causality, 
of course, is not a synthetic a priori, in Wittgenstein’s terms, a study of effects without 
due attention to their causes still seems somehow incomplete. 
 
Thus, in this thesis I will echo and reiterate a note made by Argyris and Schön (1978), 
who called for attention to the fact that organizational memory is a metaphor to describe 
some processes within the organization that display memory-like characteristics. These 
characteristics are memorization and remembering. Memorization is normally 
understood as a process of committing something to memory, and remembering is the 
ability to conjure up awareness of something from the past (Parkin, 1999). In the case of 
human beings, the use of this amalgamation is justified because memory can be broadly 
pointed to as residing in hippocampus and/or amygdala regions of the brain (ibid). This 
is not so with organizations. Not only do they lack either, organizations are also missing 
the supporting facilities for the input of information compatible with those organs. Quite 
clearly, organizations are not brains; and so there is no reason why they should be treated 
as such in social inquiry. Throughout this thesis I will refer to this phenomenon of 
treating collective memory-like processes akin to individual memory as ‘anthropocentric 
bias’ – a persistent undercurrent within the literature that perpetuates the notion of 
organizational memory as that which is intended to fulfil similar functions in 
organizations as the human memory does in individuals; namely retention and recall of 
information and knowledge (usually for use in managerial decision-making). 
 
While potentially a nuanced point, consideration of organizational memory from an 
anthropocentric perspective can create empirically significant consequences. At risk of 
presenting an asynchronistic account, I would like to illustrate by means of an anecdote 
from when I began fieldwork (Chapter 4), still largely informed by mainstream, 
anthropocentric assumptions of what organizational memory is or should look like. 
Having secured research access to the organization, and with a recently completed initial 
draft of the literature review in hand, I have arrived to the offices of my research subjects 
5 
 
looking to understand effects of formal and informal hierarchy on organizational 
memory and fully expecting to find ample evidence of:  
 interpersonal communication (Wegner, 1987),  
 knowledge sharing and (co-)creation (Spender, 1996),  
 local collaborations (Luhmann, 1997),  
 group-level induction and socialization of newcomers (Lave and Wenger, 1991),  
 storytelling (Connerton, 1989),  
 engagement with company archives and records (Snyder and Cummings, 1998),  
 information-sharing hierarchy (online and offline) (Malhotra et al., 2005),  
 profession-based identity construction (Anteby and Molnar, 2012),  
 and, at least, rudimentary mechanisms for knowledge capture and management 
(Kransdorff, 1998).  
 
What I found instead was an open-plan office full of architects who spent the vast 
majority of their day at individual workstations in almost complete collective silence. 
Perplexed, I continued with my observations for about a month with no difference in 
results – interpersonal communication was minimal, digital communication was 
functional, and there was very little to suggest any variety of organizational memory at 
play, as per the current literature. If there was an organizational memory within this 
architectural practice, it was not explicitly collective. 
 
Shortly after a month of observations, I switched focus from trying to identify collective 
patterns of remembering or memorizing to shadowing individual architects. Most 
strikingly, the way individual architects interacted with their workstations and with 
clients via the materiality of work did indeed hint at some patterns associated with 
processes resembling memory. Unable to locate anything sufficiently relevant within the 
immediate literature, I deferred to practice view of organizations as a possible lens 
through which to perceive my empirical data. The work of Schatzki (2006), to be 
discussed in Chapter 3, proved especially revelatory.  
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An attempt to derive an empirical understanding of organizational memory via practice 
view was, even with the help of Schatzki (2006), unprecedented. Traditional tenets of 
organizational memory did not necessarily apply to what I was observing or 
conceptualizing with the help of practice view. Elements most frequently found in 
existing literature such as continuity, grounding in the past, codification, and 
organizational learning were far less prominent (or wholly absent) than materiality, 
power, uneven distribution, and pragmatic concerns. As empirical data collection 
progressed, it became clear that in order for me to be able to provide an authentic account 
of any properties of organizational memory, it was first necessary to develop an account 
of organizational memory detached from anthropocentric presuppositions and authentic 
to the empirical reality that I was observing.        
  
In their literature review, Rowlinson et al. (2010) called for a more ‘social’ investigation 
of organizational memory, as an alternative to the more functional managerialist account 
which expanded rapidly following Walsh and Ungson’s (1991) model of organizational 
memory ‘storage bins’. This call was further echoed by Casey and Olivera (2011) and the 
two recent Special Issues in Organization (Rowlinson et al., 2014; Cutcher et al., 2016). I 
believe that abandoning ‘organization’ in place of ‘social’ is somewhat premature. To be 
sure, organizations are inseparable from the social, just as the social is not very 
meaningful without consideration of organizations. However, organizations are very 
particular types of social arrangements and thus deserve a specialist analytical lens.  
 
Organizations, for example, can serve to artificially improve the existing social order, as 
was proposed by Weber (1922), or bridge different social orders, as was demonstrated 
by Roy (1953), or even directly contradict existing social arrangements and regimes 
(Rothschild and Whitt, 1989). Furthermore, people are not bound to be in organizations 
in the same way as they are bound to be in the social; but when they are there, they 
generally act deliberately. Organizations are also composed of specific tools of work 
intentionally focused towards particular intended outcomes, and they usually congregate 
people in a set space, physical or virtual (or both). Finally, organizations exchange and 
transform labour and effort of their members into means for making a living for them. 
Thereby, while a ‘social’ lens is certainly suitable to study organizational memory, it is 
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not as appropriately focused to represent work processes that transpire within 
organizations as a practice view is.      
  
 
1.3. INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE STUDY 
  
Even though this thesis is not a work in philosophy in any explicit sense, a sound 
philosophical understanding of the subject matter is of crucial importance to maintaining 
the clarity of the discussion to follow. Philosophy can be understood as a process of 
thinking about things; as an emergent property of a discussion. It envelops research 
ontology and epistemology, both of which inform the choice of methods for empirical 
data collection. These can include social, physical or even metaphysical aspects of the 
study. Accordingly, a choice about any particular ‘way of thinking’ can grant access to 
certain understandings while restricting access to others (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; 
Heidegger, 1978). It is thus important to establish a philosophical foundation through 
outlining key philosophical tenets, in order to ensure clarity and internal consistency of 
the ensuing discussion.  
 
In this thesis, I intend to set out a new interpretation of organizational memory as a 
practice, supported by longitudinal empirical data. This will require a nuanced set of 
assumptions and particular beliefs about the world, the individual, and the relationship 
between the individual and world. In thinking about organizational memory, it is almost 
natural to conjure up a subject-object, dependent-independent variable image. On this 
view, organizational memory becomes a compound of two things: the organization itself 
and its memory. By this reasoning alone, organizations are seen as objects, independent 
variables relative to a memory, which, in turn, is a dependent variable, or a subject. What 
this translates into is that either organizations cause their memory or the memory of 
organizations causes some particular form of organization. Each of these avenues has 
been considered in the literature and I will describe each in more detail in the following 
chapter. Something both ways share in common, however, is the nature of their 
assumptions about how organizational memory ought to work or look like.  
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In order to study something as intangible as organizational memory, whether in 
organizations or elsewhere, an approach more sensitive to the processual and relational 
nature of organizational memory is required. As Martin Buber (1958/2013: 6) pointed 
out while describing a tree: 
  
‘Let no attempt be made to sap the strength from the meaning of the relation: 
relation is mutual. The tree will have a consciousness, then, similar to our own? Of 
that I have no experience. But do you wish, through seeming to succeed in it with 
yourself, once again to disintegrate that which cannot be disintegrated? I encounter 
no soul or dryad of the tree, but the tree itself’   
  
And so it is with organizational memory - a scholar does not encounter databases, 
artefacts and stories but a memory itself. The components of it are later put into 
categories with reversed causality (i.e. databases are a form of organizational memory in 
place of organizational memory may include databases in certain circumstances). 
  
How does one study organizational memory to avoid reductionism? At least two things 
need to be preserved: 1) the complexity of the organization and 2) the ability to 
appreciate the processes of memorizing and remembering. Fundamentally, this means 
preserving those aspects of the organization that have to do with orderly but potentially 
disparate aggregations of materially mediated work activities over time. Maintaining an 
idea of a complete organization alongside empirical data on specific memory-related 
phenomena can be very difficult using traditional (Cartesian-esque) analysis, as will be 
shown in Chapter 2. In order to account for this specific predicament I decided to adhere 
to the process ontology of organization studies, specifically following the practice view 
(Schatzki, 2006, 2012; Nicolini, 2012).  
  
Practice view, also known as epistemology of practice or simply practice theory, is an 
approach to the study of social phenomena with an emphasis on the reproductive and 
politically contested nature of practices that comprise them. Practices can be systems of 
activities (Engeström, 1988), organized sets of doings and sayings (Schatzki, 2002), 
discourses and discursive formations (Foucault, 1977), or the resources and procedures 
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that produce mutually intelligible scenes and courses of action (Atkinson and Heritage, 
1984). Importantly, practice theory enables one to perceive the organization in a less 
reductive way. The situations in which organizational members find themselves as they 
go about accomplishing everyday work are neither exhibition of the “real world” that is 
“out there” nor are they products of individual imagination and interpretation. Rather, 
organizations are material settings populated with ways of doing things that are 
routinely (re)produced by all organizational members, contingent upon particular socio-
epistemic orientations that they may share in (Heidegger, 1978; Schatzki, 2006). As far 
as the study of organizational memory is concerned, practice view is a potentially fertile 
lens of looking at the phenomena and I shall describe the practice approach adopted and 
developed for this study - the phenomenology of practice - in more detail in Chapter 4. 
  
  
1.4. INTRODUCTION TO THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
  
Conducting a meaningful investigation into organizational memory from practice view 
means moving from abstract conceptions of organizational memory towards an 
emphasis on ‘how people do it’. To do this, a very detailed long-term study in a suitable 
setting is necessary. Ethnography has been selected as an appropriate method of data 
collection in order to ensure maximum familiarization with the research site and allow 
for the unexpected, subtle and/or long-term phenomena to come forth in a way that 
would not necessarily be revelatory enough using a different method. The central aim of 
ethnography is to provide rich, holistic insights into what individuals do and say, as well 
as the nature of spaces they inhabit. This is accomplished by collecting detailed 
observations and interviews, as well as phenomenological experiences of being present 
at the site of the study, in order to understand socio-epistemic convictions and 
motivations of the research subjects (Hammersley, 1992). 
  
There are, however, specific considerations to be borne in mind when embarking on a 
qualitative study such as this one. First, while I maintain certain principles to identify 
memory-like processes, namely anything resembling supra-individual memorization and 
remembering, there is no guiding theory present. Instead, the study is inherently 
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inductive and analysis explicitly abductive; albeit presented along the principles outlined 
by Gioia and Chittippedi (1991), who called for the more traditional format of theoretical 
framing and positioning within the relevant academic discipline to be retained for the 
benefit of the reader. 
  
Empirical data underlying this research came from an ethnographic study of a large-
medium architecture firm in the United Kingdom conducted over 15 months: from late 
August 2013 to December 2014. The firm, anonymised for confidentiality purposes as 
ArchitectureCo, is an award-winning practice ranked amongst the top 100 architectural 
practices in Britain by a leading industry journal. At the time of the study ArchitectureCo 
employed around 60 staff and pursued work for clients in higher education, housing, 
commercial and office, community and culture industries. The ethnography focused on 
the internal processes within the organization and external processes during 
interdisciplinary work with other specialists from different organizations on two distinct 
construction projects. 
  
Architecture was chosen as a setting that may be of particular interest for two reasons. 
First, architecture is a distinctly institutionalized field dating back to first century AD 
(Fletcher, 1987). In the UK, a professional association for architects, the Royal Institute 
of British Architects, has existed since 1837 with the intent to set and develop standards 
of practice, advise on rules and generate new knowledge. A strong degree of 
institutionalization is a form of practice memory. This suggests that architecture as a 
profession is at the very least predisposed to operating with some kind of organizational 
memory as part of its structural integrity.  
 
Second, architecture is an inherently project-based environment. All of the work is 
structured around specific and, oftentimes, largely unique contracts. This point is 
noteworthy for two further reasons. First, building design projects, especially the larger 
ones, consist of spatially and temporally distributed project-based organizations 
assembled from smaller projects (Grabher, 2004; Whitley, 2006). In such settings, 
multiple nexuses of interdisciplinary work bring diverse specialists from creative and 
technical practice domains to collaborate on temporary basis (Boland, Lyytinen, and Yoo, 
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2007; Newell et al., 2009). In terms of organizational memory, a setting such as this 
provides an excellent space to investigate how organizational is organizational memory. 
Second, in the present literature, project-based organizations are notorious for having a 
faulty or non-existent organizational memory (e.g. Swan et al., 2010; Bartsch, Ebers, and 
Maurer, 2013). Project-based organizations are a challenging environment for majority 
of existing theoretical approaches to organizational memory. Which is why it is all the 
more appropriate to conduct a re-investigation of what organizational memory might be 
in a setting where established theory struggles to find its footing. 
  
During the study I made a point of both immersing myself into the ‘deep end’ of 
organizational life of ArchitectureCo, as well as of following two specific projects in a 
more traditionally systematic way. Having eventually secured unreserved access to the 
organization for six months initially, I carried on collecting the data for 15 months in total. 
During this time, I conducted approximately 1000 hours of observations in the office of 
ArchitectureCo and a further 120 hours observing meetings for the two projects at 
various other locations. I also followed my research subjects on a few construction site 
visits and an occasional corporate social event. While at the office, I had a desk at my 
disposal and a corporate account to use the computer and to access the database and 
email lists of my choosing. The company directors allowed me to copy any information of 
my choice from the database subject to the confidentiality agreement that was put in 
place between myself, the University and ArchitectureCo. None of ArchitectureCo staff 
demonstrated any hostility towards the research and quite a few expressed continued 
interest in the study, its aims and progress. 
  
In order to triangulate the analysis as described in Chapter 4, ethnographic data was 
supplemented by selective interviews and archival data from ArchitectureCo’s 
information repository. Specific methods and their philosophical underpinnings will be 
explained further in Chapter 4. 
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1.5. RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
  
Organizational memory is an important topic in the study of management. Used to 
explain persistence of organization and/or its characteristics through time, 
organizational memory introduces a fourth dimension – continuity - to organizational 
scholarship (in addition to people, spaces and work). Existing theory has paid scarce 
attention to the experiences of people who do, in fact, make up and interact with 
organizational memory as a matter of their daily work - as I shall outline in Chapter 2, 
much of the current research is driven by a small handful of conceptual definitions. While 
intuitively agreeable, even the more influential of these root definitions consistently 
display anthropomorphic tendencies – thinking about organizational memory as 
operating similarly to individual memory. Given how successful the field of 
organizational memory has been, both within and outside of academia, this is not a 
limitation inherently. It is, however, problematic with respect to producing good and 
interesting research that does justice to the subject of what organizational memory is as 
a practice. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to begin the process of understanding organizational memory 
through the interpretive lens of the practice view in organization studies. Accordingly, 
the purpose of this thesis is to begin a dialogue towards a practice-based understanding 
of organizational memory. The two parts of the title - the ‘towards’ and the ‘practice-
based’ - highlight the scope of the thesis and its philosophical commitment. Where the 
former refers to an aspiration for setting out a trajectory of scientific inquiry into 
organizational memory as a practice, the latter offers a dictionary by use of which this 
trajectory is to be made properly legible. Therefore, in this thesis, I am going to report 
some basic tenets and disclose some nascent findings on what are, and are not, the 
foundational characteristics of organizational memory when considered as a practice. 
Accordingly, the guiding research question that I shall follow in my theoretical, empirical 
and analytical inquiry is as follows:   
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What are the primary principles and processes that make up organizational 
memory as a practice; and in what ways do these allow for a re-conceptualization 
of memory as an organizational phenomenon?  
  
The first part of the research question will be explored in Chapters 5-7, and the second 
part of the research question will be addressed in Chapter 8, building on the foundations 
laid out in Chapters 2, 5-7. 
 
  
1.6. INTENDED CONTRIBUTIONS 
  
This study is intended to contribute, primarily, to the study of organizational memory 
and, secondarily, to the ongoing development of practice theory. 
  
Within the academic field of organizational memory, there have been perhaps two 
significant junctions, or thrusts, which have generated a great deal of research. The first, 
by Walsh and Ungson (1991) put forward a suggestion that there are distinct and discrete 
varieties of collective memory within single organizations. This stimulated a body of 
work focused on discerning the different effects that these varieties – databases, culture, 
libraries, and networks of individuals - may have on organizational functions (ibid). 
Originally a review paper, the value of Walsh and Ungson’s (1991) contributions did not 
stem from offering any theoretical tools or empirical findings to the field, but in 
formulating a convenient and intuitive interpretative lens that would provide sufficient 
focus and momentum to mobilise a multitude of research into organizational memory as 
a storage solution. 
  
The second junction, or thrust, came from a relatively recent literature review by 
Rowlinson et al. (2010), where the authors called for more attention to be given to the 
‘social’ rather than the ‘organizational’ aspects of organizational memory. Elements such 
as stories, myths and narratives, spaces and places of remembrance and collective 
worship were argued to comprise a more authentic and empirically relevant body of 
evidence of organizational memory compared to their storage-focused predecessors. One 
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of the key assumptions within this line of thinking was that organizational memory, 
following the interpretation set out by Walsh and Ungson (1991), neglected the humanity 
of collective memory in favour of function, and that more effort needed to be devoted to 
understanding the idiosyncrasies and irrationalities of how groups of people memorize 
and remember. This junction has so far resulted in at least: two special issues of the 
Organization journal (Rowlinson et al., 2014; Cutcher, et al., 2016) and one special issue 
of Organization Studies (Mordhorst, Popp, and Wadhwani, 2016), two books (Tota and 
Hagen, 2015; Langenmayr, 2016) and a number of related conference tracks and 
discussions, big and small. 
  
I interpret the two directions to broadly correspond to the subject-object orientation 
within organizational memory, where it is either thought of as an attribute of the 
organization, much like a resource; or a substance of it, usually in the form of stories and 
narratives. There is little, however, in the current literature to explain how organizational 
memory is as a regime of sociomaterial patterns of actions within an organization (see 
Chapter 2). One of the purposes of this thesis is thus to find a path into this 
un(der)explored territory – practice - by applying methods and principles derived from 
the practice view of the organization. This present study will offer guidance for any future 
inquiry into organization memory and sketch out an image of what, following the practice 
view, it may look like as well as what new insight organizational memory as a practice 
may contribute to our understanding of how individuals collectively organize their 
labour. 
  
As far as the practice view is concerned, it was not, at the time of writing, entirely clear 
whether there was room for collective memory as a primary phenomenon within this 
emerging tradition. What I mean by primary phenomenon is something that could be 
directly observed in an empirical setting, as opposed to something that would be 
analytically superimposed by the researcher at a later stage, as a descriptive category. 
According to the practice view, all phenomena are emergent and are required to be re-
enacted anew at every iteration of practice (Nicolini, 2012; Schatzki, 2012). A degree of 
continuity ensues between iterations because there are normative, material and 
networked dimensions to practices. This view of continuity, however, is not of a similar 
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kind to what is currently understood as ‘memory’ in organization studies. On the one 
hand, organizational memory, whatever the interpretation, is considered to have a 
degree of endurance relative to the passage of time. Practice view, on the other hand, 
suggests that the passage of time is enacted at every iteration of performance (Orlikowski 
and Yates, 2002). As a result, there is a conflict between the practice view of organization 
and the fundamental assumptions supporting organizational memory as a principle of 
collective work.  
  
A further difficulty between the practice view and the concept of organizational memory, 
even taken at its most general, is that organizational memory is not specific to any one 
practice. Nor could it be, because in order for memory to a meaningful concept, it has to 
be a memory of something. Could it be that practice view does not account for 
organizational memory by design? This seems contrary to reason as without memory-
like phenomena there could be no continuity through time insofar as groups of people 
are concerned, and without continuity through time there could be no practices (as 
practices are also historically rooted - Schatzki, 2006, 2012; Nicolini, 2012; Sandberg and 
Tsoukas, 2015). Research on routines also attempts to deal with this problem (e.g. Miller 
et al., 2012), albeit without considering the experience of practitioners who engage with 
organizational memory as part of their work. It thus seems that it is rather the case that 
the current conceptions of organizational memory are unable to convincingly account for 
the enactment of practices, and not the other way around. Therefore, the secondary 
contribution of this thesis will be to reconceptualize organizational memory in a way 
commensurate with the practice view of organization. 
  
  
1.7. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
  
Chapter 2 will present a systematic review of the literature to identify any aspects of the 
debate deemed relevant to formulating a practice-based account or organizational 
memory, as well as indicate a theoretical point of departure for the discussion to follow. 
In order to do this in a novel way with intention to yield previously unavailable insight, 
the literature is positioned on two axis: orientation and scope of organizational memory 
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relative to the organization. Orientation axis maps the way organizational memory is 
defined by the different literatures; focusing on two categories: organizational memory 
as an attribute of the organization, and organizational memory as a substance of the 
organization. The two categories are further supplemented by the axis of scope, also split 
into two categories: organizational memory as an atomistic, and organizational memory 
as a holistic characteristic of an organization. The axis of ‘scope’ maps the composition of 
organizational memory, whether constituted as an assemblage of discrete elements or as 
an inclusive whole, naturally emergent from the process of collective organizing.  
 
Chapter 3 builds on the literature review in order to elaborate on, and develop further, 
Szhatzki’s (2006) ideas of organizational and practice memory. This chapter evaluates 
theoretical propositions made by Schatzki about organizational and practice memory, as 
sets out a methodological foundation for developing them in an empirical environment. 
Overall, an alternative interpretative lens grounded in the works of Heidegger, 
Whitehead and Schatzki is presented and fine-tuned for the study of organizational 
memory.  
  
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology deployed in support of this thesis, comprising of an 
embedded case study within the context of architectural work. The ethnographic 
component of the case study lasted for 15 months and was performed alongside archival 
analysis. Research setting, the process of data collection and analysis, ethics and 
limitations are also discussed in this Chapter. 
  
Chapter 5 begins an empirical investigation of what practitioners understand by 
organizational memory in their daily practice. This Chapter applies the theoretical point 
of departure - Schatzki’s (2006) proposed understanding of organizational and practice 
memory - to the ethnographic dataset. The aim of Chapter 5 is to identify which aspects 
of Schatzki’s (2006) theoretical work resonate with empirical data the most, which can 
be disposed of, and which are missing. The analysis in this Chapter does not yet touch 
upon what is organizational memory for those practicing it, but rather sets the 
foundation by assisting in identifying memory-like processes to watch out for in Chapters 
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5 and 6. These processes have been identified as related to power, materiality and tools 
of work in the organization. 
  
Chapter 6 focuses on power and materiality, considering these processes as ‘submerging’ 
organizational memory into the fabric of work. This chapter is focused on a case study of 
a £30 million building extension project, with particular emphasis placed on the use of 
design drawings in collaborative design development. Findings demonstrate that certain 
objects serve as material mediators for communication across professional boundaries, 
which maintains power relationships. This is enabled by three processes: 1) the exclusive 
‘sender-recipient’ format of sharing design drawings; 2) an implicit hierarchy governing 
how professionals from different domains can engage with particular drawings; and 3) 
authoritative communicative practices – exemplified by expert comments - imposed on 
the drawings. These three processes ‘submerge’ ways of performing work into the 
relevant tools of work to the effect that social orderings, power relations and normative 
uses of equipment and artefacts gain resilience through time. Organizational memory as 
a submergent process displays some of the characteristics of what would commonly be 
referred to as ‘memorization’.     
  
Chapter 7 takes the analytical lens to the practitioner by examining how they draw on 
memory-like processes during the less structured, design stage of the project. This 
chapter is focused around a case study of a new restaurant project, with particular 
emphasis placed on describing how architects conceive of, and materialise their design 
ideas. Further attention is given to what role previous experiences (individual and 
organizational) play in this process. Findings here demonstrate the key role of non-
reflective experience, or ‘tinkering’, in the translation of ideas, inspirations and principles 
from individual architects to designs via tools of work and available materiality. There 
processes, reminiscent of what would commonly be referred to as ‘remembering’, form 
the emergent aspect of organizational memory as a practice. Empirical boundary 
between practice memory and organizational memory is also observed here. 
  
Chapter 8 brings together the submergent and emergent processes into an illustrative 
model. The illustrative model highlights the roles of power and materiality of work, while 
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accounting for the role of organization in enabling organizational memory. Implications 
of the study are presented and limitations are acknowledged. This chapter also features 
a set of guiding questions that an investigator of organizational memory as a practice may 
find helpful in the field.  
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Chapter 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents a systematic review of literature on organizational memory and 
indicates a theoretical point of departure for the empirical component of this thesis to 
follow. The purpose of literature review in this thesis is not to identify shortcomings and 
problems with existing state of research, but rather to demonstrate and substantiate 
observations made in Chapter 1 about how anthropocentric approaches to 
organizational memory can be insufficient and problematic. Much was written about 
organizational and other forms of collective memory, but very little of this diverse 
literature is consolidated in a comprehensive way. Because the aim of my thesis has to do 
with developing a practice-view account of organizational memory any empirical data, 
collected or analysed, will benefit from as broad of an understanding of previous thinking 
about this issue as possible. This is, in large part, due to the socially constructed nature 
of collective memory.  
 
During the review of the literature, I will position existing research along two thematic 
axes: orientation and scope. Orientation refers to the way organizational memory is 
conceptualized by the literature in relation to the organization. Two types of orientation 
are identified in the literature: organizational memory as an attribute of the organization 
and organizational memory as a substance of the organization. These are further 
supplemented by the two types of scope: organizational memory as atomistic and 
organizational memory as holistic. Scope refers to the composition of organizational 
memory, whether consisting of different parts or as an inclusive whole that is a product 
of organizing labour. A theoretical point of departure is identified within the 
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substance/holistic quadrant of the literature, specifically represented by the work of 
Schatzki (2006) on organizational and practice memories. This will be explained in more 
detail in Chapter 3. 
  
The remainder of the chapter will proceed as follows: First, I will introduce the context 
before describing the method used to derive a systematic sample of studies to be 
reviewed. Next, I will position and review the literature corresponding to the two types 
of orientation (attribute and substance) and scope (atomistic and holistic). Finally, I will 
explain the selected interpretative lens and outline some of the benefits and areas of 
heightened attention that are to be kept conscious of.  
 
2.1.1. Context of literature review 
 
Drawing inspiration from how individual human memory works, much research on 
organizational memory has assumed the subject of its study to be knowledge (Walsh and 
Ungson, 1991; Rowlinson et al., 2010; Argote, 2011; Casey and Olivera, 2011; Harvey 
2012). Others have focused on identity and organizational self-representation (Foster et 
al., 2011; Anteby and Molnar, 2012; Schultz and Hernes, 2013; Adorisio, 2014). Fewer, 
however, have ventured to define what is meant by organizational memory. This is 
especially true for research following in the three major trajectories outlined in Chapter 
One. These are: studies inspired by the ‘retention bin’ model by Walsh and Ungson 
(1991); studies following the codification and control of information agenda (circa Levitt 
and March (1988), Yates (1989) and Ackerman (1998)), and studies following the ‘social 
memory’ view that memory resides in stories and histories (Orr, 1986; Rowlinson and 
Hassard, 1993). For individuals, memory is an aspect of situating the self within the 
temporal experience of the surrounding environment (Olick et al., 2011) - it may, in fact, 
account for the experience of continuity itself - but this does not mean that organizational 
memory ought to necessarily follow in the same footsteps. 
  
Perhaps due to there not being a distinct, agreed-upon foundational work on what 
organizational memory is, the literature on the subject is quite fragmented. A plethora of 
metaphors, analogies and concepts from early psychology (e.g. episodic memory, 
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embodied memory, more or less concrete memory, distributed, semi-abstract, 
representative, declarative, etc.) exist scattered throughout both time and subject area. 
This makes drawing lines and identifying ‘schools’ of thought difficult, not least because 
a great number of studies do not consistently adhere to any one understanding of 
memory. With that in mind, a particular classification gained popularity over the past 
decade or so - one popularised by Rowlinson et al. (2010), comprises of ‘Organizational 
Memory Studies’ and ‘Social Memory Studies’. The former is an amalgamation of 
generally anthropo-sociological thought on collective memory broadly following 
Durkheim, Halbwachs (1980) and, more recently, Ricoeur (2004), Misztal (2003), Olick 
(2008) and Zerubavel (2003), among others; and the latter is a following of and the 
responding to Walsh and Ungson (1991) and other similar, organization-centred 
perspectives. 
  
Such a classification, however, might be misleading or unhelpful in some respects. In the 
case of the former, distinction between ‘organizational’ and ‘social forces an artificial 
separation where there needn’t be one - all organizational memory is also social memory, 
and all social memory must include an organizational element to it. The primary 
exception to this is when considering history, which, while frequently conflated with 
memory, is not the same kind of event. Alternatively, this distinction can result in rather 
abstract definitions (Hecker, 2012). Lam (2000: 491), for example, offers one such way 
of seeing organizational memory, suggesting that it “can be more, or less, than the sum of 
the individuals’ knowledge, depending on the mechanisms that translate individual into 
collective knowledge”. While this is a perfectly reasonable interpretation, it conceals much 
of the nuance of organizational memory in favour of breadth.   
  
That being said, the “organizational-social memory studies” way of grouping literature is 
just as good as any other because of how fragmented the field is, especially concerning 
the object of its study. Even a brief foray into this subject area is likely to reveal that 
research on organizational memory is actually research on organizational properties and 
characteristics that have to do with persistence through time. Few contemporary 
scholars of organization have taken the time to explore what organizational memory 
actually is - most speak of what organizational memory does (e.g. reduces duplication 
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(Kransdorff, 1998)), but not of what their perspective on organizational memory actually 
is and why. So, despite the 25 years of organizational memory research (and counting) 
since the publication of the Walsh and Ungson’s (1991) seminal article Organizational 
Memory in Academy of Management Review, the following note of caution remains 
equally apt today:         
  
Despite the general use of the term organizational memory, it is not clear that we 
have understood the concept or its implications for the management of 
organizations. To date, a myriad of unexamined conjectures has defined a concept 
that has even served as a basis for prescriptive management advice. (Walsh and 
Ungson, 1991: 84–85) 
  
In order to set the stage for an empirical study of what organizational memory is to those 
who practice it, I will first propose another way of positioning the literature on 
organizational memory. While it will invariably be as good as any other way of classifying 
currently out there, it is sufficiently different to 1) shed new light on the field and 2) set 
some of the foundations for the empirical portion of this study and the aims of my thesis. 
In spirit of a practice view (see Chapter 3 for more details), the proposed classification 
will centre on how the concept of ‘organizational memory’ is used in the literature. Of 
these, there are four ways (arranged in two pairs) of how the concept of organizational 
memory is usually applied in research: as an attribute of the organization versus as its 
substance, and perceived holistically or atomistically.   
  
  
2.2. METHOD FOR THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
The initial aspiration for this section of the thesis was to conduct a systematic literature 
review in order to obtain as full of a representation of the literature as possible. A Boolean 
string search for terms “organizational memory”, “organisational memory”, and 
“corporate memory” resulted in 1156 papers. However, following the initial overview, it 
quickly became obvious that vast majority of those papers had very little to do with the 
subject at hand. Additionally, a number of known key works were absent. In order to 
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account for the latter limitation, I have included a string for “social memory” into the 
search, which increased the total amount of papers to 2486. While effective in recovering 
a number of important works, this course of action significantly diluted what already was 
a weak sample lacking in focus. Consequently, because my goal was to learn what is 
known about organizational memory, rather than to catalogue every instance of when 
the term was used, I have decided to pursue an alternative route. 
  
It appears to be conventionally true that a systematic review equals, or, at the very least, 
closely approximates an automated review (much like the one attempted above). This 
need not be so, because a systematic review is supposed to be precisely that – systematic, 
regardless of whether done by hand or through an algorithm. In this regard, I have 
decided to employ a snowballing (chain) sampling procedure as outlined by Wohlin and 
Prikladnicki (2013), Wohlin (2014). In light of the volume and relevance limitations 
outlined above, snowballing presented itself as an effective way of conducting a review 
that was both systematic and optimally meaningful at the same time (Greenhalgh and 
Peacock, 2005). 
  
In order to begin the snowballing sampling process, it is first necessary to identify a 
tentative selection of works from which to start (Figure 2.1). Google Scholar was used in 
order to avoid publisher bias and the same search string of words as presented above 
was used. This search was not subjected to any particular time-frame. Seven articles were 
identified as suitable starting points for snowballing, based on the regularity with which 
they occurred in search results, significant numbers of citations and familiarity (achieved 
during preliminary stages of the research). 
  
1.  Walsh, J.P. and Ungson, G.R. (1991). Organizational memory. Academy of 
Management Review, 16(1), pp. 57-91. 
  
2.    Spender, J.C., (1996). Organizational knowledge, learning and memory: three 
concepts in search of a theory. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 
9(1), pp. 63-78. 
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3.  Moorman, C. and Miner, A.S. (1998). Organizational improvisation and 
organizational memory. Academy of Management Review, 23(4), pp. 698-723. 
  
4.  Stein, E.W. and Zwass, V. (1995). Actualizing organizational memory with 
information systems. Information Systems Research, 6(2), pp. 85-117. 
  
5.  Ackerman, M.S. (1998). Augmenting organizational memory: a field study of 
answer garden. ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS), 16(3), pp. 203-
224. 
  
6.      Anand, V., Manz, C.C. and Glick, W.H. (1998). An organizational memory approach 
to information management. Academy of Management Review,23(4), pp. 796-809. 
  
7.     Olick, J.K. and Robbins, J. (1998). Social memory studies: From" collective memory" 
to the historical sociology of mnemonic practices. Annual Review of Sociology, 
pp.105-140. 
  
These seven were manually supplemented by additional four works: one recent 
influential literature review (Rowlinson et al., 2010), two introductions to organizational 
memory-themed special issues (Rowlinson et al., 2014; Cutcher et al., 2016), and a book 
that presented an otherwise uncommon yet impactful theory of organizational memory 
by Niklas Luhmann (Langenmayr, 2016). 
  
8.    Rowlinson, M., Booth, C., Clark, P., Delahaye, A. and Procter, S., (2010). Social 
remembering and organizational memory. Organization Studies, 31, pp. 69-87 
  
9.   Rowlinson, M., Casey, A., Hansen, P.H. and Mills, A.J., (2014). Narratives and 
memory in organizations. Organization, 21(4), pp. 441-446.  
  
10.  Cutcher, L., Dale, K., Hancock, P. and Tyler, M., (2016). Spaces and places of 
remembering and commemoration. Organization, 23(1), pp. 3-9. 
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11.  Langenmayr, F. (2016). Organizational Memory as a Function: The Construction of 
Past, Present and Future in Organizations. Berlin: Springer 
  
From this starting set of 11 papers, both backward and forward snowballing (chain) was 
conducted. Because the manually added four are considerably more recent than the 
Google Scholar identified seven, these two groups have been analysed separately in order 
to generate a more orderly record. 
 
First, the backward snowballing of the first seven papers involved studying the 
references for each individual work. Only results relevant to the subject matter of 
organizational memory were retained, which resulted in 22 additional papers selected 
for the literature review. This was supplemented by a further 64 works identified 
through the 4 added manually. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Snowballing (chain) sampling procedure (Wohlin, 2014) 
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Next, the forward snowballing of the first seven papers added another 12 works to the 
list, supplemented by 3 from the manually added four. In forward snowballing, the Google 
Scholar citations tool was used to detect newer books and articles that have cited the 
selected sample. A great many works did not qualify during this forward snowballing 
iteration because of their subject matter. 
 
With the initial set processed, the 11 starting works have been taken out of the cycle in 
order to give way to the 102 works detected during the first iteration of 
backward/forward snowballing. The 102 papers were then evaluated to exclude non 
peer-reviewed works (except books) and redundant entries. Redundancy constituted 
either high degree of similarity (i.e. conference paper and published paper), cataloguing 
error (two entries for the same work under different years) and multiple works featuring 
the same author dealing with the same topic in close succession. This eliminated 17 
candidates. The snowballing procedure was then repeated with the remaining 85 
candidates from second iteration. 
  
The third iteration of snowballing contributed 6 additional works to the literature 
review, and the fourth iteration did not contribute any new works that survived selection. 
This is reflected by a 0% snowballing efficiency rate. These results are summarized in 
Table 2.1.     
 
  Start quantity Included Efficiency 
Start set 11 11 100% 
Iteration 1 11 102 927% 
Iteration 2 102 85 83% 
Iteration 3 85 6 7% 
Iteration 4 6 0 0% 
Table 2.1. Results of snowballing (chain) sampling 
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The resultant 204 papers qualified for the review on the basis of their use of the concept 
of organizational memory, in one way or another, informed the identification of four 
major themes within the literature as presented in the next section.  
  
  
2.3. TAXONOMY OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY 
  
Drawing on how the concept of organizational memory is applied in the literature, four 
themes of organizational memory emerged: 1) as an attribute of the organization and 2) 
as a substance of the organization. The former refers to use of the concept (or metaphor) 
of organizational memory in a broadly resource-based way - as that which can be 
deliberately deployed by management in order to satisfy more or less defined objectives, 
while the latter refers to that literature which conceptualizes organizational memory as 
indistinguishable from the organization itself. These first two themes address the 
relationship between organizational memory and the organization. The second two 
themes, atomism and holism, refer to the scope of organizational memory itself. The two 
themes bear resemblance to the distinction between organizational culture as either a 
variable or as a root metaphor (Smircich, 1983). For instance, organizational memory 
that is atomistic would be composed of a number of defined constituent entities or 
elements (e.g. transactive memory systems); but organizational memory as that which is 
holistic, by contrast, would not display such elements but would appear as an 
encompassing, continuous process. See Table 2.2 for a quick overview of the taxonomy. 
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Scope \ Orientation Attribute Substance 
Atomism The repository model (eg. 
Walsh and Ungson, 1991); 
ICT-induced memory (eg. 
Malhotra et al., 2005); 
  
Routines (eg. Mills et al., 
2012); 
Stories and narratives (eg. 
Connerton, 1989). 
Holism Identity (eg. Anteby and 
Molnar, 2012); 
Transactive Memory 
System (eg. Wegner, 1987); 
Narrative (eg. Rowlinson et 
al., 2014); 
Culture (eg. Cook and 
Yanow, 1993) 
Systems theory (eg. 
Luhmann, 1997; 2012); 
Teleology of practice (eg. 
Schatzki, 2006; 2012); 
Institutional 
remembering (Linde, 
2008). 
Table 2.2. Taxonomy of organizational memory 
 
2.3.1 Organizational memory as an attribute 
  
There is no shortage of research that considers organizational memory to be an attribute 
of the organization. What this means is essentially that organizational memory is 
considered to be either another resource for the organization to employ, a source of 
competitive advantage, or just anything useful. Critically, the studies through which this 
category emerges almost universally postulate that, implicitly or explicitly, that 
organizational memory is, or has to be, of use to the management of the organization. A 
seminal review paper by Walsh and Ungson (1991) conveniently illustrates this 
approach through its definition of organizational memory as ‘stored information from an 
organization’s history that can be brought to bear on present decision’ (ibid: 61) and by 
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observing that ‘organizational memory consists of mental and structural artefacts that 
have consequential effects on performance’ (ibid: 58). 
  
The general thesis of organizational memory as an attribute has been well-accepted 
within management theory. This is a line of inquiry normally rooted in the information-
processing model of the organization proposed by March and Simon (1958) and further 
focused on memory by Weaver and Bishop (1974) and Levitt and March (1988). A key 
capability that organizational memory as an attribute was intended to bestow on the 
organization is efficiency. For example, shortly following Walsh and Ungson’s (1991) 
defining work, Sandoe and Olfman (1992) also discussed how organizational memory 
can be of use to management as an efficiency enhancing tool. Similarly, Stein and Zwass 
(1995), Smith (1994) and Kransdorff (1998), among others, looked at how organizational 
memory can be used in order to help achieve specific organizational goals. For these 
authors, organizational memory is stored within/by organizational attributes - 
individuals, culture, transformations, structures and the broader ecology (Walsh and 
Ungson, 1991), or any variation of these. Numerous research projects have accepted and 
developed this way of thinking about organizational memory (Anand et al., 1998; Argote, 
1999; Argote et al., 2003; Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; de Holan and Phillips, 2004; Fiedler 
and Welpe, 2010; Griffith et at., 2003; Hackbarth and Grover, 1999; Moorman and Miner, 
1998; Nissley and Casey, 2002; Suddaby et al., 2010) drawing on themes and topics from 
a wide range of subfields of management.  
  
Despite this great quantity of research within the “organizational memory as an 
attribute” orientation, there is virtually no consideration of the scope of this concept; or, 
what I refer to here as ‘atomism versus holism’. For the purposes of this review, scope 
refers to the type of argument used to determine the extent of the subject area. In 
positioning the literature based on the interpretation of how the concept is used by the 
author, it is important to consider the scope of said use, and not just the orientation. 
Inclusion of scope allows to problematize existing assumptions and perspectives about 
organizational memory in ways conducive to the moving of the enquiry forward (or 
sideways, depending on one's point of view) - the primary one being whether 
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organizational memory is a set of components and distinct capabilities (atomism) or a 
characteristic of an entire organization (holism).  
  
The majority of management literature concerned with the study of organizational 
memory as an attribute also considers it in an atomistic way. The six ‘storage bins’ model 
by Walsh and Ungson (1991) is an exemplification of this as it proposes a three-stage 
method for assessing and categorising organizational memory subject to its utility with 
regards to each of the storage bins - ‘successful firms would have retrieved past instances 
of their company’s responses to environmental shocks, evaluated their similarity or 
dissimilarity to deregulation, and then formulated a new strategy in this context’ (ibid: 79). 
The studies that followed, while not directly referring to the ‘storage bins’, did carry on 
the notion that organizational memory must be retained in some form of repository. For 
instance, Anand, Manz and Glick (1998: 800) spoke of individuals having to ‘locate 
information before accessing it from organizational memory’, while Olivera (2000) 
framed the problem of organizational memory in the language of systems, writing that 
‘memory systems are connected to each other through pointers to the location of knowledge 
in other systems’ (ibid: 826) and that organizational memory consists of ‘sets of knowledge 
retention devices, such as people and documents, that collect, store and provide access to 
the organization’s experience’ (ibid: 815). Similarly, Hargadon (2002) concluded that 
memories of cognitive, social and structural activities, when properly retained and 
retrieved, are of great benefit to organizational innovation. More recently, Akgun et al. 
(2014) mirrored these findings, albeit by means of introducing ‘emotional organizational 
memory’ as another attribute. 
  
A common theme running throughout this part of the literature is preservation of past 
knowledge, usually juxtaposed against potential repercussions of its loss (Gough, 2004; 
Jennex and Olfman, 2004; Stein and Zwass, 1995). It is then perhaps not at all unexpected 
that organizational memory as an attribute is studied in particularly atomistic ways 
within the field of organizational information communication technologies (ICT’s). This 
strand of literature places strong emphasis on the rational organization (Shrivastava et 
al., 1987) concerned primarily with the codification (Snyder and Cummings, 1998) and 
dissemination (Robertson and Hammersley, 2000) of past learnings by means, or with 
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significant aid of technology (Malhotra et al., 2005; Spender, 1996; Trevino, Daft, and 
Lengel, 1990; Wijnhoven, 1999). Interestingly, such ICT-induced consideration of 
organizational memory is a topic scarcely discussed in the more recent significant 
literature reviews in organization studies (e.g. Casey and Olivera, 2011; Langenmayr, 
2016; Rowlinson et al., 2010). While this may be in part because of poor compatibility 
with Olick’s (1998) classification of ‘social memory studies’ made popular by Rowlinson 
et al. (2010), literature on ICT-induced organizational memory is significant, numerous 
and composes the majority of those studies which adopt an atomist take on 
organizational memory as an attribute. 
  
A holistic approach to organizational memory as an attribute is distinct from an atomistic 
one described above. The studies grouped under this theme consider organizational 
memory as inseparable from the organization, even if still resource-like. Compared to the 
studies that approached organizational memory as a component attribute of the 
organization (atomism), the line of thinking to be presented below approached 
organizational memory as a dimension of that which makes an organization itself; albeit 
one that can be used for competitive advantage of sorts. Moorman and Miner (1997), for 
example, wrote that organizational memory is what gives organizational culture norms 
and values (p. 93), Boje (2008) spoke of storytelling, Wexler (2002) of intellectual capital, 
and Anteby and Molnar (2012) contemplated the role of memory in shaping 
organizational identity. Similarly, Langenmayr (2016) attempted to derive function of 
organizational memory from its relationship with time via decision-making. Accordingly, 
the attribute/holistic quadrant of the proposed categorisation is centred on those studies 
which still stress manageable utility of organizational memory, but consider it to be much 
less fragmented and far more integrated into the very idea of ‘organization’. 
  
Transactive memory systems (TMS) theory is one such example. While closely related to 
the ICT-induced view of organizational memory, TMS is based around the idea that 
individuals serve as external mnemonic aids to one another (Wegner, 1987). Structured 
around the ‘who knows what’ in the organization, a transactive memory system is built 
on the assumption that there is internal (individuals) and external (organization) 
memory. Teece (2007) anointed TMS a ‘cospecialized asset’, meaning that the value and 
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efficiency of a TMS is very much subject to how its constituent elements fit together. The 
core of TMS is, thus, its external aspect - the collective memory of ‘who knows what’ in 
an organization - not the individuals who do the knowing, as it were. A number of studies 
successfully demonstrated a link between transactive memory and group (and firm) 
performance (Faraj and Sproul, 2000; Hollingshead, 1998; Lewis, 2004; Liang, Moreland 
and Argote, 1995), especially in uncertain and rapidly changing environments (Lewis, 
Lange and Gillis, 2005; Ren, Carley and Argote, 2006). Schreyogg and Kliesch-Eberl 
(2007) and Rivkin (2000) noted that TMS can be very difficult to replicate across 
organizations due to its social complexity and organizational embeddedness and Argote 
and Ren (2012: 1380) further underscored this by observing that “because an 
organization’s transactive memory system develops through experience, is idiosyncratic to 
a particular organization and hard for outsiders to discern, it is a source of competitive 
advantage”. 
  
The emphasis on functional qualities of organizational idiosyncrasies is also mirrored by 
the narrative approach to organizational memory (Argote, 1999; Meindl et al., 1996; 
Sandelands and Stablein, 1987). Drawing direct lineage from Weick (1979) and his work 
on sensemaking, research on organizational memory narratives is generally concerned 
with those processes which create and recreate certain organizational capabilities 
following episodes of learning and change (Decker, 2014; Nissley and Casey, 2002; 
Sherman, 1999; Weick, 1979). Kruse (2003: 345), for instance, wrote that ‘while past 
events have the potential to constrain future or current learning, new structures and 
processes maybe created that allow for interpretations of data and events to be viewed in 
unique ways’. Bartel and Garud (2009: 114) further elaborated that “individuals translate 
narratives in ways that activate imagination about the future while drawing on both 
memory and current experience” thereby allowing organizations to ‘set an overall cultural 
infrastructure within which innovation emerges’, thus linking organization’s memory as 
functional narratives directly to its culture.      
  
Cook and Yanow (1993: 386) made a strong case for the role of organizational memory 
in ensuring the continuity of culture, which they acknowledged to be key to organizations 
instrumental ‘abilities to do what they know how to do’. The importance of providing such 
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ability was echoed by Wexler (2002: 402), who defined this kind of organizational 
memory as a ‘dynamic process that engaged an organizational culture in highly creative 
revision, modification and adaptation of the past to suit the needs and conditions of the 
present’. Similarly, but approaching from a different angle, Berthon, Pitt and Ewing 
(2001) suggested that organizational memory generates a more structured culture with 
age. They argued that the longer-lasting organizations produce more ‘extensive 
memories’ (ibid: 147) compared to their younger analogues, which has an effect of 
impregnating their cultures with a more routinized, technical disposition (as far as 
decision-making goes). The relationship between culture and memory in such instances, 
however, is generally not very nuanced – where organizational memory is employed as 
a cause for culture, as in Cook and Yanow (1993) for example, both the culture and the 
memory take on a homogenous, monolithic form and function relative to the 
organization. One result of this is that individuals at work ‘reconstitute’ (ibid: 385) the 
organization as a matter of course and little else. This is problematic because such an 
account neglects issues of normativity, contestation and irregular distribution of both 
memory and culture throughout the organization.    
  
The above section of the review demonstrates that there is a rich tradition in the 
literature to treat organizational memory as an attribute of the organization. The primary 
manifestations of this are notions of utility and function as well as retention and retrieval; 
both with respect to organizational performance. Equally, management is considered 
able and capable of making deliberate use of organizational memory, whether in order to 
develop or to deploy it. There is, however, a marked difference in the scope of 
organizational memory as an attribute. The atomistic take on organizational memory 
paints a picture of component parts, while the holistic one puts forward a view of 
memory as a single, organization-determining factor. The function of memory, in both 
cases, is to endure knowledge through time for the benefit of organizational performance. 
 
Both of these positions offer limited insight, albeit the latter less so, when it comes to 
talking about organizations as empirical and experiential phenomena. Organizational 
memory as an atomistic attribute of an organization is a naïve interpretative lens that 
relies on a mechanistic systems architecture type of memory where knowledge inputs 
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are codified and indexed in order to be retrieved later pending an appropriate 
environmental stimulus. Such a view of organizational memory rests on the assumption 
that memory is a perpetual record of the past and that organizations are monolithic, 
linearly designed bounded systems. Seminal work by Walsh and Ungson (1991), for 
example, is an illustration of this, where organizational memory closely follows the 
storage-retrieval model set in a compartmentalized organizational setting.  
 
Research under the memory as a holistic attribute of organization does a better job of 
presenting organizations in a more sophisticated way but even the more closely aligned 
to the practice view position of Cook and Yanow (1993) still offers limited insight into 
how a phenomenon such as organizational memory is empirically performed in a work 
setting. This is primarily because organizational memory explicitly conceptualized as a 
managerial tool leaves no room for contestation or non-managerial/anti-managerial 
aspects of organizational behaviour (Nissley and Casey, 2002).  
 
In both cases, conceptualization of organizational memory as an attribute of an 
organization raises some important questions about the remit of the idea. As an attribute, 
organizational memory is compartmentalized to a particular, managerial sphere of 
influence and, as a result, is restricted to a set of locations within the organization (Walsh 
and Ungson, 1991). Because the compartmentalization is thus inherently political, the 
scope of application is not only necessarily functional but also reserved to a narrow 
section of organizational members – usually managers. This is explicitly true for both 
atomistic and holistic views of organizational memory as an attribute. Where atomistic 
approaches are concerned, such groups include managers and other persons of power 
within the organization, whereas in the case of holistic approaches, the ability to deploy 
memory for the sake of achieving organizational goals is almost always something that 
only the very senior leaders are privileged to (unless there are strong unintended 
consequences to this activity, as in Bell (2012)).  
 
Furthermore, organizational memory as an attribute approaches make some significant 
assumptions about the relationship of information and knowledge to the passage of time. 
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Research under this category tends to press on the preservation of what is memorized 
through time, up to the point of retrieval (Kransdorff, 1998); in the case with culture, this 
takes form of simply maintaining course once a desired direction has been put in place 
within the organization. Time, when seen through this prism, is linear, quantifiable and 
unidirectional (Lee and Liebenau, 1999). When thought of in conjunction with what is 
the common subject of memory across attribute approaches, organizational memory as 
an attribute emerges as a function of organizational design the primary purpose of which 
is to codify and carry information and knowledge within it through time and until recalled 
by management.  
 
2.3.2 Organizational memory as a substance 
  
Not all research on organizational memory relevant to organization studies is of 
instrumental persuasion. There is a substantial stream of literature concerned with 
organizational and collective memory that works, if slightly off-centre with regards to 
management, around the idea that organizational memory is simply a by-product of any 
social order. A number of authors grouped under this category do still acknowledge the 
utility of organizational memory is certain circumstances, but they see this as a 
favourable outcome of that which is a substance of the organization, not an attribute. 
Rowlinson et al. (2010) group some of this research under the ‘social memory studies’ 
category of their classification; as does Olick (1998), albeit from a slightly more 
sociological perspective. However, as I outlined in the introduction to the Chapter, such 
way of positioning the literature is not particularly well-suited to understanding what 
organizational memory is - it is simply too broad and grants no special priority to the 
organization within its analytical budget. The attribute-substance/holism-atomism 
framework that I am proposing here is considerably more sensitive to both the role and 
form of the organization in question as well as to the scope of organizational memory 
itself. Also, the framework proposed here is specified for organization studies, having 
been synthesized from a systematic review of the literature - diverse management 
literature included - rather than borrowed from the field of culture studies. 
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The ‘social’ aspect of social memory studies primarily refers to the sociological roots of 
these corresponding lines of inquiry. Traditionally stemming from work of Maurice 
Halbwachs (1980) on Collective Memory, these studies understand memory as 
continuously (co-)constructed and reconstructed by individuals interacting with each 
other and with their socio-material environments (Corbett, 2000; van Dijck, 2007) - it is 
frequently described as a “representation of the past in a whole set of ideas, knowledge, 
cultural practices, rituals and monuments through which people express their attitudes to 
the past and which construct their relation to the past” (Misztal, 2003: 6), as well as an 
activity of constituting “groups and their members simultaneously in the act (thus re-
member-ing)” (Olick, 1999: 324). Most fundamentally, this line of thinking presents 
collective memory as rooted in the community. Halbwachs (1980), for instance, looked 
at how communities of people living in close proximity to one another would maintain, 
develop and socialize into a particular idea of who they were and how they would do the 
things they do. Accordingly, the object of memory is seen as something that is firmly 
rooted in the past and the activity of memory is mainly centred on subjects (the people) 
interpreting the object (the memory).  
 
Social memory studies gained considerable recognition and popularity over the last 
decade, with recent special issues (Cutcher et al., 2016; Rowlinson et al., 2014), specialist 
journals (Hoskins, 2009), and edited collections (Olick et al., 2011). At the same time, 
however, the object of inquiry progressively moved away from organizational memory 
in organizations to various forms of commemoration, remembering and history of 
organizations (e.g. Bell, 2012; Connerton, 1989; Guthey and Jackson, 2005; Decker, 2013; 
Mills et al., 2016). In other words, and rather paradoxically, social memory studies shift 
the analytical focal point away from an ‘organization’ and towards the individual whose 
understanding of organization is achieved through an interpretative lens of collective 
memory.  
  
Concerning understanding organizational memory from the practice-theoretical 
perspective, the category label of ‘social memory studies’ is unhelpful at best and 
restrictive at worst. Foss (2007: 33) noted that invoking the entire social into the 
question of memory “obscures important micro-mechanisms” and Hecker (2012: 425) 
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added that adjacent theories thus “lack a robust foundation and refrain from providing an 
explanatory link to the individual as a basic locus of knowledge and action”. While Feldman 
and Feldman (2006: 862) influentially argued that the first step in the direction of a 
“conceptualization of organizational remembering as a collective, culture and time-specific 
process and practice” requires theoretical departure from ‘organizational memory’ 
towards ‘organizational remembering’. These two critiques point to the overly broad 
focusing of the social memory studies lens – in neglecting dynamic micro-processes in 
favour of broad categories this approach is not positioned well to derive insight into 
collective memory on an organizational level, where idiosyncrasies and particulars 
matter more than generalizations.  
 
The distinction between ‘memory’ and ‘remembering’ is meant to highlight the 
processual nature of the phenomenon. Even with this in mind, it seems that there ought 
to be something more to it because, much like the more managerial take on memory as 
an attribute, a great deal of ‘social memory studies’ also deals only with consequences of 
what individual scholars take memory to be - whether organizational, collective or social. 
Furthermore, as pointed out by both Foss (2007) and Hecker (2012) above, the meaning 
and value of terms such as ‘social’ and ‘collective’ progressively depreciates as one moves 
from societal to organizational level of analysis. Moreover, it would be counter-
productive to disregard this emergent area of memory research on the basis that it is ‘too 
broad’. Thereby, in order to reconcile this theoretical conundrum in a way that will be 
useful to exploring what organizational memory actually is, I will ground the second 
category (of orientation) in the common denominator present across the three main 
areas of ‘social memory studies’: commemoration, remembering and history. 
  
Accordingly, the vast majority, if not all, of qualifying research considers memory as a 
substance of the organization/collective/social; where the substance refers to the 
essential nature underlying phenomena that are, otherwise, subject to variation. Thus, 
for example, in the case of organizations, memory is that substance which allows 
meanings from stories (Adorisio, 2014; Bell, 2012), rituals (Casey, 2000) and places and 
spaces (Beyes and Steyaert, 2013; Zhang et al., 2008) to continue through time - the 
substance refers neither to container nor information, but to a potential for memory in 
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activities and things. In the relevant literature it manifests as either atomistic (as 
particular acts or things - e.g. Connerton, 1989; Miller et al., 2012; Petani and Mengis, 
2016) or holistic (as ways of organizational ‘being/existence’ - e.g. Balmer and 
Burghausen, 2015; Luhmann, 1997; Schatzki, 2006). 
  
Scholarship on organizational memory as a substance expressed through particular acts 
and things is mainly focused around investigations of cultural and symbolic practices 
(Assmann, 2005; Guthey and Jackson, 2005; Maclean et al., 2014; Nora, 1989; Zerubavel, 
2003), as well as events and rituals (Ashley, 2016; Young, 1993) that develop a commonly 
shared understanding of the past between individuals (Boje, 1991, 2008; Cutcher et al., 
2016; Halbwachs, 1980; Ricoeur, 1974). For instance, in her research on sites of 
memorialization and objects of remembrance, Bell (2012) describes how one event 
(termination of a historic manufacturing site) generated a distinctly different 
interpretative lens through which organizational memory was to be made sense of. 
Ybema (2014), Willmott (2000) and Humphries and Smith (2014) offer similar findings 
from their respective works, whereas Decker (2013) highlights the role of competing and 
counter-dominant interpretations of memory. It is also noteworthy that these studies 
also bring forth the plurality of memories in and around organizations, highlighting that 
organizational memories, much like organizations, are not monolithic. 
  
With respect to narrative constructions of memory as a substance (as opposed to 
narratives-as-an-attribute view presented in the preceding section), Petani and Mengis 
(2016) show how narratives can import aspects of memory into not-yet-existing/future 
spaces and activities, and Patriotta (2003: 372) notes that stories “are prompts and 
reminders, collectors and transmitters of knowledge”, broadly echoing Rowlinson et al. 
(2014) as well as indirectly supporting propositions by Bruner (1986) and Brown and 
Duguid (1991) of narratives as a form of memory. Overall, these studies characteristically 
develop and carry forward original concepts of social memory as proposed by Halbwachs 
(1980), who outlined how communities of people would produce and reproduce 
particular memories based on their history, commemorative practices and material 
environments.  
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To be sure, while the studies introduced above, and others like them, extend our 
understanding of collective memory in broad and useful ways, they do so from a macro-
perspective (Foss, 2007). A micro-perspective is addressed by the Transactive Memory 
Systems (TMS) approach, which makes a brief reappearance here by way of 
organizational routines (Argote and Ren, 2012; Miller et al., 2012). While these do not 
represent organizational memory directly, it is through the remembering of routines that 
organizations enact their capabilities - “learning to perform a routine efficiently depends 
much more on the rate at which agents remember other agents’ skills than on their rate of 
remembering task sequences” (Miller et al., 2012: 1552). Accordingly, organizational 
memory is operationalized through the performance of routines. However, Essen (2008) 
suggested that both the performance and composition of routines is subject to 
organizational memory, meaning that routines are a subset of organizational memory. 
Mutch (2016: 1) further elaborated that routines “are not created ab initio but draw on 
existing templates, and that they are linked to broader bodies of ideas and resources which 
shape their form” thus reinforcing Essen’s (2008) point about organizational routines 
stemming from organizational memory and beyond. Accordingly, routines appear to be 
either a part, or an outcome, of organizational memory, but not organizational memory 
as such.   
  
Organizational memory as a substance with atomistic scope is still a nascent and, 
consequently, messy area of inquiry where a number of different concepts overlap 
between one another, as well as across disciplines. With the exception of research on 
organizational routines (Miller et al., 2012), this scholarship borrows heavily from 
sociology, anthropology and culture studies. Because of such multidisciplinary nature, 
the scholars concerned managed to import and uncover various valuable macro-level 
insights into the substance of collective memory. However, there is a marked absence of 
‘the organization’ in these works, even where specific organizational elements are put 
under scrutiny (e.g. Bell, 2012; Mutch, 2016; Suddaby, Foster and Trank, 2016). The 
result is lack of clarity and relevance with regards to how these forms of memory may 
(or may not) empirically manifest within organizations. 
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This is not the case with studies following holistic scope on organizational memory as a 
substance. While theoretical to a large degree, these works all but equate organization 
with organizational memory (Balmer and Burghausen, 2015; Cruz, 2014; Luhmann, 
1997, 2012; Schatzki, 2006, 2012). In addition to still maintaining the importance of past 
decisions, experiences and knowledge to the continued existence of the organization, an 
added emphasis is placed on what effect these characteristics have concerning 
determining potential future states of the organization. For instance, in her study of 
informal credit organizations in Liberia, Cruz (2014) empirically illustrates how specific 
events from the past virtually pre-determined organizational form and conduct in the 
present and into the future. A similar message comes from Balmer and Burghausen 
(2015), who focused on effects that organizational heritage has on how organizations 
interpret themselves through their members. These two works highlight the force with 
which organizational memory may launch the organization on a very particular 
trajectory. An important factor there, as the authors repeatedly argue, is that 
organizations identify with their memories. To a large extent this involves processes and 
practices that give rise to and maintain the memories in question, but there is also much 
to be said for how organizational memory ‘protects’ itself by means of legitimising only 
compatible information and action - what Cruz (2014: 458) terms the “circuitous 
approach”. 
  
The theme of self-reconstitution is found elsewhere in the literature on organizational 
memory too. Niklas Luhmann (1997, 2012) referred to this organizational property using 
a metaphor for a self-replicating system from biology - autopoiesis. Unlike Balmer and 
Burghausen (2015) and Cruz (2014), Luhmann’s understanding of organizations did not 
necessarily extend to include human agents capable of individual, cognitive memory. 
Instead, conceiving of organizational memory as “system’s presence of the past and 
oscillation of the system’s presence of the future” (Luhmann, 1997: 364), the issue of 
continuity through time was framed as a matter of communication and, specifically, 
communicated decisions. By this line of reasoning, organizations are systems of 
communication that are distinguished from their environment, as well as one another, on 
the basis of the form of networks in which said communication becomes arranged 
(Luhmann, 2012). The role of organizational memory is, thus, to maintain these 
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arrangements in spite of an almost infinite quantity and variety of external information 
and decisions impacting the organization at any given point in time. Organizational 
memory achieves this by means of constructing, interpreting and defining the past and 
the future state of the organization with respect to its current present. Using sequences 
of conversations collected from an R&D department of an entertainment business, 
Langenmayr (2016) empirically demonstrates how the organization continuously 
switches between the two temporal states on daily basis. The ongoing repetition of this 
process is what allows the organization - a network of communicated decisions - to 
‘oscillate’ between the two temporal states in a consistent pattern. The process of 
oscillation is closely related to organizational identity, identification and the making 
sense of things (Luhmann, 2012: 49). 
  
Luhmann (1997, 2012) presents some interesting consequences of such a way of 
conceptualising organizational memory. Determination of the past and the future state 
of the entire organization, and the oscillation between the two, places organizational 
memory in a position where its primary function is to maintain the distinction between 
the organization and its environment at the expense of all non-compatible information. 
This is achieved by essentially ignoring all new information that may be coming into the 
system in so far as possible. In other words, for Luhmann (1997, 2012), organizational 
memory is a way of not distracting the organization from its predetermined end goal.         
  
Another approach to the pursuit of holistic understanding of organizational memory as a 
substance is proposed by Schatzki (2006). In his work on teleology of practice, Schatkzi 
(2006: 1868) conceptualizes organizational memory as an ongoing performance in 
relation to the broader “practice memory”. First, organizational memory is 
conceptualized as “the persistence of organization structure from the past into the present 
together with the complex of actions, thoughts, experiences, abilities, and readinesses” (ibid: 
1870) which “contains potential activity pasts and futures beyond the pasts and futures of 
its actual actions. The totality of these is not open to every or even to any single member of 
the organization. Rather, different pasts and futures are open to different members 
depending on such matters as status, experience, abilities, current position in objective time 
or in space, and the people with whom and in relation to whom a person acts” (ibid: 1872). 
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A similar approach is taken by Linde (2008), who demonstrated how the practice of 
organizational memory was performed by employees of a large insurance company. 
Unlike Schatzki (2006, 2012), however, Linde (2008) focused on the relationship 
between collective memory and institutions, specifically discussing institutional 
memory. Institutional memory is related to the concept of practice memory. That being 
said, practice memory is a less structured and more materially-determined shade of 
collective memory than institutional memory as per Linde (2008). Furthermore, unlike 
practice memory, where the binding agent is performative action, Linde’s take on 
institutions is bounded to memory via identity (ibid: 4). 
  
Thus, in contrast to Luhmann’s (1997, 2012) systems understanding of organizational 
memory, the teleology of practice approach substitutes determinacy of past and future 
with a purpose - the that-towards-which (Heidegger, 1978; Schatzki, 2006, 2010, 2012) 
- of organizational work. Additionally, the social fabric which organization is made of is 
distinctly non-monolithic for Schatzki, even if still holistic in its general scope. Finally, 
where the role of memory for Luhmann (1997, 2012) was to maintain distinction of 
organization from its environment, the teleology of practice recognizes a significantly co-
constructive relationship between the organization and the broader practices; where 
practice memory is understood as “the persistence of the structure of a practice. Its 
content, this structure, is a complex of practical understandings, rules, teleological 
orderings, and general understandings. This memory is also a feature of the practice 
involved, not an aggregation of features of participants in it, for instance an aggregation of 
individual memories” (ibid: 1869) and it is related to organizational memory, 
conceptually, in the same way as a universal is related to a particular - practice memory 
is not involved with organizational memory, but organizational memory is always 
involved with practice memory (much in the same way as the relationship between 
institutional memory and identity works for Linde (2008)). 
  
Research presented in this section of the review is varied and, at times, disparate 
(especially when compared to the studies under ‘organizational memory as an attribute’ 
section). That being said, despite the proliferation of interdisciplinary work and 
borrowing from sociology, anthropology and cultural studies, the research outlined 
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above revolves around one central notion - that organizational memory is an irremovable 
substance of an organization and a necessary (by-)product of organized social activity. 
There is certainly much less emphasis on the functional value of memory among these 
works. Indeed, organizational memory is treated as an inevitable fact of organizational 
and collective being. As such, organizational memory is not as much a managerial tool as 
it is a distinguishing factor of the working environment.  
 
Unlike the memory as an attribute approach, studies under the substance category do not 
follow many of the same assumptions. The subject of memory, for example, is not limited 
to information and knowledge, but also includes more phenomenal issues, such as 
identity and normativity. Furthermore, the relationship of memory with time is not 
necessarily linear. Schatzi (2006), for one, demonstrates this through the notion of 
teleology, where decisions made in the past are not stored as units of information but will 
rather impact any decision made in the present and in the future. Additionally, both 
Schatzki (2006) and Linde (2008) introduce additional level of complexity to 
organizational memory – practice and institutional memory respectively. These help 
account for extra-organizational processes that describe how individuals learn the 
practice extraneously of the organization and, by extension, why there may be uneven 
distribution of not only memory among the individuals but also different interpretations 
of memory. Unfortunately, neither Schatzki (2006) nor Linde (2008) develop this 
fundamental issue in sufficient detail, nor do they attempt to draw distinction between 
practice/institutional memory and organizational memory. This latter point is especially 
important because it is hardly meaningful to speak of organizational memory without a 
sufficiently clear understanding of how organizational memory relates to practice 
memory.  
  
  
2.4 SUMMARY 
  
In this chapter, I endeavoured to offer a different way of interpreting the body of 
literature behind the concept of organizational memory. Organizational memory is not a 
well-defined theory or even a commonly understood idea, which makes it particularly 
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sensitive to the interpretative lens. Based on the review of the literature along the lines 
of orientation and scope of the concept, certain assumptions about organizational 
memory came to light. These are the key components found throughout the entire body 
of scholarship, even where the terminology is different; and they include questions of 
location of memory, purpose of memory, relationship between memory and temporality, 
as well as the function of memory is organizations. 
 
One of the aspirations for this literature review has been to learn as much as possible 
about the different aspects of organizational memory in order to not only identify 
limitations of various existing literatures, but also to identify the pervasive themes and 
questions found across all these studies. Of these, there are five:  
 
1. What is ‘organizational memory’ a conceptual construct of?  
2. What is the subject of memory?  
3. What is the location of organizational memory?  
4. What is the role of organizational memory in the organization?  
5. How is time to be thought of?  
   
These five questions, distilled from the review of all the studies presented above, form 
the core of thinking about organizational memory. To illustrate, I will apply the five 
questions to Walsh and Ungson’s (1991) seminal work, allocated to the 
atomism/attribute quarter of the typology (Table 2.2). In their work, organizational 
memory is a conceptual construct of the continuity of organizational characteristics 
through time; the subject of memory is information; the location is spread across the five 
repositories (also known as ‘bins’); the role is to contribute to the competitive advantage 
either by means of cutting waste or accelerating innovation and decision making; and the 
relationship with time is linear in form and Newtonian in nature. The end product of 
asking the five questions of Walsh and Ungson’s work is a clear representation of their 
understanding of organizational memory. 
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To apply the same treatment to Schatzki’s (2006) work on the teleology of practice will 
yield the following results: organizational memory is a conceptual construct of a 
persisting structure around which individuals re-enact their organization and practice 
anew every time; the subject of memory is practice; the location of memory is in patterns 
of action; the role is teleology; and the relationship with time is non-linear, with an 
emphasis on the present and the future. The end product is a picture of organizational 
memory that is not as concerned with the events of the past and far more entwined with 
the everyday regimes of activities within (and outside of) the organization.    
  
In this respect, the ideas espoused by Schatzki (2006) are not only significantly under-
explored and in need of empirical validation, but are also more interesting by virtue of 
presenting a categorically different understanding of organizational memory, its function 
and its place within time and among space. Next chapter will consider Schatzki’s (2006) 
ideas in more detail.  
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Chapter 3 
 
THEORETICAL POINT OF DEPARTURE 
  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter is going to develop a theoretical point of departure, based on the works by 
Schatzki (2006) Heidegger (1978) and Whitehead (1920, 1929). The literature review 
provided a comprehensive basis on which to make this decision, and, subject to the brief 
summary of key components outlined there, this thesis will proceed with an empirical 
investigation broadly inspired by Schatzki’s (2006) work on teleology of practice. I will, 
specifically focus on dissecting and exploring the definition of organizational memory 
and its relation to practice memory.  
  
In terms of scope and detail, Schatzki (2006) supplies a useful distinction between 
memory of practice and of organization. This is one of the key contributions of his work, 
as it grants explanation for why not all organizations that perform the same practice are 
homogenous. Equally, the practice/organization distinction explains how organizations 
with very distinct ways of structuring work process can bear a significant degree of 
similarity to one another (also Kravcenko, 2015). Methodologically, this presents a 
challenge with respect to determining what organizational memory is and what practice 
memory is. Practices exist in nested relations to one another as well as to the spaces and 
places of their occurrence (Czarniawska, 2007; Gherardi, 2012). If organizations are 
assemblages of practices (Schatzki, 2012; Nicolini, 2012), then how does practice 
memory become organizational memory? What is the relationship between practice and 
organizational memory?  These questions will be the focus of the next Chapter, where I 
am going to refine and substantiate Schatzki’s (2006) proposed definition of 
organizational memory using empirical data. 
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Concerning methodological advantages afforded by selecting Schatzki (2006) as an 
interpretative lens, his intrinsically Heideggerian approach to practice view foregrounds 
embodiment of practices, materiality of work and the situational space within which 
practices occur (Schatzki, 1997, 2006, 2010, 2012). While I will develop these points in 
Chapter 5, it is worth noting here why it is worthwhile sensitizing this study to those 
elements. The embodied view of practices places emphasis on the physicality of the 
practitioner, which not only grants explanatory space to the body and its experiences of 
and interactions with the material environment, but also secures the individuality of the 
practitioner within an otherwise social world of practices (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 
2002). This is methodologically significant, as the primary tool of ethnographic research 
is the embodied researcher. To come into the architectural practice and immerse oneself 
into its regimes of activities means, primarily, to undertake an embodied experience of 
what it is like to be an architect. Consequently, a theoretical lens that allows for 
understanding of embodiment in the workplace is highly beneficial. 
 
With regards to the materiality of work, one of the points of mutual agreement among 
the scholars adherent to the practice-theoretical approach is that practices are materially 
mediated (Nicolini and Monteiro, 2016; Nicolini, 2012; Schatzki, 2002, 2012). Much 
previous research into organizational memory, as was outlined in the review above, 
places a degree of emphasis on the role materiality plays in facilitating this organizational 
characteristic. Research further afield also recognizes the importance of materiality to 
organizational life and work (e.g. Latour, 2005). My own work on boundary objects 
(Kravcenko and Swan, 2016) highlighted the overarching effect of material objects on the 
way individuals engage in collective work. It is thus appropriate to sensitize this study to 
the materiality of work by drawing on Schatzki’s (2006) thoughts about organizational 
and practice memory. 
 
Finally, an interesting point of view afforded by Schatzki (1997, 2002, 2006) as a 
theoretical choice for this thesis, is the conception of the practice as the site of the social. 
This is a philosophical position that situates practices within social activities and social 
activities within the material practices. It is particularly intriguing with respect to 
organizational memory, as Schatzki’s approach, developed from Heideggerian 
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philosophy, gives space for distinct practices to cause distinct memories, even within the 
context of the same organization. To the best of my knowledge, such flexibility is not 
currently well-developed in any of the fields concerned with collective memory.      
   
 
 3.2 INTRODUCTION TO KEY PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN STUDYING 
ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY AS A PRACTICE 
  
Philosophical foundations underlying research into organizational memory are not 
discussed as frequently as they, perhaps, ought to be given the abstract nature of the 
concept (notable exceptions are Schatzki (2006) and Luhmann (1997, 2012)). Because a 
key area of concern for empirical inquiry is how to operationalize this abstract concept, 
the two should not come at the expense of each other and a sound and coherent 
philosophical underpinning should really be articulated where something as intangible 
as organizational memory is concerned (Bacharach, 1989; Sandberg, 2005). Additionally, 
a sound philosophical foundation provides something of a semantic vocabulary for the 
benefit of the reader, clarifying linguistic concepts and meanings and allowing for further 
development by subsequent scholars (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011, 2013). 
  
While it may be less important to delve into philosophy when the object of study is 
tangible and/or readily observable (i.e. out there in the world for all to see), 
organizational memory does not afford such unmediated access to itself. In fact, 
organizational memory affords no unmediated access to the researcher. While the 
definitions vary (see Chapter 2), organizational memory is most akin to a relation 
between information generating processes and practices and a temporal collocation of 
people and objects. It is a conceptual construct and must be considered as such. The issue 
is further compounded by the very real possibility that as far as direct enquiry is 
concerned, organizational memory is not likely to be found to exist in an unambiguous 
way. What is it then? As I have briefly mentioned in the preceding Chapter, organizational 
memory has been used first and foremost as a metaphor to account for the apparent 
continuity of particular organizational processes that resemble characteristics normally 
attributed and experienced by humans through their individual memories. More 
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specifically, these processes centred around 1) ability of organizational members to build 
on the work performed in the organization in the past and 2) continuity through time in 
organization despite change in their constituent parts (individuals, artefacts and spaces). 
To this end, organizations were endowed with the ability to recall previous experiences 
and information, simultaneously granting them quasi-independent information-
processing properties characteristic of human cognition or mechanistic information-
processing. 
  
Organizational memory as a conceptual construct raises a number of issues to be 
addressed in order for a meaningful discussion and investigation to ensue. These issues 
have been surfaced from the literature review at the end of Chapter 2: 
  
●    What is ‘organizational memory’ a conceptual construct of? In other words, 
which organizational phenomenon is being explained when the term is used. 
●   What is the subject of memory? Is organizational memory a conduit for 
information, knowledge, experiences or some combination of the three? This 
depends on how the three are to be defined, but as I have briefly outlined in the 
previous Chapter, the distinction between information and experiences can be 
roughly traced along the lines of memory as a repository versus social memory. 
Knowledge can present yet another dimension here when it is understood beyond 
the traditional ‘true, justified belief’ definition (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001). 
●    What is the location of organizational memory? Is location the function of 
pooling individual memories, as is the case with the transactive memory systems, 
or is it literally ‘in the organization’. Following from the previous point on the 
subject of memory, this issue bears significant methodological consequences to 
any empirical study of organizational memory. In a basic sense, if, on the one hand, 
organizational memory is to be taken as a form of collective application of 
individual memories, then people become the focus of study; if, on the other hand, 
organizational memory is to be taken to be in the organization proper, then things 
such as ICT’s and data repositories take centre stage. 
●    What is the role of organizational memory in the organization? This concerns 
such questions as whether organizational memory is a supportive capacity to 
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learning and competing, a central driving and defining force that makes an 
organization what it is, or is it simply a record of past events. 
●    How is time to be thought of? Because organizational memory, indeed any kind 
of memory, is meaningful only in conjunction with time, a clear understanding of 
the nature of temporality is important. For instance, attribute/atomism theories 
of the kind I outlined in Chapter 2, rely heavily on the Newtonian understanding 
of time, which allows information to be embedded in a ‘time capsule’ repository 
and carried forward unaltered until such a point in the future when it may be 
required once again. Conversely, the understanding of time common across 
substance/holism theme is closer to the ‘lived time’ approach. This perspective 
allows phenomenal and social experiences to shape both the content (by means 
of alterations) and meanings (by means of interpretations) of that which is to be 
remembered; as well as perceived chronological durations (Bluedorn and 
Denhardt, 1988; Liebenau and Lee, 1999; Kravcenko and Morrell, 2015). 
  
The issues highlighted above represent broad categories each of which can be further 
subdivided into a number of subcategories and sub-questions. They have been arrived at 
following literature review in Chapter 2. Insofar as the scope of this thesis is concerned, 
these questions underpin the key methodological challenges. The thinking that went into 
these questions was also instrumental in deciding on the onto-epistemological position 
of this study. Most importantly though, it highlighted distinct anthropocentrism 
permeating existing literature on the subject 
  
Traditional onto-epistemological approaches to the study of management do not fare 
well in answering the above questions without reverting to either a strongly naturalist 
or a highly relativist position. On the one hand, in using the term naturalism I refer to the 
tradition within social sciences that expects the study of the social to resemble the study 
of subjects such as physics or chemistry - where the whole equals the sum of its parts. 
Note that while such an approach is inherently positivist, it does not mean that every 
positivist approach is inherently naturalist. Positivism properly understood is a 
philosophical position geared towards observing fundamental laws and principles of the 
phenomenon under study. In a broad sense positivism is a rejection of metaphysics, a 
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conviction that all knowledge is derived from empirical research of the commonly 
accessible phenomena. As such, it can very well be applied to interpretative as well as, if 
to a lesser extent, phenomenological research. This thesis too draws on a positivist 
philosophy in a very basic sense, albeit diverges from it considerably in a methodological 
realm. On the other hand, in using the term interpretivism I refer broadly to social 
constructivism and subjectivism, both of which, when taken to their limits, result in 
relativism of varying amplitude (subject to unit of analysis). Interpretivism, commonly 
understood, is a general term for neo-Kantian opposition to the application of naturalist 
research methods to the social realm. On an onto-epistemological level, however, 
interpretivism differs little from subjectivism with distinction being that interpretivism 
requires there to be something to be interpreted, while subjectivism leans towards 
solipsism. 
  
In order to illustrate how this works with regards to organizational memory, I shall 
consider the recent work of Anteby and Molnar (2012) who called for integration of 
organizational memory with organizational identity. Their argument, that identities 
construct memories (also Nora, 1996), also carries with it an implicit assumption that a 
way of thinking alone determines the content of (and access to) organizational memory. 
Accordingly, this means that organizational memory is a choice of the subject of thereof; 
whether a choice of interpretation or an effort of cognition. What this means is that, 
according to Anteby and Molnar (2012), two mutually exclusive aspects follow: 1) that 
organizational memory is holistic and accessed by means of particular ways of thinking 
about it (i.e. transcendental approach), and 2) that organizational memory is a product 
of individual consciousness only. In other words, is organizational memory something 
(note the reference to a static ‘thingness’) individuals partake in, or is it entirely in 
individuals’ minds? Neither is particularly helpful in delivering a coherent set of answers 
to the philosophical issues of organizational memory outlined above because, in the case 
of the former, existence of organizational memory is speculative and, in the case of the 
latter, unmediated empirical access to individual cognitions is not possible. In a similar 
manner, much of the literature adopts a pragmatic approach infused with elements of 
either interpretivism or subjectivism (or both) to explain and describe effects and 
properties of those characteristics of individual memories reflected in collective 
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processes. While, as I have mentioned before, this results in some fascinating social 
science, adopting a pragmatic approach to a phenomenon as broad and poorly defined as 
organizational memory does limited justice to it. 
  
A different way of thinking about organizational memory and its constituents is by 
observing what does organizational memory mean to those concerned with it directly. 
Numerous studies have shown that organizational memory, defined as per their 
respective modes of inquiry, either constitutes an organization by means of culture or 
identity, or is a major asset of it in terms of providing knowledge-based competitive 
advantage (or a limitation where it is faulty – see Chapter 2). There are, of course, 
significant differences between the two, but the two things all the scholarship on the 
subject agrees on is that individual organizational members (i.e. people) have the ability 
to access organizational memory in one way or another, and that organizational memory 
is a way to bring the past to bear upon the present and/or future of collective 
organizational work. Because individuals have access to organizational memory, either 
as a resource or as a collective accomplishment, they (we) are a natural focal point for a 
study of organizational memory. Such study, however, need not take the much critiqued 
here anthropocentric model, where collective memory is modelled on individual 
memory. Instead, it can take a phenomeno-centric approach, where organizational 
memory is studied in so far as it appears as something meaningful to those concerned 
with it. 
  
 
3.3. PRACTICE THEORY ANCHORED IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MARTIN 
HEIDEGGER 
  
An ontological position well suited for considering social phenomenon through the 
perspective of meaning is phenomenology. In this work I will adopt phenomenology of 
Martin Heidegger, outlined in a series of lectures preceding and following the publication 
of Being and Time (1926/1978), as well as in the book itself, as a guiding ontology. 
Heidegger is one of the most prominent philosophers of practice, having drawn attention 
to a deeply fundamental way in which individuals make sense of activities and materiality 
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(Braver, 2013; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2015). To achieve an empirically grounded 
understanding of how organizational memory, as a phenomenon, is experienced by those 
concerned with it, I will draw on the post-humanist variety of practice view grounded in 
the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (e.g. Schatzki, 2002, 2006, 2012 and Nicolini, 2011, 
2012). I will operationalize this thinking into research l by means of phenomenologically-
infused ethnography. In this section I will describe what that entails, what Heideggerian 
phenomenology is, as well as how it is different from phenomenology traditionally 
understood (i.e. following Husserl (Husserl and Welton, 1999).  
  
Phenomenology is traditionally understood as the study of structures of consciousness 
as experienced by the individual. Individual experience is structured around 
intentionality in being directed at something it is an experience of. This directedness is a 
function of the experiential content or meaning - which represents the object - combined 
with appropriate enabling conditions for it (Husserl and Welton, 1999). Such 
phenomenology is geared towards answering the question of ‘how and why am I 
predisposed to experiencing things/events in a particular way’ (for a detailed discussion 
see Holt and Sandberg, 2011). 
  
By contrast, Heideggerian phenomenology rejects the role of consciousness in the human 
experience, arguing that the focus on consciousness is misleading (Dreyfus, 1991). It is 
much closer related to the idea of intersubjectivity than traditional phenomenology, 
where the primary concern is with cognitive experiences and schemas of individual 
agents (Sandberg, 2005). The reason for this is because inclusion of the concept of 
consciousness in the phenomenological process inevitably generates a subject-predicate 
dualism that separates individuals from their environments and, indeed, from 
themselves. Where consciousness is part of phenomenology, experiences and meanings 
become the objects of consciousness (thus reverting to subject-object dualism). Because 
the purpose of phenomenology is to analyze human experience in absence of subject-
object dualisms, Heidegger believed that using the concept of ‘cognition’ was not only 
irrelevant but also counterproductive (Braver, 2013). 
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Heideggerian phenomenology, while difficult, concerns itself with very concrete human 
experiences. Following the outline of the world as per the terminology above, the 
following picture emerges: 
  
●    Individuals care about their efforts and prospects; 
●    Accordingly, they do their best to interpret, construct and understand the world 
they find themselves in; 
●    Part of that activity involves putting the world to use in order to accomplish the 
aims and goals individuals care about, whether directly or indirectly; 
●    As individuals put the world to use as equipment, they engage in learning and 
knowing; 
●    Such learning and knowing, however, is largely shaped by where in the world they 
find themselves in. 
  
Such characterisation of the human experience is not uncommon, especially within the 
broad spectrum of practice view where matters such as social order, knowledge, 
institutions, identity and power result from, and transpire through, practices and their 
configurations (Nicolini, 2012). However, as Dall’Alba and Sandberg (2014) duly note 
with regards to how particular studies make use of the practice view, it is not uncommon 
for philosophy and application to diverge at the point of methodology when it comes to 
empirical data collection and analysis. Drawing on the work of Heidegger, with its 
emphasis on the holistic aspect of human experience, is thus further appropriate in order 
to maintain integrity between philosophy, methods and analysis.  
  
 
3.3.1 Applying Heideggerian phenomenology of practice to the 
conceptualization of organizational memory. 
  
In terms of answering the key methodological questions of researching organizational 
memory based on the practice-theoretical perspective, Heideggerian phenomenology 
provides the following answers. These answers represent the boundaries for the thinking 
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in this work, just as they were identified to form the boundaries of thinking during the 
review of literature in Chapter 2. 
  
What is ‘organizational memory’ a conceptual construct of? While Heidegger does 
not explicitly write about organizations, collectives or the memory of either, he does 
mention individual memories. Because the exploration of organizational memory must 
begin with the concerned individuals, this is sufficient. According to Heidegger, memory, 
in its original sense, is not just a thinking or recalling of past events - it is a thinking about 
what one is engaged in simultaneously with thinking of past, future and now. In light of 
Heidegger’s preoccupation with the question of Being, this means that individual 
memory is a thinking about work compounded by thinking about individual experiences 
and aspirations which impregnate this work with meaning (or lack of thereof). 
  
However, despite such thinking being performed by individuals, the environment within 
which it occurs is not individual. Thinking about work is largely external, being subject 
to the objects and materiality available to the individual. I shall refer to this as first-order 
thinking. Thinking about experiences and aspirations is the thinking of work that has 
generated meaning previously. Such thinking, a second order thinking, is what shapes the 
sensitivity of individuals to find certain objects and event meaningful. The two things 
combined generate a state of heeding that which transpires in the present. Memory is 
then a situation that humans inhabit - it is a form of activity. 
  
This is a crucial point from which I can depart to understand the relationship between 
individual memory and collective memory. Because individual memory is an activity 
performed within the allowance afforded by the environment (i.e. materiality) of where 
it is performed, both the individuals and the organizations share the environment in 
common. Thus, the question of what organizational memory is a construct of, is answered 
in terms of environments conducive to activities of memory, which are of concern of the 
organization/collective. In other words, organizational memory may be understood as a 
function of the environment of work. The notion of concern is a cornerstone of 
Heideggerian philosophy and of Schatzki’s (2002; 2006; 2012) interpretation of practice 
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view within organization studies domain. Here I prefer the term ‘meaning’ to ‘concern’, 
but the two can be used interchangeably unless otherwise specified. 
  
What is the subject of organizational memory? In the existing literature the subject of 
organizational memory can be broadly characterized as tools. With the exception of 
transactive memory systems, where the subject is a group of individuals, organizational 
memory is described in the context of either the technology that facilitates or inhibits 
preservation of knowledge through time and space, or in the context of stories and other 
such methods that assist in constructing and maintaining a particular interpretative lens 
(organizationally desirable or otherwise). 
  
On the other hand, considering the subject of organizational memory from a 
phenomenologically inspired practice theory, such as the one broadly proposed by 
Schatzki (1997; 2002; 2006; 2012) on the basis of Heideggerian philosophy, is misleading 
because of the rejection of Cartesian dualism. Individuals exist in the world amongst the 
things in the world, and the relationship between the two is recursively emergent. An 
Aristotelian concept of hylomorphism may be useful in giving better form to this 
particular matter, so to speak (Normore, 2007). 
  
Hylomorphism postulates that the separation between subject and object (the inner and 
the outer) is negotiated through form. For Heidegger, form is understood as substantial 
form - that which makes matter (objects) intelligible to individuals (subjects) through 
activity of using equipment in the world (morphism). Thus, the subject-predicate 
distinction so readily available in the current literature on organizational memory 
transforms, in light of Heideggerian view of practice, into a holistic activity of making 
sense of the work through using objects (note that this is not to be understood as a 
technical term ‘sensemaking’ (Weick, 1995)). The subject of organizational memory, to 
return to the initial question, is work. 
  
What is the location of organizational memory? In Chapter 2, I outlined what are some 
of the locations organizational memory has been observed to inhabit. Walsh and Ungson 
(1991) have done a particularly good job of identifying the ‘retention bins’ where 
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organizational memory of different kinds may be found. Casey and Olivera (2011), in 
their literature review, suggest that the discussion of location of organizational memory 
shifted from organization to process in the early 2000’s. The qualification of these 
processes ranged from people interacting with one another (Corbett, 2000) to the more 
contemporary theory on organizational routines (Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 
2003). Much of this work, however, resembled what Schwartz (2005) referred to as 
commemorative symbolism - a coming together of individuals to identify and shape 
patterns from organizational memory in order to meet the needs of the present. 
  
What is the role of organizational memory in the organization? Existing literature, 
as was highlighted in Chapter 2, frequently emphasizes utility as the major role of 
organizational memory in organizations. The qualification of utility largely depends on 
whether a study follows the ‘memory as an attribute’ tradition as set out by Walsh and 
Ungson (1991), or the ‘memory as a substance’ tradition that largely follows the work of 
Halbwachs (1992). Either way, there is a something that organizational memory is meant 
to accomplish, be it competitive advantage via a resource route or organizational 
cohesion via the organizational culture or identity route.  
  
Within Heideggerian philosophy the role of organizational memory is more akin to 
‘Aletheia’ and/or ‘Clearing’. Organizational memory, as all else that human beings 
concern themselves with, is an activity. However, it is different from most other activities 
by not being directly concerned with any specific end. This is because organizational 
memory is not a type of equipment but, as Heidegger would put it, a type of Clearing. 
Because organizational memory is both intangible and, as a generality, interpersonal it is 
neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand; rather it is a different way in which work can 
present itself in organizations. 
  
Consider a situation depicted by the image below (Figure 3.1). This is a photograph of 
myself and a Senior Architect taken by another Architect while visiting a building site of 
Case 1 on an early morning. On the surface level this is no more than a photograph of two 
people, one of whom is wearing a reflective vest with a logo of a construction company 
(blurred for anonymity). In other words, this is meaningless without further information. 
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If one were to know my role and activity at the time the photograph was taken, a memory 
of ArchitectureCo as an organization that partook in a scientific study may begin to 
emerge. 
  
If one were to continue with investigating the picture beyond that and were find a report 
and two presentations that I compiled for ArchitectureCo, one may begin to build 
competitive advantage based on very specific and very in-depth information contained 
in those artefacts. Hypothetically, my findings and suggestions about the role of objects 
and power contained in those artefacts could be built upon to develop novel (to 
ArchitectureCo) procedures and practices for knowledge-sharing. This could constitute 
competitive advantage and the photograph could become part of it within the 
organizational memory. 
  
A hypothetical situation such as this, describing main existing approaches to 
organizational memory (very generally), would be considered quite differently from the 
standpoint of Heideggerian phenomenology of practice. Assume all of the above to hold 
true and consider that organizational memory as ‘not-equipment’ practice would look 
like. Emphasizing the importance of ‘meaning’ to Heidegger, a person finding the 
photograph above would partake in performing organizational memory if: 1) the image 
was meaningful to them in any, even the most irrelevant, way, and 2) they would engage 
in organizational work (i.e. work towards organizational purposes) as a result. Thus, a 
person finding this image but having no knowledge of any people in the photograph may 
get inspired by the way a metal pole barrier is set up to follow the red brick road, for 
example, and implement such a design feature in whatever hypothetical project they may 
be working on at that point in time. The reason why such a hypothetical chain of events 
would constitute organizational memory is threefold: 1) the individual in question is part 
of the organization (i.e. Being-in-the-world, Thrownness, Aletheia); 2) s/he is using 
equipment esoteric to the organization (i.e. Equipment, Present-at-hand, Ready-to-hand; 
Thrownness); 3) the resultant activity is for the sake of organizational purposes (i.e. Care; 
Clearing). 
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Figure 3.1. An example of organizational memory artefact 
 
By placing an emphasis on primacy and emergent nature of meaning combined with 
Thrownness, Heideggerian phenomenology of practice does away with one persistent 
paradigm found in all of current literature on organizational memory - that which has 
been memorized has to keep a direct link to that which is to be remembered. Such an 
algorithmic perception of the role that individuals play in collective action prevents 
development of more complex theory of organizational memory. There is no 
demonstrable reason why objects and equipment, concepts and information circulating 
around the organization has to bear something like a one-to-one relationship to the 
meaning it is impregnated with; it is certainly not how actual human memory or 
experience works (Parkin, 1997).   
  
How is time to be thought of? Time and temporality is simultaneously a key and a 
disposable concept in the research on organizational memory. It is the former because 
no conception of memory (or practice, for that matter - Hernes, 2014; Sandberg and 
Tsoukas, 2015) is meaningful without time, and it is the latter because it is extremely 
difficult to present anything but a linear narrative in the form of an academic text. 
Nevertheless, time is not to be swept under the page, so I will take the time to describe 
what a theory of time consistent with the Heideggerian phenomenology of practice would 
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look like. It will then be up to the reader to, very kindly, keep this notion in mind while 
reading the remainder of the work. 
  
Time, as a concept, can provide a useful backdoor to understanding memory. This applies 
to both existing literature and to this thesis. For instance, the two common perspectives 
on time, Newtonian time and lived time, can be neatly correlated to the two main 
perspectives on organizational memory – memory as an attribute models that resemble 
and/or follow Walsh and Ungson (1991), and memory as a substance interpretations that 
resemble and/or follow Halbwachs (1992) and Olick (1999). 
  
In the case of the former, memory is an attribute of the organization that is carried 
forward through linear time until such point that it can be deployed for the benefit of 
organizational goals. In order for this to be so, two assumptions have to be in place: 1) 
linear uniformity of time independent of anything else, and 2) memory can be embedded 
into some form of materiality, which, in turn, can occupy a space in time (Lee and 
Liebenau, 1999; Starkey, 1989). Interestingly, this view of time is so firmly entrenched in 
management thought far beyond matters of memory that it has been the basis for 
scientific management of F.W. Taylor and his followers. Indeed, whether it is the 
repository model, the transactive memory systems model or the codification model 
popular in ICT area, the requirement for an objective, chronological time is satisfied when 
used in concert with theory of organizational memory – the two are inseparable as there 
could be no organizational memory as an attribute if there would be no possibility to 
preserve the attribute from morphing through time and associated change (Bakker et al., 
2010; Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988). 
  
Lived time, on the other hand, is prevalent in approaches to organizational memory as a 
substance (Rowlinson et al., 2010). Time there is seen as something subjectively or 
intersubjectively experienced (Costas and Grey, 2014; Crowell, 2001; Jaques, 1982; 
Hernes and Maitlis, 2010; Luhmann, 2002; Ricoeur, 1980; Schutz, 1967) and can be seen 
as defined by, and through, the human experience (Lee and Liebenau, 1999; Adam, 2000). 
Where linear time leaves the past behind and the future ahead (hence ‘linear’), lived time 
brings both into the present (Schutz, 1967; George & Jones, 2000). Living involves a deep 
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unity of past, present and future (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Ricoeur, 1980); or even a 
transcendence of these categories (Heidegger, 1978; Sartre, 1973). Temporality appears 
to be an intrinsic property of human consciousness (George and Jones, 2000), and 
individuals appear to be hard-wired to make sense of their existence in temporal terms, 
locating information and knowledge in relation to the flow of time (Schutz, 1967). On this 
basis, aspects of organizational memory including, but not limited to, stories, myths and 
culture build an argument for memory as an interpretative lens rather than hard fact. In 
very general terms, organizational memory is a particular way of interpreting work and 
associated information developed by means of organizational history (subject to 
manipulation by powerful agents). 
  
The distinction between linear and lived is more of a continuum than a dichotomy; and 
so provides space for interplay between attribute and substance. Nevertheless, such 
continuum is still severely restrictive, especially for understanding of the role of objects 
and materiality. For instance, how is it that codified and stored knowledge (in memory) 
may become unintelligible or ineffective at the moment of retrieval even if all other things 
in the organization remain the same? Similarly, what is the relationship between time 
and things as far as lived time is concerned? Are the objects of work to be found in the 
experience of subjects, in their inter-subjectivity or in the environments they experience? 
First two options point towards a deep constructionism which, in itself, presents 
significant difficulty to anything like collective memory in all but the most abstract sense 
(Zerubavel, 2003); and the last option suggests transcendental idealism of the Kantian 
variety (where objects in the world are perceived through intuition but never directly as-
themselves). 
  
In either case, the role of material objects in facilitating organizational memory through 
either linear time or within lived time has not received much attention in the literature. 
Organizational memory as an attribute brings information (in form of capabilities and/or 
knowledge) to the fore and organizational memory as substance (conceptualized through 
stories, culture, etc.), emphasizes conscious agents. Both are fundamentally 
anthropocentric in the understanding of time and relationship between time and 
organizational memory. 
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An alternative perspective on time, one rarely given much attention in the literature (not 
least due to its complexity) but one that substantiates my empirical observations with 
theory best, is a view of time as made up of events (Whitehead, 1929). For Whitehead, 
events are the building blocks of reality and, as such, they are composed of what is 
normally understood as objects. As Whitehead writes: 
  
An object is an ingredient in the character of some event. In fact, the character of an 
event is nothing but the objects which are ingredient in it and the ways in which 
those objects make their ingression into the event. Thus the theory of objects is the 
theory of the comparison of events. Events are only comparable because they body 
forth permanences. We are comparing objects in events whenever we can say, ‘There 
it is again.’ Objects are the elements in nature which can ‘be again.’ (Whitehead, 
1920: 143-144) 
  
Not only does Whitehead suggest that time is fundamentally made up of materiality, he 
also makes a direct reference to memory-like characteristics of both objects and time by 
suggesting that objects ‘can be again’. To be sure, objects themselves do not constitute 
experience of time, rather individuals in-the-world achieve experience of time through, 
and by, interacting with objects. That being said, events (and objects) are neither fixed 
nor static – they are interdependent units of experience in the process of becoming. 
       
It is the characteristic of becoming of events that allows me to draw on Whitehead’s 
theory despite a broadly Heideggerian orientation of this thesis. Heidegger’s conception 
of temporality, as complicated it is as it is interesting, is of limited use on a collective level 
because of profound emphasis on personal experience. Through the process of becoming, 
however, Whitehead’s ‘events’ allow for compatibility with this works ontology in a 
number of areas but most significantly in the attitude to how individuals relate to their 
world. 
       
In both philosophies individuals emerge from the world as opposed to the world 
emerging from individuals, as is the case when looking at it through the linear or lived 
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time lens. Such shift of emphasis, as well as object-centred interpretation of time, goes a 
long way towards helping to account for why organizational memory-like processes that 
I observed resembled instances (or junctions) rather than continuities (Sandberg and 
Tsoukas, 2015). Even more than that - why the instances were not necessarily consistent 
in both chronology and locality, which is something that would be reasonably expected 
from traditional approaches to the study of organizational memory.  
      
 
3.4. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE TELEOLOGY OF PRACTICE 
  
Schatzki’s (2006) brief conception of organizational and practice memory considers 
organizations as sites where work practices are brought together with material 
arrangements. When combined, the two form episodes, or ‘happenings’ of practice (p. 
1864). As practices are re-enacted in the organization by means of what Schatzki (2006) 
refers to as teleological structures, they also persist from the past into the future. 
Organizational memory ensues as long as practices are enacted within the material 
arrangements of present in an organization. It is thus an aggregation of all practices 
performed within an organization and, by extension, of memories of all performed 
practices. 
  
Elaborating on how organizational memory as an aggregate property of organizational 
practices looks like, Schatzki (2006) proposed that organizations enact organizational 
memory by means of ‘the complex of actions, thoughts, experiences, abilities, and 
readinesses’ (ibid: 1870). This five-point definition is what I will be evaluating against 
the empirical dataset here. Accordingly, organizational memory as a practice may consist 
of the following: 
  
Actions: this refers to organized sets, or regimes, of doings and sayings (Geiger, 
2009; Whittington, 2011). As individuals in organizations enact work practices, 
actions are the basic manifestations of ‘performative understanding of reality’ 
(Latour, 2005). In other words, individuals only do what is intelligible, so by 
performing regimented activity individuals engage in particular understandings 
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of the world, work and other practices around them. In organizations this is, in 
part, evident through specialization of skills and division of workforce into 
specialisms; 
Thoughts: Schatzki (2006: 1869) positions ‘thoughts’ as negotiations among 
practitioners about what constitutes a ‘good practice’. This is a normative 
dimension of organizational memory because thoughts, in this understanding, 
enact organizational memory by keeping the actions of practitioners 
‘appropriately regarded as answerable to norms of correct and incorrect practice’ 
(Rouse, 2001: 190; also Shotter and Tsoukas, 2014); 
Experiences: the exact meaning of ‘experiences’ with regards to organizational 
memory is not entirely clear. It seems that this has to do with where individual 
practitioners are relative to their peers in the mastery of the practice (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991; Schatzki, 2002). If so, this dimension also entails coordination of 
practices along the demarcations of knowledge-based expert power (Hsiao et al., 
2012; Kravcenko and Swan, 2016). Alternatively, experiences may refer to 
socialization of individuals into particular practices; 
Abilities: this refers to knowledge of how to do something. In a narrow sense it 
seems that ability is a faculty of an individual that allows repeat performance of 
particular actions. In a broader sense ability might entail knowledge in general - 
of how to do things, of how things should be done (i.e. thoughts) and of what to do 
things with. In regards to the latter, this would involve knowledge of the material 
world and of which parts of it can be used and in which ways (Gherardi, 2006; 
Heidegger, 1978; Orlikowski, 2010); 
Readinesses: related to abilities but with reference to anticipation (Nicolini, 
2009). In a sense, practitioners are always anticipating the practice they are 
performing (Shotter, 2006; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011). Closely related to the 
phenomenological idea of protention (Merleau-Ponty, 2005), readinesses of 
practitioners can be understood as related to their abilities to enact organizational 
memory. 
  
It is also worth noting that, regarding the context for these five characteristics of 
organizational memory, Schatzki (2006) appears to be considering organizational 
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memory in terms of historical realism. Past enactments of practices that constitute an 
organization, of which organizational memory is a register of, are seen as trajectories into 
the future. While the future in this case can consist of multiple potentialities, the past 
does not appear to be subject to change and re-interpretation (or this is not seen as a 
relevant issue given anticipatory nature of practices). With reference to the more 
traditional thinking about organizational memory in management (i.e. following Walsh 
and Ungson, 1991), such a view is in contrast to that of past and memory as a manageable 
attribute of the organization (see Chapter 2 section on ‘Organizational memory as an 
attribute’). What follows from this is the reduced importance of past events that are re-
classified as actualized anticipations. 
  
Where previous work portrayed the temporal aspect of organizational memory in linear 
terms - focusing on either bringing the past into the present or interpreting the present 
through the past (see Chapter 3) - practice memory considers organizational memory to 
be recursive, which, rather paradoxically, renders it future-oriented. While Schatzki 
(2006) does not consider this in depth, he does mention that individuals strive towards 
what they perceive as important and significant out of the past and into the future. This 
holds true for both organizational memory and for practice memory. 
 
 
3.5 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has set out a foundation for further empirical investigation of organizational 
memory from the practice-theoretical perspective. Resting on the ontological and 
epistemological foundations of Heideggerian phenomenology and Whitehead’s view of 
temporality, this chapter built on, and expanded beyond, Schatzki’s (2006) brief outline of what 
organizational memory as a practice may look like and work as. While Schatzki (2006) provided 
some intriguing insight via his essay on organizational memory as a practice, such as the inclusion 
of a distinction between practice memory and organizational memory to which I will pay 
continuous attention throughout the empirical chapters, he did not present a coherent qualitative 
investigation of how, or why, organizational memory considered through the lens of practice 
would work the way he argued it should. Fundamentally, this approach differs little from the 
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anthropocentric bias presented throughout Chapter 2, and so Schatzki (2006, 2012) still leaves 
much to be desired in terms of building explanatory theory.  
 
Following the next Chapter, where I am going to present and discuss methods for this study, the 
remainder of the thesis is going to go beyond existing work on organizational memory as a 
practice in order to derive empirical foundations, principles and patterns of how mundane 
activities of individuals and groups of individuals result in temporal assemblages that display 
characteristics similar to those of what cognitive memory, as is commonly understood. That being 
said, building on Schatzki (2006, 2012) does provide a valuable point of departure with respect 
of what to look for in the empirical setting, which is how the initial stages of this study are going 
to proceed (Chapter 5) before departing and detaching into an independent qualitative 
investigation informed by the principles outlined in this and the next Chapters.  
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Chapter 4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
  
The research question driving this thesis demands rich data of the type that can assist in 
identifying contextually specific factors and which is drawn from the experiences and 
actions of those most concerned with organizational memory - employees. Such data 
needs to be processual, meaning that it needs to be able to demonstrate how activities, 
processes and materiality exist and persist over lengthy periods of time. The methods 
adopted in this research strive to account for all of these desired features. This research 
adopts an in-depth embedded case study approach (Yin, 2009), involving the collection 
of longitudinal data on memory-like processes and actions within an architectural 
practice, and two projects in particular, over a period of 15 months. This time-frame is 
further augmented by five years of archival data recovered from the organization's 
records. 
  
This chapter gives details of the units of analysis, provides detail on the philosophical 
footing critical to the proper understanding of the findings, justifies the research 
approach and design, and explains the process of data analysis. Considerations for 
ensuring the validity and reliability of the findings are discussed and the main method - 
ethnography - is elaborated upon. 
  
4.1.1 The units of analysis 
  
An embedded case study design refers to an activity of gathering contextual data at 
multiple levels in the organization, all the while maintaining focus on the primary unit of 
analysis (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Yin, 2003). The primary unit of analysis is the 
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individual engaged performing organizational memory-like processes. This level is 
embedded within the second unit of analysis, the organization. The two are further 
interrelated by a third unit of analysis - material conditions within which they exist. Such 
three-tier design is operationalized by observing the second and third levels of analysis 
in accordance with the way they bear (or don’t) upon the first (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 
1988). 
  
By adopting an existential phenomenological approach (discussed below), individuals 
performing organizational memory are considered to be purposeful agents necessarily 
embedded in the temporal, material and teleological events attempting meaningful 
organizational memory practices at work. This research investigates what is it that such 
practices reveal about organizational memory-like processes and, eventually, 
organizational memory. The intention is to understand how organizational memory can 
be comprehended through the experiences of practitioners alone (i.e. without theoretical 
pre-conceptualizations of what organizational memory ought to be). Accordingly, all data 
is grounded, to varying extents, in the terminology and vocabulary of the research 
subjects. 
  
4.1.2 Interpretative process 
  
It is important to ‘reach beyond the surface’ when investigating organizational memory. 
This is because organizational memory is an intangible organizational phenomenon 
which is not readily observable. Nevertheless, a meaningful investigation demands 
analytical and theoretical interpretations of empirical data. The data were first collected 
by documenting the same phenomena from a variety of sources and in variety of 
situations. Analytical abduction (see below) followed in order that a grounded 
interpretation of architectural practices could begin to present itself (Denzin, 1989). 
Following this process, and upon reaching data saturation, an appropriate interpretative 
framework needed to have been developed in order to gain access to the 
phenomenological experiences of research subjects.  
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4.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
  
This section will briefly introduce the empirical case (ArchitectureCo) and explain, in 
detail, the process of negotiating access. It will then continue to describe how data was 
collected, from which sources and using which methods, as well as how it was analysed 
and what ethical considerations were in place. 
  
4.2.1 Introduction to the empirical case 
  
Empirical research took place in the context of an architectural practice, referred to here 
as ‘ArchitectureCo’ for confidentiality reasons. In this section I will first discuss the merits 
of conducting research on organizational memory within architecture and introduce 
ArchitectureCo. 
  
4.2.1.1 Why research architecture? 
  
Architecture was chosen as a setting of particular interest for two reasons. First, 
architecture is a distinctly institutionalized field dating back to first century AD (Fletcher, 
1987). In the UK, a professional association for architects, the Royal Institute of British 
Architects (RIBA), has existed since 1837 with the intent to set and develop standards of 
practice, to advise on rules and to generate new knowledge. A strong degree of 
institutionalization is a form of practice memory in its own right. This suggests that 
architecture as a profession is at the very least predisposed to operating with some kind 
of organizational memory at its foundation. Second, architecture is an inherently project-
based environment. All of the work is structured around specific and, oftentimes, largely 
unique contracts. 
  
This latter point is noteworthy for two further reasons. One, building design projects, 
especially the larger ones, consist of spatially and temporally distributed project-based 
organizations assembled from smaller projects (Grabher, 2004; Whitley, 2006). In such 
settings, multiple nexuses of interdisciplinary work along both vertical and horizontal 
axis of organizations bring diverse specialists from creative and technical areas to 
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collaborate together on temporary basis (Boland, Lyytinen, and Yoo, 2007). In terms of 
organizational memory, a setting such as this provides an excellent space to investigate 
how organizational organizational memory really is. Two, in the present literature 
project-based organizations are notorious for having a faulty organizational memory (e.g. 
Bartsch, Ebers, and Maurer, 2013). In other words, project-based organizations are a 
challenging environment for majority of existing theoretical approaches to 
organizational memory. For this reason, it is all the more appropriate to launch a re-
evaluation of organizational memory in a setting where established theory struggles to 
find its footing. This is because, on the one hand, theories exist to offer an understanding 
of the setting for experience (Llewelyn, 2003); but, on the other, much of existing work 
on organizational memory does not provide for an empirically consistent explanation of 
organizational memory beyond a monolithic organization. 
  
4.2.2 Introduction to ArchitectureCo 
  
ArchitectureCo is a medium-large, award-winning architectural practice situated the 
United Kingdom. Established in the late 1960’s, they have played an important role in the 
region where they are situated, not only designing some of the city’s most prominent 
buildings, but also contributing to architectural education, architectural associations and 
popular awareness of buildings and other such spaces. 
  
At the time of the study the practice employed around 60 full-time staff (Figure 3.2), all 
collocated in a single open-plan office. The nominal working day lasted from 9:00 to 
17:30, but quite a few of the staff would remain at work for a few hours after that. The 
legal structure of ArchitectureCo was a limited partnership composed of four main 
Directors, each responsible for a working group of architects as well as for a managerial 
function. They were aided by six Associate Directors who would partake in the day-to-
day management of the practice, and six Senior Architects, who would perform duties 
similar to those of project managers. There were eight administrative staff to look after 
most operational issues and manage accounting, marketing, IT and secretarial duties. 
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Architectural staff was organized around four working groups that were broadly focused 
on workplace, education, housing, culture and community. Depending on the concurrent 
workload, the composition and quantity of architects in any one group would vary and it 
was not uncommon for staff to travel between groups, although this was not a frequent 
occurrence due to the long-term nature of architectural work. 
  
The office within which the practice was situated was of open plan, semi-hot desk design. 
What this means is that all the workstations critical to performing architecture were co-
located in a single open space, but no one person (including Directors), had assigned 
desks. Each workstation comprised of a large desk, an iMac with a standard software 
suite, and a cordless telephone that was digitally linked with whichever account was 
signed in on the iMac. In theory, this meant that on any given morning any one architect 
could have sat wherever they would wish. In practice, however, architects occupied 
specific desks on semi-permanent basis subject to which people they were working on a 
project with at the time. In any case, there were more workstations than personnel at the 
time of research, so seating arrangements were not contested. The only exceptions were 
a handful of specialists whose work depended on specific computing requirements. 
These included visualizers, IT administration and secretarial staff. 
  
Architectural work is inherently interdisciplinary. This characteristic of it is further 
beneficial to the research into organizational memory because such inherent 
interdisciplinarity of architectural work should provide a good analytical space for 
observing the interaction between practice memory and organizational memory 
(Schatzki, 2006). The main object of architectural work is to resolve a design problem, 
usually posed by the client. In doing so, architects collaborate with various types of 
engineers, consultants, suppliers and other relevant professionals. While the scope of the 
collaboration may vary depending on the role assigned, architects normally perform 
critical functions and, thus, command a significant amount of expert knowledge. On 
majority of ‘typical’ projects - where a structure is designed by the architect and 
constructed by the building contractor - architects also fulfil the function of administering 
the contract. This means that, in addition to design duties, architectural professionals 
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would ensure that the building that was being built was as close to what the client 
commissioned as possible. 
  
4.2.3 Negotiating access 
  
An empirical investigation of organizational memory is inevitably going to be an intrusive 
affair. A generous degree of access is thus required because organizational memory is at 
the core of what an organization is and/or does. Therefore, on a practical level, it is very 
important to select an organizational setting that could adequately reflect organizational 
memory-like processes to the researcher in a reasonable amount of time allocated to 
empirical work. As I described above, architecture fulfils such requirements well due to 
its project-based, knowledge intensive and highly institutionalized nature. 
Simultaneously, gaining access to architectural work is difficult because of how close 
clients can be involved with the practice as well as because of considerable financial, 
safety and regulatory interests associated with designing and constructing buildings. 
Such considerations must, therefore, be given attention before embarking on 
ethnographic, or ethnography-like, research of commercial architecture. 
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Figure 4.2. Official organizational structure of ArchitectureCo 
 
Following thorough deliberation with my academic supervisors on where to collect data, 
we settled on architecture as a suitable site for conducting research on organizational 
memory as a practice. In order to test whether our assumption and this decision were, 
indeed, correct I scheduled an informal lunch meeting with an architectural assistant I 
had very briefly known through my avocational interest in photography. The results of 
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the lunch meeting were generally inconclusive but intriguing enough to request contact 
details of one of the directors of the firm s/he worked for in order to learn more about 
architecture, architectural practice and structure in respect to memory-related aspects 
of commercial architecture. The phone call led to a meeting where I learned more about 
the firm, which led to another meeting, with a managing director of ArchitectureCo this 
time, where I requested, and was granted, provisional access to conduct research subject 
to a confidentiality agreement. 
  
Permission to collect data has not been obtained for the entire 15 months from the very 
beginning. The initial period agreed was 6 months. Even though, following the meeting 
with the managing director, I was granted unreserved access to all areas of the 
organization, a probation period of 1 month was also put in place in order to test whether 
me collecting data will not cause unacceptable interference with the day-to-day 
functioning of the company. It was agreed that access could be easily and unilaterally 
withdrawn during the probation period should it ‘not work for us’ (Managing Director I). 
Fortunately, this proved to not be the case and this study was allowed to continue 
unhindered. 
  
At the beginning of the sixth month, I approached the Managing Director to see whether 
we can agree on an extension of equal length. In response, ArchitectureCo have graciously 
granted access for an unspecified duration of time subject to the existing confidentiality 
agreement carrying forward as well. 
  
Clearly, gaining access to ArchitectureCo has been a crucial part of this research that 
cannot be taken for granted. This is because, as Burgess (1984) aptly noted, access is a 
continual process in research - it is a relationship in which the study is being legitimised 
by a gatekeeper (Managing Director in my case) to the subject or a group of subjects that 
may not necessarily know, want, or trust the research and the researcher (Denscombe, 
2014; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Murchison, 2010; Whyte, 1981). Relationship is 
an apt way to describe access to research subjects because even though I had an interest 
in, and was granted permission to get to know the organization better, the organization 
did not have permission or much interest to get to know me, in a manner of speaking. 
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Consequently, much like in an interpersonal relationship where one party is just not 
interested, I have found myself a stranger at a gathering where most of those present did 
not even know I was coming. In practice this meant that throughout the duration of the 
study I would have to (re-)negotiate access and (re-)build trust relationships with 
gatekeepers other than the Managing Director (Barley, 1995).  
  
The need to continually negotiate and legitimize my presence within the organization, 
especially for as long as 15 months, to individuals and groups of individuals was 
undoubtedly helped by the support and company of the Managing Director. It also 
highlighted how fragile such a relationship can be and how important it was for me to 
continue investing into it throughout. To be sure, after a period of time employees of 
ArchitectureCo have grown accustomed to my presence (Barley, 1995) and I even 
accompanied them to a few social events in a non-researcher capacity. Some research 
subjects even became informants who would proactively seek to share their experiences 
and opinions with me (Denzin, 1989). Others, a small minority, would remain distant and 
unwilling to participate for the entire duration of the study. 
  
Securing access to ArchitectureCo has not been excessively difficult and converged 
mainly to being honest and trustworthy, making realistic and paced requests and not 
distracting the employees too much. Securing access to ArchitectureCo’s clients and 
collaborators was considerably more difficult and complex. Negotiating further access to 
some of the clients, in addition to ArchitectureCo, was necessary in line with the 
interdisciplinary nature of architectural work. 
  
Gaining access to clients was helped greatly by informants and gatekeepers from 
ArchitectureCo. They would initially mention me to whomever I needed to agree to 
participate in the study by phone, email, or in person where possible. I would then be 
introduced and, every time in the presence of a senior ArchitectureCo employee, describe 
this research project and the confidentiality agreement by which they would be covered. 
Quite likely because my presence was quite novel and, in many cases, unprecedented, on 
more than one occasion I would need to introduce the study multiple times and in 
different ways. In the end, a combination of legitimacies granted by ArchitectureCo, the 
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University of Warwick brand and my own person (but mainly the former), resulted in all 
external parties and clients concerned granting varied degrees of access so that my data 
collection could proceed unimpeded wherever I would choose to follow ArchitectureCo. 
To illustrate, a construction company responsible for building the office building 
extension (Case Study 1) granted me full access to the site, which I have visited 
independently of ArchitectureCo on several occasions while tracing artefacts of work and 
memory; while a large University client allowed me to observe, but not keep/produce the 
artefacts of, a meeting where ArchitectureCo representatives conducted interviews to 
appoint contractors for a new building project. 
  
In some situations, my presence during lengthy meetings would provide material for 
humour. I recall a particular senior project manager from an engineering firm referring 
to me as a ‘sketch artist’ sitting in the corner and drawing the participants. Similarly, me 
taking notes would be playfully referred to when an odd unflattering comment would be 
made about a client or a regulator during meetings. 
  
4.2.4. Data collection 
  
The initial research design for this study specified an interview-enhanced ethnography 
and documentary analysis as a method of data collection. Having spent a few months in 
the field, I decided to abandon formal interviews because the results would likely not 
have been worth the disturbance caused to ArchitectureCo (something management 
were particularly sensitive about during access negotiations). Moreover, because I spent 
significant parts of the day observing and shadowing various individuals, as well as 
getting to know them and building trusting research relationships, I would be conducting 
informal interviews as a matter of fact of my being there. Therefore, the need for formal, 
recorded appointments was considered unnecessary, especially given that there was 
potential to compromise access through doing so; and ethnography and documentary 
data remained as methods of data collection. 
  
 
 
77 
 
4.2.4.1 Ethnography 
  
Ethnography can be described as a qualitative research method by means of which 
shared and learned patterns of values, beliefs, behaviours and ways of communication 
can be identified and described (Harris, 1968). This is done through extended 
observations and, frequently, through participant observation which allows the 
researcher to immerse into the processes and experiences of the research subjects 
(Creswell, 2013). Most crucially to the study of organizational memory as a practice, 
ethnography allows insight into the meaning of things (Forsey, 2010). 
  
It is worth noting that there are different kinds of ethnographies available to a 
researcher: 
  
●    Early sociological ethnographies of Durkheim (1995) and Weber (1978) that 
aimed at uncovering, through examination of individuals using ethnographic 
methods, the wider meaning and understanding of social life; 
●    Phenomenological ethnography of Schutz (1972), who building on Husserlian 
phenomenology emphasized the importance of social structures and processes in 
the structuring of meaning by individuals; 
●    Postmodernist ethnography of Lyotard (1984) and Stanley (1987), who brought 
to the fore the implicit (and explicit) authority with which ethnographers 
structure their stories and suggested a considerably more relativist, value-neutral 
way of documenting the social instead; 
●    Post-modernist ethnography of Brewer (2000), Hammersley (1992) and Altheide 
and Johnson (1998) who, in recovering ethnography from postmodernism, 
broadly argue that it is both impossible to fully uncover social facts through 
ethnography as well as that it may be difficult to determine to what extent social 
facts bear on the individuals and vice versa; 
●    Critical realist ethnography of Porter (2003) which is essentially Kantian in its 
aspirations and Marxist in its methods; and aims to bridge postmodernist and 
phenomenological ethnographies.   
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All of the above broadly adhere to the subject-predicate ontology that is currently 
underlying vast majority of the literature on the subject. In contrast, I wanted to perform 
an ethnography within the scope of Heideggerian tradition (to which much of practice-
theoretical perspective can be traced back) in order to develop a more authentic 
understanding of meaning. 
  
The emphasis on meaning is particularly poignant when a defining characteristic of this 
research project is to distance itself from those frameworks and understandings which 
anthropocentric bias (see Chapter 2). Accordingly, if organizational memory is to be re-
examined in a way that is different, i.e. not a priori anthropocentric - finding meaning in 
the ideas, actions and behaviours of organizational constituents is key (Wolcott, 2008). 
  
Meaning, and what it means for something to be meaningful, is at the centre of Heidegger-
inspired view of practice on which this thesis is built. Individuals do not usually pursue 
that which is devout of meaning to them, much in the same way as they are unable to 
understand that which carries no meaning in so far as they are concerned. Objects and 
other individuals in the world that have no meaning of even the most marginal degree 
cannot even be said to be in the world in any way that would make any difference. People 
do and say things because the things they do and say are impregnated with meaning, 
however benign and indirect it may be. Heidegger makes it explicit that it is in the human 
nature to be in the state of care for someone or something all the time (Heidegger, 1978), 
which is a different way of saying that, for all intents and purposes, human beings run on 
meanings. 
  
A key advantage of ethnography over other qualitative methods in studying 
organizational memory is the allowance for participant observation. First of all, 
participant observation techniques, as opposed to systematic observation, favour 
intentions, motivations and meanings of observation subjects rather than detailed 
descriptions of their behaviours (Denscombe, 2014); which is in concert with the 
emphasis on meaning, above. The principal concern of such observation is to witness 
practices in the most natural and unaltered way possible (Fetterman, 2010; Wolcott, 
2008). This approach is sometimes referred to as methodological ‘naturalism’, where a 
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key tenet is to remain as true to the unaltered phenomenon of study as possible 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Matza, 1964). Of course, the sheer presence of the 
researcher will inevitably alter any studied situation (at least in the short to medium 
term) in two fundamental ways: one, by directly altering the spatial deployment of 
practices and, two, by potentially prompting observation subjects to reflect on their 
conduct (Wilson, 1977). This is also known as the ‘observer effect’ or the ‘Hawthorne 
effect’ (Shipman, 1997; Spano, 2005).  While there is little to be done with respect to the 
presence of the researcher, the issue of self-reflection by the research subjects will fade 
with time as they become accustomed to the presence of the researcher. The duration 
after which such interference will likely be safe to consider negligible should vary subject 
to the development of trust and rapport between the researcher and the research setting, 
as well as the physical properties of the researcher him/herself. 
  
In respect to the building of trust and rapport one can rely on one's personal charisma or 
on the passage of time. In designing this study, I have made a decision to relieve my social 
skills of unwarranted strain and leave it to the forces of time to pull my relationship with 
the people I studied closer together. This decision was also supported by access 
conditions, which implicitly stipulated that I was to keep any interference caused by my 
study to a minimum. A long-term scope of the study was further accommodating to this 
strategy. 
  
In terms of reducing my spatial impact, I took proactive steps to ‘camouflage’ myself in 
the workplace. During the first few days in the field, I paid especially close attention to 
how my observation subjects dressed. ArchitectureCo had something of a dress code in 
place, which could be best summarized as ‘business casual’. As Managing Director I told 
me, the purpose of the dress code was primarily to maintain presentable aesthetic in the 
office space for visiting clients. This was not forced upon me, however, and when I 
abandoned my ‘camouflage’ towards the final few weeks of data collection, I neither 
sensed nor received any comments as to my new (still presentable albeit more casual 
than ‘business casual’) attire. In any case, following my observations of ArchitectureCo 
fashion choices I acquired grey trousers and a selection of pale shirts of different colours 
which would be supplemented by dark grey or beige sweaters in the cooler weather. I 
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was pleased to observe that this not only made me feel less out of place in the office 
(which I found extremely important to performing a long-term ethnography), but also 
resulted in clients and collaborators mistaking me for an employee of ArchitectureCo 
very frequently. 
  
As I have mentioned above, I opted for the participant observation technique. In addition 
to allowing more in-depth observation of practices and practitioners, participant 
observation brings with it a different way of attending to observation subjects and spaces 
- where systematic observation would follow a pre-determined observation schedule, 
participant observation allows for a more flexible approach where the researcher has the 
ability to vary spatio-temporal ‘vantage point’ in response to unfolding and emerging 
events (Fetterman, 2010; Wolcott, 2008). Accordingly, my observations took me to a 
number of different locations outside of the office, as I followed groups of architects or, 
in some cases, their material artefacts. 
 
As I immersed myself into the working life of my research subjects, I made an effort to 
record as much of my experience and of their activity as was possible without detriment 
to data collection. By this, I mean that it was not my intention to produce as complete a 
record as possible, but rather strike a balance between taking notes on paper and taking 
note of what was transpiring in front of and around me. Three types of technology were 
used to capture observations: a notepad/iPad, a camera, and a voice recorder. A 
notepad/iPad was a primary means for capturing data; a camera, whether on an iPad or 
an iPhone, was used to complement the notes with visual cues as well as to capture 
seemingly significant events (whenever possible); a voice recorder, usually part of the 
iPhone, was used for ad hoc interviews and/or to record quick exchanges between 
research subjects. With regards to voice recording, due to the nature of access agreement, 
I only used this tool within ArchitectureCo and never if any clients were involved.     
 
A key part of capturing data in qualitative social research is the recognition of a 
researcher bias (Spano, 2006; Van Maanen, 2011). Because the researcher is the main 
tool for data collection, it is important to develop and maintain awareness of any 
prejudices and/or dispositions towards the phenomenon of study (Goffman, 1989). 
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Denzin (1989) warned that all observation is infected with the values of the researcher 
in some way, at least; and Patton (2002) urged ethnographic researchers to make note of 
any potential biases within the data. Reflexivity of the researcher, thus, becomes a central 
metric for establishing the degree to which an ethnographic report can be trusted. While 
I will explore the questions of data validity in later, the question of reflexivity of the 
researcher during data collection will be addressed here.  
 
To be reflexive is to exercise an effect on the way in which data is understood and 
collected (Van Maanen, 2011). As an ethnographer, the researcher ‘does not merely report 
findings as facts but actively constructs interpretations or experiences in the field and then 
questions how these interpretations actually arose’ (Berg and Lune 2012: 205). 
Importantly, this is not done retrospectively but alongside the recording of the data 
(Jackson, 1990). As Geertz (1973: 19) aptly noted, ‘the ethnographer 'inscribes' social 
discourse; he writes it down. In so doing, he turns it from a passing event, which exists only 
in its own moment of occurrence, into an account, which exists in its inscription and can be 
reconsulted’. The central technology for creating such an account in this study was the 
notepad/iPad. Both were highly suitable for facilitating reflexivity as both allowed me to 
be flexible with the organization of the page. A typical page in any of the used field 
journals was structured following a 2:1 ratio, where the larger space was reserved for 
notes that had to do with phenomenological observations of organizational memory-like 
practices, and the smaller space was reserved for descriptions of activities and 
environment. A chief advantage of using such format for capturing ethnographic data was 
that it embraced the phenomenological aspect of the study while still providing space for 
simple descriptions of actions and objects. This was of great use when combined with 
photographic, documentary and interview data during the analysis stage, as I would be 
able to reflect on whether the actions that transpired during the recorded event had not 
been contradictory relative to the meanings that I conjectured at the time.   
 
Notes were taken as contemporaneously to the phenomena as possible and, because of 
my camouflage and a relatively static (in terms of not moving around all that much) 
nature of architectural work, I rarely felt the need to retreat to a quiet space to catch up 
on the note-taking (Cahill et al., 1985). During observations of meetings, I would refrain 
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from joining at the table instead positioning myself in a corner of the room where I could 
observe events and conversations from ‘the outside’. Once again, my camouflage and 
deliberate minimisation of movement, however physically discomforting during 
routinely long meetings, went a long way to consistently hide me in plain sight, on par 
with furniture perhaps. Similarly, photographs were taken discreetly during the 
unfolding of the event under observation, but always shown to the research subjects at 
regular intervals (end of week/month depending on volume of photographs generated) 
in order to make sure that: 1) they did not object to those photographs being taken as 
data and 2) my interpretation of what the photograph is of was correct.    
  
Overall, while I did not spend every working day for 15 months in ArchitectureCo I made 
an average of 3 research visits per week. During this time, I recorded 1120 hours of 
observations over 720 pages of research notes. In addition to those, I have also gathered 
and retrieved 12084 e-mail conversations, 4098 architectural drawings, 244 
photographs and 93 other artefacts (Table 4.1). These exclude social events that I 
attended as a non-researcher (and 1 as a researcher) which were not recorded but still 
contributed to my understanding of architecture as a practice and architects as 
practitioners. 
  
The total data set from the study can be divided into two cases, each tracing a particular 
project, and a general set consisting of more traditional ethnographic observations of 
architectural work and organizational memory. The two cases are: Case 1, focusing on a 
£30 million building extension project at the stage of construction, and Case 2, focusing 
on early design of a new, smaller, restaurant project. The two cases were selected to allow 
a more detailed examination of different aspects of architectural work – design and 
construction. This is consistent with recommendations by Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007), who suggested that case study research ought to focus on specific areas in need 
of explanation. 
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Data type Total collected Case 1 Case 2 
Observations 1,120 hours 40% 2% 
Research notes 720 pages 33% 12% 
Emails 12,084 73% 5% 
Drawings/commented 
drawings 
4,098/330 84%/86% 3%/10% 
Artefacts 93 units 64% 13% 
Photographs 244 units 80% 13% 
Table 4.1. Overview of collected data 
  
An obvious difference in the volume of data collected for Case 1 and Case 2 is evident here 
- this was primarily due to the longevity of Case 1, which has been ongoing since 2008 
and concluded 5 months after the data collection ceased. Case 2, on the other hand, was 
a brand new project that I was pleased to observe from conception up to the same point 
as when I began observing Case 1. This permitted me a full overview of the life-span of 
an architectural project which would not otherwise be possible within the scope of this 
study due to the amount of time large projects displace. To control for continuity of 
practice, both cases focused on projects administered by a group led by Managing 
Director I and Director J, meaning that even though architectural manpower may have 
been different between the projects, the leadership and strategy remained constant. Data 
residual to both cases is from general observations of ArchitectureCo as an organization. 
  
An approach to organizational memory as the one I have adopted here (described at the 
beginning of Chapter) comes with certain difficulties in respect of the disposition and 
identification of the subject matter. Works on organizational memory as an attribute 
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(especially psychologistic stream), following Walsh and Ungson (1991) and Moorman 
and Miner (1997), make it reasonably clear where one may find organizational memory 
(i.e. IT systems, archives, culture, etc.); while works on organizational memory as 
substance, following Halbwachs (1992) and Olick (1999), make is reasonably clear what 
organizational memory may look like (i.e. buildings, stories, photographs, etc.). 
Relegating both to the status of memory-like processes and features at the same time as 
assigning primacy to what it is that organizational members do makes it very difficult, 
especially at first, to plan where to be, what to do and whom to follow while collecting 
data. In other words, increasing the empirical area of catchment has had an initial effect 
of reducing the volume of data I would generate simply because it was not clear what is 
relevant to organizational memory as a practice, where I can find it, and for how long I 
ought to continue observing it. 
  
In order to calibrate my perception and to achieve a better understanding of the ways of 
ArchitectureCo, I selected two cases on which to focus my ethnographic efforts. The 
thinking behind this was that instead of observing organizational memory in the 
organization proper, and then moving on to specific cases where emergent hypothesis 
can be verified in more detail, I would begin with cases which would educate me in the 
ways of architecture and architectural work.  
 
Entering this community of practitioners as a novice meant I was able to ask ‘naïve’ 
questions about things I do not understand and learn about the work of ArchitectureCo 
as architects engaged in collaborative work with people outside of their organization. 
Having identified instances of organizational memory and/or memory-like processes in 
these specific cases, I would then look for them in the broader organization. I do feel it 
important to note that while, in written form, this makes my search for organizational 
memory in practice appear linear, in operational terms the identification of areas of 
interest in cases and the application of those to ArchitectureCo as an organization was a 
recursive process and I did not attempt to force it into a sequence, rather following a logic 
of abduction (to be described below). 
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Within ethnographic research, a case study is not a methodology but rather a choice of 
what it is to be studied (Stake, 2005). While such interpretation of the ‘case study’ is 
contrary to what is traditionally understood by this term (i.e. Creswell, 2013; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005; Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2003), I see it to be a better fit for qualitative research 
of the variety presented here. The nuanced difference between the two is in whether the 
case is a product of study, as used here, or an object of study, as used traditionally. Case, 
as a product, is emergent from ethnographic work parts of which require a closer 
investigation/exposition; while case as an object is a priori bound to particular definition, 
requirement or spatio-temporal duration (Denscombe, 2014). 
  
Overall, in the conduct of this ethnographic study I aimed to follow the performance of 
work as opposed to following particular people or events. This was because the collective 
performance of memory was philosophically determined to occur during the 
performance of organizational work, as opposed to individual work. What does this 
mean? Primarily that work conducted by individuals, where no recourse to 
organizational processes could be found, would be of secondary interest (but of interest 
nevertheless). I identified such recourse by observing ‘corrective’ behaviour. For 
instance, because the practice of architecture is not part of organizational memory of an 
architectural firm, any more than digestion is part of individual memory of any human 
(see Chapter 5 for a more in-depth discussion), the ability to do what one needs to in 
order to perform architecture was considered to be of secondary interest. The ability to 
do what one needs to in a particular way, however, was considered more relevant. 
Consequently, corrective behaviour would occur when a qualified architect would need 
to correct his/her way of doing architecture, in order to converge with the particular way 
of doing architecture as recognized by ArchitectureCo. Similarly, other architects and 
even external collaborations would find themselves subject to corrective behaviour at 
times. Such instances of work would give a glimpse of memory-like processes within the 
organization which could then be explored further and in more detail. The reason I 
qualified these processes as memory-like is because of patterned regularity. The 
practitioners would correct themselves and others based on a combination of: a) past 
experiences of being corrected by others, and b) future expectations of being corrected 
by others. This was most frequently expressed by comments such as “this is how we did 
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this that time”, “you may not know/remember, but…”, and “you should change this for the 
[upcoming] design review”. I will explore these themes in more detail in Chapter 4. 
  
Of course, in practice, this translated into following individuals and groups of individuals 
for most of the time. In all cases, I would aim to linger around those individuals who took 
part in organizational work in order to reserve the opportunity for informal discussions, 
hear opinions and ask questions. Assuming, in an ethnographic spirit that data is 
everything and everywhere, I would listen in on telephone conversations, stare into 
computer screens and attentively ‘eavesdrop’ whenever and however I could. All these 
data were copiously recorded, as shown in Table 4.1 above, for later analysis. 
 
4.2.4.2 Documentary data 
  
The primary source of documentary data was the organization's archive. ArchitectureCo 
maintained an archive, as required by law, of all their projects going back 10 years. These 
were stored in a non-networked location on Blu-ray disks. A smaller subset that included 
more recent projects as well as some projects of particular interest/distinguished 
projects was available on one of access controlled networked hard-drives. Thus, the 
entire archive was a collection of directories of completed projects. 
  
Directories committed to archive bore no difference to current, active project directories. 
In so far as I could tell, once a project has been completed, the entire directory would be 
transferred into the archive, first digitally and, following an unspecified period of time, 
physically. Not all of working data has been maintained in a digital form, however. 
Architects would routinely carry and use voluminous folders in which a portion of the 
digital directory would exist in a physical state. Most specifically these would include 
print-outs of design drawings and various specifications/samples of materials and 
services relevant to the project at hand. Following the completion of the project these 
would be destroyed leaving only the digital copy for posterity.  
  
The organization of project directory would follow the same format, presented in Figure 
4.3. This was a hierarchy of empty folders and subfolders into which appropriate 
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documentation was to be placed. Depending on the size and complexity of the project, the 
degree to which all of these would be used varied. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. A sample of ArchitectureCo’s project directory 
 
The two primary types of documentary data that were accessed were emails and design 
drawings. The three secondary types of documentary data that were accessed were client 
reports, project briefs, and meeting minutes. Email conversations and design drawings 
were selected as primary sources of documentary data because of their prevalence in 
interpersonal and inter-organizational communication - a great deal of architectural 
work transpired through the sending of drawings via email. Client reports, project briefs 
and minutes were mainly referred to in order to understand what are the formal 
boundaries and accountability procedures within any single project. Overall, this archival 
data was used to anchor and inform ethnographic data collection process by supplying 
information on how work should proceed, in which direction, with whom and when. It 
further served the purpose of verifying how well individuals remember, or how much in 
alignment are their interpretations, of different documented events of work. To a lesser 
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extent, such data was used to help me familiarise with architectural issues, from which I 
could derive some specific questions for the research agenda (Yin, 2009). 
  
Auxiliary forms of documentary data from the public domain were also accessed. 
Architectural publications, relative performance rankings, newspapers and other news 
media were located and deployed to assist with understanding the general state of the 
industry, emergent and historic issues and debates, accounts of construction projects and 
successful, as well as unsuccessful applications for such projects, and the general ‘feel’ of 
what it is like to be an architect in an architectural practice. ArchitectureCo held a small 
library which contained some books which explained how to practice architecture both 
on individual and organizational level, as well as subscribed to industry-leading journals, 
such as Architectural Journal (AJ), all of which were helpful not only towards 
understanding the variety of architecture valued by and within ArchitectureCo, but also 
towards familiarizing myself with the broader practice of architecture.  
  
4.2.5 Data analysis 
  
This section will discuss how data was analysed. I will first introduce the principle for 
this analysis – analytical abduction – before moving on to the discussion of saturation, 
validity and ethics. 
  
4.2.5.1 Principles of abduction 
  
In analysing the resultant large body of ethnographic and documentary data I followed 
main tenets of the interpretive tradition in general and the principle of abduction in 
particular (Tavory and Timmermans, 2013, 2014; Timmermans and Tavory, 2012; 
Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Analytical abduction, much like the grounded theory 
it relates to, is based on the concept of iteration between data and theory (Timmermans 
and Tavory, 2012). Unlike grounded theory, however, abductive analysis privileges 
surprising research evidence and the cultivation of multiple theoretical explanations of 
observed and recorded phenomena. Consequently, data analysis functions as an 
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ampliative form of reasoning in which the researcher strives to process unexpected 
findings into coherent theoretical explanations (Mantere and Ketokivi, 2013). 
  
The analytical path unfolded in two stages and four phases. Stage 1 consisted of analysis 
of data from the two case studies and the following stage 2 applied emergent constructs 
from stage 1 to the general organization data. At the onset of the first phase of Stage 1, I 
outlined both cases, paying particular attention to the interactions among the main 
professional groups. The reason for this was to build on my position within 
ArchitectureCo as someone on the fringes of both the organization and the practice, thus 
experiencing a form of situated learning (Lave and Wenger, 1991). This, in turn, allowed 
me to ask questions about mundane interpersonal and inter-organizational behaviours 
and practices in order to understand the underlying assumptions and rituals supporting 
the ways of doings and sayings of those involved. As mentioned previously, in absence of 
a clear theoretical construct which to investigate, it was important to focus on patterns 
with memory-like characteristics (i.e. some forms of memorization and remembering). 
An overview of these can be found in Table 4.2. 
  
Aggregate 
dimensions 
Second order codes First order codes  
Processes of 
memorization 
 
Adjustment of design 
drawings 
Design Review 
corrections 
Influence from wider 
practice  
Building models  
CAD Drawings 
Delivering training to new staff  
Training received  
Staff turnover  
Quality control 
Showcasing of awards 
Professional literature  
 
Processes of 
remembering 
 
 
 
 
Design alterations 
Challenges brought by 
colleagues and 
management 
 
More recording and admin work  
Hierarchy of communications on projects 
Pragmatic interests 
Former contacts and invoking experience 
Power relations 
Contract bids 
 
Organizationa
l memory 
Materiality of work 
Normativity 
 
Workstations and IT systems 
Library 
Material samples 
Completed projects 
Office manual 
Rules and routines 
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Events and away days 
History 
  
Table 4.2 Coding schema for memory-like characteristics in ArchitectureCo 
 
These patterns were shared and discussed with the supervisory team for purposes of 
feedback and independent (from the ethnographic burden) validation. This stage 
revealed a very dynamic nature of memory-like processes, partially exemplified by the 
boundary dynamics that emerged as professionals collaborated on projects under 
investigation - divisions, separations and flawless integration would interchange and 
morph into each other depending on the focus of work and practical interests present 
(Nicolini, 2012). These dynamics were particularly evident during work that involved 
tools of work that would take on the role of boundary objects (Kravcenko and Swan, 
2016). Professional groups continuously erected distinctions and alliances between 
themselves when those were involved, suggesting strong catalytic effect that such objects 
had on their respective ways of performing work. Having observed this, I concluded that 
situations such as those presented by the cases are suitable for a continued investigation 
of organizational memory-like processes. Such investigation would begin with the 
application of existing theoretical constructs of organizational memory in practice, as 
found in Schatzki (2006), to the empirical data from the case studies. 
  
Having compiled and processed all empirical materials relevant to memory-related 
processes in the organization, I proceeded onto phase three to explore the relation of the 
data to the existing literature on organizational memory. At this point, it became clear 
that existing theory on organizational memory could not account for a practice-based 
perspective on organizational memory in such a way that would do justice to my 
observations; and existing theory of practice did not account for organizational memory. 
The former generally lacked the tools necessary for a processual understanding of 
collective memory proper, and the latter was not very convincing in reconciling ‘heavily’ 
processed philosophical foundation with something as apparently stable as memory. 
  
Finally, armed with this emergent theoretical model as a sensitizing device, I revisited all 
the episodes in the data highlighted for their relation to organizational memory-like 
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processes and used the main tenets of the approach to identify, reconstruct and explain 
the processes by which organizational memory in ArchitectureCo was enacted. 
  
 
4.2.5.2 Data validity 
 
Sound, transparent criteria for how empirical data is validates is one of the fundamental 
attributes of what makes a piece of writing ‘academic’ and ‘scientific’, as opposed to 
speculative. Traditionally stemming from naturalistic traditions and the philosophy that 
research ought to be replicable and applicable in order to be considered valid, there is 
more to issues of validity than measuring correlation with an objective reality (Sandberg, 
2005). This is because the qualification of what counts as ‘real’ or ‘objective’ is 
significantly different in the study of the social than in the study of the natural (Giorgi, 
1994).  
 
An in-depth discussion of what those differences are would warrant a separate thesis in 
its own right, but for the purposes of justifying the interpretation of data presented here 
it will suffice to mention that any system of validity control ought to follow from and be 
consistent with the underlying ontological and epistemological foundations of the study 
concerned (Salner, 1989; Denzin, 1994; Sandberg, 2005). Because this study follows 
Heideggerian tradition, the corresponding validity criteria of intersubjective reality 
apply (Bengtsson, 1989). 
 
Intersubjectivity is a position whereby reality of the world is subject to individual 
experiences of existence. However, because individuals do not exist in the world 
independently of other individuals, collaboration, negotiation, common material 
arrangements and pragmatic pressures and interests, among other things, all serve to 
constitute an agreed meaning of a shared reality (Sandberg, 2005). Similar to 
Heideggerian idea of ‘clearing’, where certain meaning present themselves subject to 
material and technical environment, the content of intersubjectivity is hedged against 
sociomaterial conditions prevailing for individual actors in their existential 
environments (Bengtsson, 1989). 
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Two validity criteria follow from this ontology: reflexivity and transparency. In terms of 
the former, the researcher ought to maintain awareness of how the research subjects, 
results, and conditions are represented by ensuring that the knowledge and information 
that does make it into the study is relevant (Giorgi, 1990). In this study, reflexivity was 
especially important considering the role of power and power relations both within and 
across disciplines. Representing pragmatic concerns accurately and accounting for 
individual motivations, as reported by research subjects, was key to getting this part of 
data right.  
 
In addition to the above, there are two further aspects to ensuring phenomenological 
data validity when it comes to transparency. The First is primacy of description in place 
of explanation when presenting data and the Second is validation of presented data with 
the research subjects (Giorgi, 1988; Sandberg, 2005). In terms of the First, the primary 
effort is on description of what has happened rather than on what the practitioners think 
has happened and why. Ethnography is especially well suited for such an approach as 
majority of observations are done from the outside anyway. The main purpose behind 
prioritization of descriptive over explanatory is to keep the researcher in check against 
surpassing ‘what is given in their experience’ and using theories and models instead 
(Sandberg, 2005: 60). 
 
In terms of transparency, giving research subjects the opportunity to validate 
researchers’ interpretations ensures that the ‘measurement’ of intersubjectivity is 
relevant and accurate in as far as possible. Because the researcher is most often entering 
the research setting in the middle of things (Heidegger, 1978; Braver, 2013), as it were, 
their ability to harmonize with research subjects is at a significant starting disadvantage. 
This disadvantage, however, can be mitigated by allowing practitioners to validate the 
interpretations of data, which is what has been done here towards the end of study.    
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4.2.5.3 Some limitations 
  
While the practice-theoretical approach allows unique insight into organizational 
memory by foregrounding such aspects of human existence as embodiment, materiality 
and acute perception to power relations, it also backgrounds a number of other issues 
that may be important. One of these, for example, is discourse. The variety of practice 
view mobilized here does not account well for discursive matters. This is a potential 
limitation because part of the literature on organizational memory (see Chapter 2) 
directly deals with stories and narratives. It is, however, worth noting that none of those 
studies analyse organizational memory matters by means of conversational, discursive 
or linguistic analysis. It is, therefore, reasonable to deduce that the omission of discourse 
in the framework of phenomenology of practice is very limited value to the overall aims 
of the study. 
 
Another area of deliberate omission is quantitative measurement of organizational 
memory. A stream of studies in transactive memory systems and ICT-induced 
organizational memory perform simulations or other algorithmic manipulations of 
quantified data in order to derive patterns attributable to the empirical experience of the 
phenomenon by practitioners. These parts of the field of organizational memory are 
neglected by design in this study as incompatible with the selected ontology. As practice 
view places emphasis on enactment, emergence and social construction of reality, use of 
dependent and independent variables has no place within this framework. 
 
Finally, the primary limitation of this research has to do with its scope. Despite being a 
longitudinal ethnographic work, this is still a study of a single organization in a single 
industry at one, continuous, 15 month period of its existence. Data collected from 
multiple organizations across variety of industries and at different times of their lifecycle 
would have yielded a more comprehensive and representative dataset (Denscombe, 
2014). 
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4.2.5.4 Ethical considerations 
  
In order to secure research access to ArchitectureCo and its clients and collaborators, a 
signed guarantee of anonymity of the organization and all of its members, clients, and 
other involved parties was made. Such a guarantee was rooted in the Data Protection Act 
of 1998 and University of Warwick Ethical Guidelines and Requirements. These included 
ensuring that all the narrative and all the documents cited in the thesis and/or any other 
research output were to be scrutinised to ensure that no reference could be made that 
would potentially reveal the identity (directly or indirectly) of the organization and its 
work or the individuals involved. Accordingly, all original documents and/or 
photographs have been redacted to a sufficient degree and all sensitive content was 
blurred out or removed. Where data suitable for supporting the argument could not be 
redacted, it was not used and different data was found instead (or the argument was 
either abandoned or redeveloped). 
  
Ethnography, as a research method, carries with it further ethical requirements due to 
very close and prolonged contact of the researcher with the researched. However, 
because this thesis is not operationalized as pure ethnography, but rather as an 
‘ethnographic study anchored in the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger’, a great deal 
of those ethical issues is avoided. This is because grounding ethnography in 
phenomenology, Heideggerian or otherwise, sways the descriptive focus away from 
actions and activities of research subjects towards the acquired perception of those by 
an informed researcher - meaning that I am careful to leave out anything but the 
meanings relevant to identifying organizational memory-like processes (at which point 
the focus is no longer on individuals proper); and that this is an ethnography of a practice 
(where I examine my take on the phenomena I observed). Either way, in conjunction with 
a sweeping guarantee of anonymity, the only ethical issue related to ethnographic study 
that remains is reimbursing the participants. 
  
In terms of reimbursing the participants for their time and accommodation, I have 
submitted a report outlining main findings pertinent to ArchitectureCo, and performed 
two presentations: one, more detailed, to the executive team and, another, less detailed, 
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to the entire staff of the office. The latter presentation was also accompanied by 
celebratory pastry so well received by all those present.  
  
  
4.3 SUMMARY 
  
In this Chapter, I outlined methodological foundations of this study. A key, albeit brief by 
necessity, description of the philosophical underpinning of this work was supplemented 
by information about the case and its selection, data gathering methods (ethnography 
and archival sources) and procedure for analysis (abduction). 
  
The next three chapters will present empirical data arrived at by means of these methods, 
and Chapter 8 will synthesize the thesis and deliver a final discussion. 
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Chapter 5 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY AS A PRACTICE 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
  
As was outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, while empirical and theoretical research provided 
rich insight into the effects and forms of organizational memory (Rowlinson et al., 2010), 
much of that work was conducted around a limited and restrictive set of definitions. The 
themes of organizational memory as an attribute and as a substance are not only readily 
traceable to their founding works - Walsh and Ungson (1991) and Halbwachs (1980) 
respectively – but still bear a significant degree of similarity to their predecessors with 
regards to the conceptual understanding of organizational memory. This characteristic 
of the field was one of the chief reasons why I chose Schatzki (2006) as an initial analytical 
lens. 
  
Schatzki’s (2006) work falls within the domain of the practice theory, which means that 
is sensitizes the research lens to the issues of materiality, processual nature of the world, 
and teleological-affective structures in organizations. Unlike the work done on 
organizational memory as an attribute or as a substance, the thinking about 
organizational memory as a practice is still underdeveloped. More specifically, Schatzki’s 
(2006) hypothesis is as intriguing as it is lacking in empirical grounding, and Linde’s 
(2008) study is only adherent to the practice view of organization on a methodological 
level. Consequently, it is still not clear how organizational memory as a practice is 
empirically distinct from practice memory, which aspects of organizational life count as 
organizational memory and which do not, and whether Schatzki’s (2006) definition of 
five elements is wholly appropriate and/or empirically sound. 
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This is a key chapter of the thesis as it establishes the foundation for all analysis and 
discussion that follows. As I mentioned previously, Schatzki (2006) offered a tantalizing 
concept of organizational memory without providing any empirical justification to go 
with it. This chapter is aimed at applying Schatzki’s (2006) concept to an empirical 
dataset in order to understand how (and whether) his interpretation works in practice, 
as well as to develop the multiple unexplained and/or underexplored areas of that work. 
In effect, this chapter builds the initial framework key parts of which will be later 
explored in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.  
  
The remainder of this section will unpack Schatzki’s (2006: 1870) five-part definition – 
‘the complex of actions, thoughts, experiences, abilities, and readinesses’ - in order to better 
understand the thrust and relevance of its component elements. 
              
 
5.2. ACTIONS: ARRIVING AT A CATEGORIZATION 
  
Actions as organized regimes of activities that enable individuals to enact a collective 
practice are meaningful units of analysis only in so far as it is clear what the subject of 
such organization is. Importantly, for Schatzki (2006), organizational memory is a type 
of activity made regular by relevant practices. Additionally, regularity also stems from 
organizations, which are enacted by a complex array of socio-material practices 
(Giddens, 1984; Schatzki, 2002, 2005; Czarniawska, 2007; Nicolini, 2009). Therefore, 
activity is one of the building blocks of both the organization and the practices. 
Accordingly, in order to make sense of regimes of activity in an empirical setting, it is 
important to identify what are the practices around which actions and activities are 
organized. 
  
There are a number of ways to categorize, group and/or otherwise divide an organization 
into meaningful patterns of actions. For instance, activity following job descriptions in a 
popular way of doing this, as is division by the subject of work (i.e. activity following aims 
and objectives). Concerning project-based organizations, the latter is of limited 
explanatory value because subject of work can change and vary as individuals travel 
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between projects (DeFillippi and Arthur, 1998); and the former, grouping by job 
description, is not necessarily representative of activities that individuals actually 
undertake. For instance, according to the official organizational structure of 
ArchitectureCo (Figure 4.2), the company’s employees performed 12 distinct job roles: 
Architect, Architectural Assistant, Building Information Modelling (BIM) Manager, 
Architectural Technician, Interior Designer, Financial Controller/Secretary, Marketing 
Assistant, IT Manager, 3D Architectural Visualizer, Graphic Designer/Administrator, 
Team Administrator, and Receptionist. Because architectural work is organized around 
projects of limited duration, only the supporting staff (receptionist, IT manager, 
marketing assistant, administrators and the financial controller) would experience long-
term stability in the orientation of their work. 
  
The majority of employees would be allocated to work on projects by the directors of the 
firm and re-appointed as and when required or at the completion of the project. In a 
typical project, an Architect would lead design work while Architectural Assistants and 
Technicians would provide supporting roles. Directors and Associate Directors, all of 
whom were also architects by specialization, would perform client and contract 
management duties, and consult and supervise the designing architect when needed. 
  
Following a Heideggerian take on practice theory, considering actions and activity with 
regards of “that-for-the-sake-of-which” is a more phenomenologically authentic way of 
establishing distinctions between practices and practitioners. A decision of how to 
distinguish activities in which practitioners engage must be informed, first and foremost, 
by the reasons behind why practitioners do and say what they do and say (as they do and 
say those things!). 
  
Despite the 12 different job types offered by ArchitectureCo, in practice, the staff were 
grouped into architectural and non-architectural categories. The architectural staff 
would include those individuals who were directly involved in the design of the building, 
and non-architectural staff would include everybody else. This particular way of 
differentiating between regimes of action was repeatedly enacted by ArchitectureCo 
itself – in describing the firm, for example, both the architectural and non-architectural 
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staff would reliably mention the ‘architects/non-architects’ dichotomy. The following 
extract from my field notes below illustrates this point further: 
  
“Arrived this morning to find most of the office shifting towards the breakout 
area where two people I haven’t met before are setting up a presentation. Went 
to find G (Senior Architect) to ask about what is going on but he was on the 
phone. Went to see L (Receptionist) and found out that these are the people from 
RIBA here to do a presentation as part of the firm’s CPD (Continued Professional 
Development) commitment – ‘they are here for the architects’. Went back to the 
breakout area to find that most of the office was already there either sitting or 
taking up seats/preparing hot and cold drinks. Found a place in the corner and 
observed the beginning of the presentation. Because of location could not hear 
much so asked J (Architectural Technician) what this is about and was told that 
this is a presentation of the new Plan of Work framework [a ‘best practice’ of 
building design developed by RIBA]. Observed some more of the presentation 
and the people watching the presentation. Some taking notes others just 
watching. […]. Still couldn’t see/hear much of the presentation and did not seem 
that much was transpiring so went to look around the office while it was empty 
to examine the ‘work-in-progress’ drawings and tools that were left behind on 
the desks by people at the presentation. Noticed N (Graphic Designer) and A (3D 
Visualizer) quietly exit the kitchen carrying food and go towards the opposite 
end of the office towards T (Marketing assistant) speaking progressively louder 
the farther they walked from the presentation space. Caught up with N and asked 
about what is going on – ‘this is an architectural thing, it’s not for us’. When 
asked why N and A are not joining in, they reiterated that ‘it’s for the architects’. 
[….] Approached G (Senior Architect) and asked about the presentation and to 
comment on what N and A said – ‘Well, they wouldn’t be here. This is an 
architecture thing and they are not doing that. They do other things’. ***Later in 
the day J (Architectural Technician) and K (Architect) expressed similar 
opinions” (Field notes, 28/01/14). 
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The extract above is particularly useful as it demonstrates implicit and mutually 
observed division of activities between those in the organization who are ‘doing 
architecture’ and those who are not. Overtly, there was little to no apparent 
differentiation of this kind because people were getting on with doing their jobs, as well 
as because of the inherently inclusive physical layout of the open-plan office (see Chapter 
4). The situation with representatives from RIBA visiting the firm to give a presentation 
on a new architectural framework caused a ‘breakdown’ in the normal functioning of 
everyday activities of ArchitectureCo (Tsoukas and Mylonopoulos, 2004). The 
breakdown was constituted by the interjection of a distinctly architectural activity into a 
regular working day; causing a kind of imbalance, or oversaturation of ‘architectural 
stuff’ in the workplace. This quite literally displaced all the architects in the office into a 
breakout area leaving only those behind who did not consider attending an architectural 
CPD event relevant to their practice (Figure 5.1). 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Architects attending a RIBA CPD event 
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Observing ‘breakdowns’ in practices such as this one presents a rewarding opportunity 
to gain understanding into the underlying assumptions and tenets of work activities that 
practitioners routinely engage in as part of their practice (ibid). This is because practices 
are mainly achieved in a way difficult to notice for the outsider, in the background of 
everyday life (Nicolini, 2009). While not the only instance of this architects/non-
architects separation, the situation presented in the vignette above does especially well 
to bring a key organizational practice out into the fore, demonstrating a pattern of 
relationships rooted in distinct sets of activities.  
   
It follows then that there are two broad types of activities within ArchitectureCo as 
experienced by employees. The vignette above exemplifies classes of activities which 
they perceive their work to consist of (i.e. those who do architecture and those who do 
other things). Those who ‘did architecture’ included: all the architects including directors, 
architectural technicians, all architectural assistants and interns. Those who ‘did other 
things’ included: 3D Visualizer and Graphic Designer, Marketing assistant and all 
secretarial and administrative staff who were not also architects, as well as IT manager. 
The unity with which architecture was identified by all employees as a central practice 
suggests, rather unsurprisingly, that majority of activities in ArchitectureCo were 
oriented towards architecture in one way or another. Following Orr (1998), in doing 
what they do, most if not all employees of ArchitectureCo made sense of their respective 
practices with reference to architecture because that is what their activities were 
informed by.   
  
By observing the ways in which employees of ArchitectureCo understood their respective 
fields of activity, it became possible to ascertain what the focus of further analysis ought 
to be - a meaningful understanding of activity did not centre on projects, subjects groups 
or even levels of seniority; it centred on superimposing one evidently primary practice 
on an amalgamation of a number of secondary practices. Importantly, the primary-
secondary distinction here does not invoke hierarchical or authoritative dimension (i.e. I 
am not suggesting that architects enjoyed intra-organizational hegemony). It was simply 
a way in which employees of the firm found it meaningful to orientate between different 
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regimes of activities they were involved in. In other words, employees of ArchitectureCo 
understood their activity in terms of the practice of architecture.   
  
 
5.3. THOUGHTS: NORMATIVITY AND ARCHITECTURE 
  
The way thoughts affected the work of ArchitectureCo was not merely esoteric - what it 
means to do ‘good’ architecture in ArchitectureCo fed back into what it was considered 
to do good architecture generally. This is most acutely seen in how the firm approaches 
the work that it does. As one structural engineer reported in an interview, when asked 
about what it is like to work with ArchitectureCo: ‘working with them is very easy - 
everything gets done and all the drawings are very detailed. But it’s not like that with all 
other firms. ArchitectureCo have a bit of a name behind them so they can afford to ask 
higher prices for their work. That gives the architects more space to concentrate on their 
jobs, I think’ (Structural Engineer C). The striving towards a particular way of practicing 
architecture that is considered ‘good’ by ArchitectureCo not only serves the purpose of 
organizing work activities within the organization but also (re)produces an experience 
of architecture as a whole. These attitudes, as was suggested by the Structural Engineer 
C, also feed into related and entangled practices, such as engineering is this case. 
Accordingly, the normative dimension of ‘thoughts’ through which actions acquire 
meaning and enact organizational memory has far reaching implications for the wider 
practice (Rouse, 2001). 
  
Since thoughts inform actions, and actions shape the way in which organizational 
practices are arranged and made sense of by practitioners (section 5.2 and Schatzki, 
2006), it then follows that 1) thoughts play an important role in shaping a memory of an 
organization that is distinct from memories of other organizations, and 2) that 
organizational memory does not relate to the organization on a one-to-one basis (i.e. it is 
not monolithic). As I demonstrated in section 4.1.1, ArchitectureCo displayed clear 
differentiation between organizational members who were architects and those who 
were not. As a result, the thoughts informing actions of the two groups would be different 
as well, even though all members of ArchitectureCo work in a single, collocated, open-
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plan office together. One question that emerges from this observation is whether the 
difference in thoughts and actions of the two groups is because the individuals concerned 
simply do different things as part of their work (i.e. practice memory (Schatzki, 2006)), 
or is there something on an organizational level that is facilitating this as well? Answering 
this question will go towards understanding the relationship between practice memory 
and organizational memory, as well as clarify the role of the organization in the definition 
of organizational memory (to be addressed in further detail in Chapter 7).     
  
Empirical observations of ArchitectureCo suggested at least three distinct mechanisms 
responsible for maintaining a certain way of thinking about architectural work: awards 
and distinguished cases, contract bids and design reviews. Each one of these represents 
a certain way of thinking about ArchitectureCo as an organization, about the past 
achievements of its employees and owners, as we all as about its future aspirations.    
  
 
5.3.1 Awards and distinguished cases 
  
The literature on the effects of awards and prizes on the formation of practices and spaces 
of collective intelligibility notes that not only do these recognize paradigmatic 
achievement and confer prestige and status, but also align interests and sustain networks 
(Anand and Jones, 2008; Anand and Watson, 2004; Lampel and Meyer, 2008; Monteiro 
and Nicolini, 2014; Watson and Anand, 2006). In doing so, awards and other 
distinguished cases build and perpetuate particular ways of thinking about the 
organization. Different aspects of the organization and of its practice are recognized in 
different ways. For instance, the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) gives out an 
annual award for the best new building (The Stirling Prize). They also give out a number 
of regional, national and even client awards, an award for a distinguished portfolio of 
works over time (The Royal Gold Medal), an award for buildings with a budget of under 
£500,000 (The Stephen Lawrence Prize), a President’s Award for Research for research 
in architecture as well as a three-tiered President’s Medal awarded for outstanding work 
of architectural students (RIBA, 2015). In addition, the British Council for Offices, a 
research and best practice dissemination association for the office sector, has an award 
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for ‘excellence in office space’ (BCO, 2015). There are also awards for conservation, civic, 
quality and environmental awards as well as awards from leading industry publications. 
In other words, there are many different ways in which architecture can be legitimately 
thought of based on various awards and distinguished cases, with each one emphasizing 
a particular aspect of architectural practice. 
  
ArchitectureCo made explicit emphasis on their ability to win awards. Since their 
founding in the late 1960’s they have averaged a major RIBA award once every two years 
and many other award annually. In 2014 ArchitectureCo received 10 different awards 
from 6 awarding bodies, including 3 of the 4 buildings winning a combined 5 RIBA 
awards and one building winning a total of 6 awards from various awarding bodies. 
These various awards played a prominent role in three different aspects of organizational 
life at ArchitectureCo: they were displayed at the entrance to the office, they figured 
prominently in the email signature of all employees, and there was stress on the award-
winning character of the firm in both the orientation programme for new employees and 
the office manual. 
  
In terms of the awards displayed at the entrance corridor of the office, these were 
presented in the form of a gallery with framed A4 size certificates in two rows taking up 
an entire wall spanning the length of half of the office (Figure 5.2). The corridor itself was 
described by one senior partner as intended ‘to guide the person into the practice and 
showcase, tell the story of it as they make their way into the office’ (Director I). In terms of 
the email signature, the practice made use of a standard signature generated by a 
marketing assistant in conjunction with the IT manager. This signature would display the 
name of the company followed by the address and some legal information about the 
status of the firm. It would then display a banner consisting of up to three images, two 
showing different views of the same building and a third a logo of whichever prestigious 
award that building won. The final part of the signature would change regularly to reflect 
the most recent achievement of ArchitectureCo and would accompany every email sent 
from the corporate account (which was also the only account in use for work-related 
correspondence). 
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Figure 5.2. A corridor wall displaying the various awards of ArchitectureCo 
 
There are two ways in which awards and distinguished cases relate to organizational 
memory. On the one hand, displaying awards in these two ways is not purely an effort in 
marketing or interior design, but also a mechanism of importing past achievements to 
bear on the present organization. While displayed awards and email signatures do not 
serve as repositories of knowledge as such, they do play a role in what is referred to by 
the literature as communities of memory (Boje, 2008; Pickering and Keightley, 2012; 
Suddaby et al., 2010;  Zerubavel, 2003). Communities of memory are particular 
environments within which recorded information is translated ‘into discourse about the 
present and the future’ (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994: 53-54). They can be seen as discursive 
spaces between individuals and their material surroundings (Keightley and Pickering, 
2012: 109) or as interpretive lenses through which individuals and collectives perceive 
the past (Apfelbaum, 2001; Olick, 2001; Yanow, 1998). Communities of memory are 
groups of people and objects that perpetuate a particular way of interpreting the events 
that have happened, or are thought to have happened, in the past (Halbwachs, 2001). 
With this in mind, the basic idea for using something like a corridor with displayed 
awards and email signatures highlighting recent achievements is to foreground unique 
characteristics of the firm. ArchitectureCo is actually displaying a continuous ability to 
make valuable decisions that brought about success in the past. It is a reminder to the 
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architects and other professionals working for ArchitectureCo of the significant legacy 
that they share with those who came before them; a legacy they are responsible for 
carrying forward into posterity. 
  
It follows then that awards and distinguished cases did play a significant role in the 
organizational memory of ArchitectureCo, albeit not in the same way as was observed by 
Nissley and Casey (2002) in their study of corporate museums. In that case, awards were 
manipulated in such a way as to present a particular image of the organization to the 
external world. In contrast, ArchitectureCo’s display of their awards and accolades was 
also aimed at the organization itself. While it is, of course, worth noting that awards are 
usually displayed for the benefit of the customer, the effect is also strongly felt in the way 
employees absorb that information. After all, customers only spend a small fraction of 
their time in the architect’s offices, whereas architects themselves are there most of the 
time. 
  
Recognizing that organizations may direct their normative efforts inwards paves way for 
a more nuanced understanding of how organizational memory works and where the 
transition between it and practice memory may be found. Specifically, individuals 
employed by the organization join as already qualified and skilful practitioners. 
Accordingly, it is not up to the organization to socialize their employees into the practice 
(Lave and Wenger, 1991). Observing the ways in which awards were used in 
ArchitectureCo, however, suggests that the role of the organization was to educate 
employed practitioners in the norms of what constitutes ‘good architecture’ by that 
particular organization. Such normative filtering is echoed by Schatzki’s (2006) concept 
of teleological-affective structures and is thus an aspect of organizational memory.    
  
5.3.2. Contract bids 
  
One of the most obvious areas where remembering and reminding took place was during 
the preparation and submission of contract bids to potential clients. At the time of 
research, a sizeable portion of ArchitectureCo’s work was done for the public sector. As 
working for the public sector in the UK almost always entails submitting prospective 
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design to a competition, thinking how to best position themselves in favourable light to 
other architectural firms was not alien to ArchitectureCo employees. The process of 
submitting a bid is a potential organizational memory event because it brings forth those 
characteristics of the organization that are, or may be, considered unique to it (such as 
norms, awards, achievements etc.). These usually include past awards and distinguished 
cases, but also novel capabilities (e.g. ability to use latest 3D design software) and 
organization-specific interpretation of how to do architecture. The way the process 
works is that a client retains an architect who then prepares a number of proposed 
building designs of which the clients selects one they prefer to others. If the options 
provided by the architect are not satisfactory, the client may wish to change the architect 
a restart the process at this point. Once the selection is complete, the architect will release 
selected designs to a select group of construction companies who will then bid for the 
contract on the basis of their ability to construct the building and the costs they expect to 
incur on the client. 
  
Considering the normative dimension of thoughts in organizational memory, contract 
bids appear to go hand in hand with awards and distinguished cases in terms of 
connecting the organization with particular stakeholders and practitioners. For one, 
contract bids are explicit efforts on behalf of the organization to not only display the kind 
of work it can produce but also to educate the client in the benefits of that particular 
approach to architecture. As Associate Director R described:  
 
“putting together a bid is about getting into the right state of mind, you know? It is 
very important to stick to the brief but, at the same time to show them how… what 
is it that we can bring that others may not be able to. Part of this is the team, of 
course. Showing who the architects are and what they achieved is important, but 
also telling a story about the practice and its successes”.  
 
In repeatedly mentioning the ‘showing’ aspect of putting together a bid, Associate 
Director R is not only referring to the actual physical document through which 
architectural ideas will be communicated (see Chapter 7), but also the activity of telling 
about past achievements or ArchitectureCo, the skill and knowledge of its employees, and 
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the importance of understanding what the clients need. All of these are characteristic of 
organizational memory. 
  
The contract bidding process can be thought of as consisting of two stages. During the 
first stage, architects focus on designing something agreeable to the client based on the 
requirements outlined in the ‘brief’ (a short statement from the client describing the 
basic properties they want a building to have). This stage is generally centred on 
delivering an initial design and explaining why it is superior to competing designs. The 
second stage is internal to the organization and consists of ensuring the proposed design 
fits within the organization’s approach to architecture (i.e. ‘thoughts’). The first stage 
requires skill and familiarity with the practice of architecture, while the second stage has 
more to do with normative design reviews (discussed below). Accordingly, the first stage 
is best understood as referring to ‘practice memory’, while the second stage is closer 
related to ‘organizational memory’ (Schatzki, 2006). 
  
In the remainder of this section, I will explore the first stage of the contract bidding 
process by drawing on an empirical case study of a new building design (Case 2 – see 
Chapter 4). The second stage – design review - will be discussed in the following section 
(5.2.3). The reason why such close attention to the bidding process is warranted is 
twofold: 1) it forces the architects to reflect on their own organization and practice 
relative to competition, and 2) it foregrounds internal normative practices that dictate 
what qualifies as ArchitectureCo and what does not. Both of these aspects of the bidding 
process expose elements of organizational memory. 
  
Turning to the initial design of the new building, a significant design decision in the 
conception of this restaurant building was concerned with the shape of the roof. Arguably 
the roof was the only element of the building where an architect could make an aesthetic 
difference through design because of the restrictions presented by the site (limited space 
by a lake) and a specific design brief with precise specifications for the building (size, 
purpose, facilities, etc.). Accordingly, the document produced for the client by 
ArchitectureCo presented five building options differentiated only by the variation in the 
design of the roof. In other words, the ‘body’ of the building has been designed to 
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requested requirements with ‘traditional use of brick and curtain walling to form external 
envelope’ (Contract Bid document) and remained the same - it was essentially only the 
roof that varied across the five options presented to the client for consideration. Two of 
the options had very similar curved roofs, third option had a flat roof with the possibility 
of being used for a green roof, fourth option had a curved roof, and the fifth option had a 
complex ‘stealthy’ folding roof. Four of these options are visible in Figure 4.3, below, 
which is a photograph I took of a document presented to the client at the end of one of 
the design meetings. The document was destroyed shortly after the client selected three 
of the initial five design options (visible as red dots next to options 3-5). 
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Figure 5.3. Design options from the contract bid document 
 
Processes associated with organizational memory were evident throughout the 
preparation of these five options. For instance, while options one and two were prepared 
by means of looking at existing traditional designs for a kind of roof a building of this type 
would have, options three to five were prepared in line with the practicing principles of 
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ArchitectureCo - ‘to be imaginative and pragmatic in delivery of service’ (Director W). In 
addition to the more ‘traditional’ flat roof option number three the architects on the 
project explored two alternative designs - a curved roof and a folding roof. Amongst the 
three, if the flat roof was the most ‘pragmatic’ design option and the folding roof the most 
‘imaginative’, it was the curved roof that fell in the middle ground and, eventually, 
generated the most excitement amongst the architects and, later, the client. The 
qualification of different design types as either ‘traditional’, ‘pragmatic’ or ‘imaginative’ 
was only possible in relation to past experience of designing buildings. By labelling design 
work along these categories, Director W invoked elements of organizational memory into 
the design process (see also Chapter 7). 
  
The three roof options (options 3-5 in Figure 5.3.), while designed with explicitly 
different intentions, all had correspondence with the values and principles that 
ArchitectureCo identified the products of their work with: imagination in the case of the 
folding roof (option 5), pragmatism in the case of the flat roof (option 3), and design in 
the case of the curved roof (option 4). The flat roof was considered to be a tried and tested 
solution as it could support a green roof that would allow the building to better ‘relate 
directly to the surrounding ecology’ (Senior Architect G). When working on the design 
the architects frequently referred to it as ‘conservative’, ‘basic’ and, most frequently, 
‘traditional’ on the basis of it being the simplest to build but least ‘interesting’ as far as 
design went. Consequently, flat roof was not a personal preference of project architects 
during design. Option 5, the folding roof, initially generated most enthusiasm for the use 
of unorthodox shapes that it afforded. Asymmetric angles could provide for ‘interesting’ 
play with lighting subject to the use of different materials and the shape itself would add 
a ‘dynamic’ property to the building as it would appear slightly different depending on 
the vantage point from which it was to be observed once built. This design was described 
as ‘orientated to maximize views across the lake from the dining/break out spaces’ and to 
‘relate to the different heights of the surrounding tree canopies’ (Contract Bid document). 
Project architects spent quite a lot of time determining the possible arrangement of 
shapes necessary for such a roof by going through hundreds of images found via Google 
Images. Some of those images were saved onto a project directory folder in the database. 
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A sample of the ones used as examples in the contract bid later on can be found in Figure 
5.5. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. A sketch of one of the proposed roof designs. 
 
After a few attempts to sketch out a possible structure using CAD (Figure 5.4), the 
asymmetric roof resign (option 5) fell out of favour as the architects concluded that it 
would ‘cost too much to build’ due to high degree of complexity (Senior Architect G). 
While the more current version of work-in-progress of a folding roof was included into 
the contract bid proposal, it was hoped by the project architects that the client does not 
select it. The final, curved roof, was given most detailed attention after the previous two 
options were dismissed, in a weak sense of the word, for their respective reasons. The 
curved roof was envisioned to also allow for a green roof but with the added benefit of 
extra space and light allowed by curving up towards the lake. 
  
The curved roof (option 4) became a personal favourite for the project architects who 
believed it would create scenic ‘visual spectacle’ (Architect K) from the inside of the 
building as well as allow ‘a multitude of possibilities for acoustic treatments and lighting’ 
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(Senior Architect G). This was consistent with key design principles that project 
architects determined for this contract bid. The principles for this project were ‘to provide 
a striking feature adjacent the lakeside and enhance views from the building across the lake’ 
(Director I). An appropriate design of the roof and ceiling were perceived to be key to 
actualizing these principles. Curved roof became an appealing option to the architects 
because it achieved these principles by means of a simple yet aesthetically interesting 
solution. 
  
Preference for a particular design based on principles internal to the organization is in 
itself an instance of organizational memory. Design principles are not generated from 
new with every project but emerge from practice as the work on a conceptual outline of 
a new building begins. With the onset of this work, project architects attempt to 
determine a visual approximation of the brief provided by the client. In many ways this 
is an iterative process of arriving at a compromise between design and function, where 
function is the desired capability of a building expressed by the client. Observing three 
project go through conceptual design phase, two superficially and one in detail (Case 2), 
I witnessed that designs produced by ArchitectureCo would undergo a pragmatic-
imaginative-pragmatic oscillation. This means that following the initial process of using 
web-search for visual representations of ideas for solutions to the design brief, architects 
would actually veer off, or get inspired, and produce more elaborate designs than 
perhaps necessary. At that point, they would reflect on whatever complex and/or 
innovative solution they had generated and return to a more pragmatic ground. The 
restaurant project was a model case for this as the design of the roof began with a very 
simple concept proceeding to a folding roof (which was determined as too complex to 
build within budgetary constraints) before settling preference on a compromise curved 
roof. 
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Figure 5.5. Sample images for the design of the curved roof 
 
So what does this have to do with memory-like processes in organizations? First, the 
design brief came from the outside of the organization and was invariably influenced by 
the presence of other buildings of this type in the vicinity and elsewhere. Because the 
restaurant building was not the first building of its kind to be constructed, certain key 
constraints were imposed on the design even prior to the initial conception. Second, the 
normative dimension of what constitutes good architecture simultaneously preceded 
and emerged from the performance of work in a recursive way. Awards and distinguished 
cases, for instance, played a part in arriving at potentially successful principles, as did 
personal experiences of previous work. 
  
The observations presented above suggest that organizational memory is most distinct 
from practice memory where a strong interpretation of some particular way of doing 
architecture is present. This was the case with ArchitectureCo who repeatedly designed 
buildings following certain design principles thought to be important/preferential by 
organizational decision makers. Interestingly, while the exact principles were never 
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coherently articulated, the designs produced by different teams in ArchitectureCo would 
still bear strong internal resemblance to one another at the same time as being 
significantly different from competing designs produced by competitors. 
  
Observing how a contract bids are constructed can reveal much about processes with 
memory-like characteristics at the level of the organization. For one, manipulations of 
existing representations of the practice (existing buildings), whether from within or from 
the outside of the organization, reveal tendencies of what constitutes ‘good architecture’ 
for the organization. It can be readily surmised what the tenets of ‘good architecture’ are 
from observing how project architects interacted with the five options that needed to 
have been prepared for the bid document - the more traditional options have been 
determined to not be ‘imaginative’ enough and the most ‘imaginative’ option fell out of 
favour for pragmatic reasons. When juxtaposed with the project principle ‘to provide a 
striking feature adjacent the lakeside and enhance views from the building across the lake’ 
(Director I), the choice of the curved roof option reveals the benchmark for what may 
constitute a ‘striking feature’. This, in turn, brings forth the normativity of ‘thoughts’ that 
shape the organizational memory of ArchitectureCo. 
  
5.3.3 Design reviews 
  
Previous sections highlighted the importance of normativity for the performance of 
organizational memory. Normativity is an ongoing effort of monitoring and appraisal. 
Both of these are done by architects who are also managers, or in charge of managerial 
functions. This overlap between practices of architecture and business administration is 
worth noting as it has a strong claim to constituting a process which makes 
organizational memory normative (which, as I discussed above, is what distinguished 
organizational memory from practice memory). During the 15 months’ observation 
period, those architects most aligned to ArchitectureCo’s vision of architecture AND 
consistent at winning awards and clients were the ones promoted into managerial roles. 
Conversely, a successful architect who repeatedly pushed in a direction not supported by 
management’s vision for ArchitectureCo left the firm 7 months into the data collection 
period. Architects who did get promoted and maybe even made partners in the Company 
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would then find themselves in a position to review the design work of their colleagues. 
In the absence of any formal metrics, the experience of producing ArchitectureCo-
approved work in the past became a primary yardstick against which I observed them 
evaluate designs decisions of their peers and employees. This is not to suggest that 
architects newly promoted to managerial roles vehemently maintained status quo – what 
they did was draw on their best judgement to do the best job they could do. The following 
examples provide illustration: 
 
“it’s not enough to make something interesting – it is very important to make sure 
that what they [fellow architects] work on does not stand out too much [from the 
organizational portfolio]" (Director W) 
 
“the way I go about it is by looking at the technical quality of the design but also at 
whether it would be possible for me to have someone else continue working on it 
should that person [the author of the design] leave the project for any reason” 
(Associate Director R) 
 
“all of our new recruits are exceptionally bright and have great potential to become 
great architects. There is no problem here. What I do try to foster in them is a sense 
of appreciation of what our practice [ArchitectureCo] stands for – where it came 
from and why. I think this is very important for them to understand if they wish to 
succeed.” (Director I) 
 
The organizational memory is made noticeable in that the values and priorities exposed 
by the senior architects in the quotes above were contingent on the particular 
interpretation of architecture as perpetuated by ArchitectureCo (and reified via their 
numerous awards).      
  
Continuing with the example of the roof design for the restaurant project, the curved roof 
that both the project architects and the client were very keen on failed the design review 
and had to be changed (Figure 5.6). In effect, following the presentation of the project to 
the design review team project architects received feedback on which parts of their 
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design of the restaurant project building need to be adjusted. In terms of the roof design, 
ArchitectureCo directors on the design review team pointed out a few shortcomings in 
the existing plans. For one, they disagreed with the project architects that a curved roof 
would deliver enhanced views over the lake from the inside so it had to be changed 
despite this also being a preferred option for the client. As the architect explained to the 
client in an email a few days later: 
  
“We have given serious consideration to the roof / ceiling design, especially when 
using both the dining and break out space as one area for banqueting. We felt the 
sweeping form of the ceiling set against the downstand supporting the moveable 
wall would detract too much from the visual spectacle you expect to see when stood 
within the dining space looking back along the ceiling line. The horizontal 
downstand provides an uncomfortable junction against the sweeping form of the 
ceiling. Other elements of concern regarding this roof design are acoustics and AV 
requirements. We are now proposing to use a flat ceiling approach as this helps us 
resolve a number of these issues” (Architect K). 
  
It is noteworthy that in this letter to the client Architect K is using the pronoun ‘we’ to 
refer to ArchitectureCo. In many ways, this highlights the normative dimension that 
‘thoughts’ bring to the memory of the organization. On the one hand, a record (Figure 5.3) 
of how project architects for the restaurant facility were guided towards a more 
ArchitectureCo appropriate choice of design exists in the corporate archive. On the other 
hand, external actors will only remember that ArchitectureCo adjusted a previously 
agreed-upon design because due to pragmatic concerns. This facilitates a certain image 
of the organization as remembered by both the internal and external actors. Given that 
internal records received little attention from organizational members, it is safe to 
suggest that, in this case, the way organization is going to be remembered by external 
actors will probably have a stronger impact on organizational memory. 
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Figure 5.6. Results of a design review 
 
This episode, and others like it, suggests a disproportionate role in the determination of 
the normative aspect of the organizational memory of ArchitectureCo that more senior 
architects play. While it is difficult to correlate whether being part of the senior 
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management team produces more bearing on the decisions of what constitutes ‘good 
architecture’ the fact remains that in ArchitectureCo there are no senior architects who 
are not on the senior management team in either a direct or associated position. 
Similarly, during a different design review for a building restoration project, significant 
changes were made because of comments by one of the directors who was also the most 
senior member of the senior management team on the design review team. When asked 
about the purpose and process of design review meetings, he elaborated that: 
  
‘She is a good architect but this is a very sensitive building and she’s never done 
anything like this before. I have worked on restoration before and there are some 
things that you need to be aware of when working with older buildings. Some things 
that you would do on normal projects you just can’t do here. This is something I 
showed her and we’ll see if it’s right when she makes the changes [in the design]’ 
(Director W). 
  
The desired changes were made and, after the renovation of the building has been 
completed, it went on to win a number of significant awards and was even featured in 
regional news outlets. 
  
For the normative dimension of organizational memory-like processes within 
organizations, it certainly seems plausible that thoughts on what makes ‘good 
architecture’ for ArchitectureCo are well grounded in the broader environment of their 
practice. The last design review example clearly shows how thought-influenced 
experiences of previous work translate into awards and distinguished cases, which, in 
turn, are very likely to influence thoughts that will inform future experiences. Because 
awards find their way into email signatures sent both within and outside of the 
organization, and onto the walls of the entrance to ArchitectureCo’s offices, these 
buildings become visual artefacts. Having observed the process of preparing a new 
contract bid, it is clear that the main thrust behind developing an initial design comes 
from visual artefacts of distinguished cases and/or award-winning buildings (not least 
because those are much easier to find when looking for visual cues and elements of 
design). 
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A ready comparison of this normative dimension of collective memory to organizational 
memory as constituted in organizational culture comes to mind (Barney, 1986, Pfeffer, 
1981). Both appear to shape, and be shaped, by prior experiences of collective work and 
both can be used in procreation of organizational storytelling. However, ‘thoughts’ 
(Schatzki, 2006) as a component of organizational memory are different to culture as 
organizational memory. The latter is normally conceptualized in terms of collective 
habits described by a ubiquitous “this is how we do things around here” (Deal and 
Kennedy, 1982), whereas the former represents a minority opinion of “how things should 
be done around here”. A key point being that if ‘good architecture’ was ingrained in 
ArchitectureCo as a ‘culture’, no design reviews would be necessary to adjust any work 
as organizational members would simply do the things the usual way. What I observed, 
on the other hand, clearly demonstrates that even experienced architects with long 
tenures at the firm are subject to realignment in how they approach particular designs. 
This is because normativity is not a property of the entire collective but rather a small, 
managerially endowed, subset of it (Nissley and Casey, 2002). It is worth further noting 
that I am not interpreting a tyrannical portrait of norm-setters but merely the caretakers 
of prior successful (as determined by peer-recognized awards and distinguished cases) 
experiences.    
  
 
5.4. EXPERIENCES: VISCERAL PERFORMANCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
MEMORY 
  
The ‘experiences’ component of Schatzki’s (2006) definition of organizational memory 
foregrounds the thoughts and actions of its most experienced members, i.e. experts 
(Hsiao et al., 2012; Kravcenko and Swan, 2016; Lave and Wenger, 1991; Schatzki, 2002, 
2012); as well as the ways in which new members are socialized into particular attitudes 
and practices of architecture. Accordingly, these are closely related to the concept of 
knowledge. Because Schatzki (2006) is positioned within a broadly Heideggerian 
tradition, he is likely to be avoiding the more objective and static term ‘knowledge’ in 
favour of a more phenomenological and idiosyncratic term ‘experience’. A fundamental 
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concept of Heideggerian phenomenology (Chapter 3) is ‘being-in-the-world’, which, both 
for Heidegger (1969, 1978) and for Schatzki (1997, 2002, 2006, 2012) is rooted in the 
degree to which individuals are attuned to their environments (Umwelt – see section 3.2). 
This means that individual experiences of practices have a degree of uniqueness and that 
there are limits on how well these experiences can be communicated to others. This, of 
course, is an issue for organizational memory because organizational memory is 
inherently social. 
  
Practice-theoretical perspective does offer a way to bridge the gap between tacit 
experiences of individuals and shared attitudes to collective practices arising from them. 
This is done through material arrangements and through regimented activities that make 
up practices. Both of these will be considered in this section. The role of materiality is 
especially noteworthy, as it routinely has an effect on, and participates in, everyday work 
practices (Kravcenko and Swan, 2016; Monteiro and Nicolini, 2013; Nicolini, Mengis and 
Swan, 2012). Because ArchitectureCo was based in a single location, all materiality was 
also collocated as well as shared by all employees of the firm. Kelleher (2001) noted that 
shared materiality performs an important organizing function by making up the 
‘connective tissue’ of an environment where people interact (p. 224). Writing about 
homes, Rochberg-Halton (1984) suggested that shared materiality not only distinguishes 
one house from another, but also designates the function of different spaces within a 
house (i.e. pots and pans mean kitchen). Similarly, the shared materiality of 
ArchitectureCo (the office, desks, storage units, awards, computers etc.) facilitated the 
sharing of tacit experiences between architects by providing the ‘connective tissue’ - it 
made it possible for architects to have point of reference in the external world when 
reflecting or communicating their experiences to each other. 
  
However, shared materiality can only partially be attributed to organizational memory. 
This is because much of what makes up architectural firms is tools of architectural work. 
Neither the physical models nor the blueprints or drawings, or even iMacs with CAD 
software were specific to ArchitectureCo. In fact, vast majority of shared materiality 
found in ArchitectureCo was there because ArchitectureCo was an architectural firm – it 
was a shared materiality of a practice, consisting mainly of appropriate tools of work. If 
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this is so, how is shared materiality relevant to organizational memory or even to 
experiences? The starting question was how individuals are able to translate their 
personal and idiosyncratic experience of the world onto a collective level where it can be 
made intelligible by others. Practice view sensitizes research to a number of social 
aspects, materiality being one of the key ones. Establishing the means by which 
individuals can relate their respective experiences to one another – through shared 
materiality – highlighted the role of practice memory (Schatzki, 2006). Practice memory, 
however, does not equal organizational memory. Therefore, having established that 
practitioners communicate their experiences with reference to the tools and conditions 
of their work (shared materiality) I will now attempt to discern what is it that 
organizations do to qualify individual experiences as parts of organizational memory.  
           
A finely tuned frame of reference is required in order to understand whether individual 
experiences feed into organizational memory or remain at the level of a practice. This is 
because separating practice memory from organizational memory is difficult because of 
organizational memory largely consisting of practice memory (Schatzki, 2006). Yet, the 
two are clearly different, not least because not all organizations engaged with the same 
practice are identical. Brown and Duguid (2000) propose a way to navigate this 
conundrum by suggesting a way of thinking about how practices relate to organizations. 
According to them, practices become ‘organizational’ only as far as processes keep them 
together. Visualizing processes as “vertical structures creating an organizational spine” 
(p. 93), Brown and Duguid argue that the productive characteristics of practices need to 
be structured by processes in order to allow coordination. Similarly, organizational 
processes require practices in order to avoid becoming “increasingly static” (p. 94). With 
regards to arriving at a frame of reference needed to understand the role of experiences 
in organizational memory, Brown and Duguid’s (2000) way of conceptualizing 
organizational practices is very useful because it shows that a) practices span 
organizations, consistent with Schatzki (2002, 2006, 2012), and b) organizations 
coordinate their activities by imposing processes upon practices. Individual experiences, 
in the context of Schatzki’s (2006) definition discussed above, arise from practices and 
the shared materiality of practices. It then follows that what makes experiences 
organizational is processes, or, to be more specific, the coordinating effects of processes. 
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While there is a lack of consensus in the management literature about what a ‘process’ is 
(Sandberg, Loacker and Alvesson, 2015), Brown and Duguid (2000: 94) mention that 
process entails the setting of organizational agendas. Organizational agendas overlap 
with organizational goals as well as with practical concerns of individuals (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991; Wenger and Snyder, 2000; Nicolini, 2011), meaning that individual 
experiences of work traverse into the realm of organizational memory following 
orthogonal interaction between process and practice. For example, a major practical 
concern for architects is safety and sustainability of a building; this is unrelated to the 
concept of organizational memory as a practice. Similarly, key organizational agendas are 
profitability and repeat business; neither of which relate to the concept of organizational 
memory as a practice either. However, the ways in which architects balance 
responsibility for producing safe and sustainable designs with the organizational goals of 
staying in business is relevant to the concept of organizational memory as a practice. 
Individual experiences then contribute to organizational memory, as defined by Schatzki 
(2006), by means of reflecting how practitioners negotiate the competing forces of 
process and practice. 
  
The following excerpt from Case 1 (the £30 million office building extension project) will 
illustrate this by reporting on how a team of ArchitectureCo attempted to balance a 
practical concern for sustainability with an organizational agenda for delivering contract 
on time and to commissioned specifications. Interacting with a number of colleagues 
from other disciplines, members of ArchitectureCo made use of shared materiality in 
order to both safeguard their practical concerns and maintain organizational interests 
(perhaps leaning more towards the latter in the end).       
  
The vignette below picks up at a point when part of building design came under most the 
significant threat of being altered, much to the dismay of ArchitectureCo who developed 
it. The proposed alterations had to do with the results of a thermal model which showed 
unsatisfactory thermodynamic performance of a design already under construction. 
ArchitectureCo were the leading architects on the project as well as contract 
administrators. Other parties comprised various engineers, the construction company 
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and a quantitative survey company (i.e. financial control). These specialists (see table 5.1 
for details) were assembled into a ‘Design Team’ for the project. The purpose of a design 
team is to integrate design drawings and other technical information into an ongoing 
construction of a building. 
  
While the different professionals on the design team were expected to work 
collaboratively and towards a common goal, they were not part of the same organization. 
In fact, majority of their work was spent at separate locations (e.g. ArchitectureCo and 
EngineersCo were based 130 km apart) and they would only ever convene for regular 
meetings. These were called design team meetings (DTMs) and during the early and 
middle stages of the project the team would assemble for a DTM at ConstructionCo’s site 
offices on a fortnightly basis. The DTM was a space in which specialists to update each 
other on the progress of construction and development of the design, as well as to 
address more complicated issues not readily resolved by phone or email. DTMs lasted for 
an average of five hours with some of the longest ones falling just short of eight. 
  
Approximately three months into the construction of the building members of the design 
team recognized that they lacked a detailed and reliable understanding of how the 
building was expected to perform in terms of its thermal signature and environmental 
impact. More pressingly, ArchitectureCo, as the party responsible for the design of the 
building, was required to submit evidence in the form of a thermal model to the local 
regulatory authorities for approval. Securing this approval was crucial to ensuring 
uninterrupted construction process. The model, however, was not available and could 
not be readily produced because EngineersCo, a party responsible for producing this 
particular artefact, did not understand nor agree on the interpretation of data that was 
supposed to be inputted into the model. 
  
A design meeting was convened to address some of the assumptions relevant to thermal 
appraisal and an existing, presumably incorrect, thermal model was interrogated. 
Discussions during this initial meeting not only surfaced divergent experiences of 
construction work but also gave first glance of how multiple parties may be attempting 
to sway each other’s respective experiences for own benefit. Unlike ArchitectureCo, 
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members of EngineersCo and ConstructionCo were convinced that the project was at high 
risk because the existing thermal model indicated non-compliance with the local 
authority regulations and, consequently, contractual obligations. To exacerbate the 
matter, it was not possible to verify the accuracy of data in the existing thermal model 
without considerable input from an external party (ConsultantsCo) which proved 
difficult to obtain. 
  
  ArchitectureC
o 
EngineersCo ConstructionCo ConsultantsC
o 
Professional
s on the 
design team 
Senior 
Architect 
Senior 
Engineer 
Construction 
Manager 
Consulting 
Engineer 
Architect Engineer Quantitative 
Surveyor 
Affiliation Independent ConstructionCo 
subsidiary 
Independent Independent 
Affiliation on 
project 
ConstructionCo ConstructionCo Client Client 
Table 5.1. Composition of the design team and respective practical 
concerns 
  
Thermal models depend on complex mathematical equations that involve incorporating 
data on design and building specifications (e.g., predicted energy consumption, number 
of building users) into a two and/or three-dimensional model (IES Virtual Environment 
in this case). This is then used to simulate the energy consumption of a building over a 
period of a year. Some of the information that goes into the thermal model can include 
variables such as regulated energy consumption (fixed lightings, heating, etc.), 
unregulated energy consumption (any item that can be plugged into a socket), and 
renewable energy production to offset consumption (solar panels, wind turbines, etc.). 
Within the region where the building was being constructed, local planning authorities 
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required 10% of the predicted energy consumption of a building to be produced on site, 
or in from a renewable energy source nearby. The core of the issue, as will be seen below, 
was that professionals on the design team were unsure about whether the 10% 
renewable energy generation figure was to be calculated opposite the regulated energy 
consumption alone, or also on predictions for the unregulated energy consumption. 
  
Although the thermal model was within the expertise domain of EngineersCo, 
ArchitectureCo were the ones responsible to submitting the results of thermal modelling 
to local planning authorities as part of their contract administration responsibilities. This 
resulted in the following experiential alignments - EngineersCo had the specialist 
knowledge about the workings and constitution of the thermal model, while 
ArchietctureCo were well informed on the wider business and regulatory environment 
surrounding the construction project in general given their higher understanding of 
building regulations and various practicalities associated with them. Table 5.2 represents 
overall positions and awareness of each group in relation to the thermal model. 
 
  ArchitectureCo EngineersCo ConstructionCo 
Position 
regarding the 
Thermal Model 
To be completed as 
soon as possible. 
Negotiation and 
interpretation of 
inputs acceptable. 
Requires 
comprehensive data 
and calculations. 
Needs to be fully 
compliant with the 
contract and 
regulations. 
Is a risk to the 
construction 
process that needs 
to be overcome as 
soon as possible. 
Knowledge 
about thermal 
modelling 
Low High Low 
Knowledge of 
regulations 
High Low Intermediate 
Table 5.2. Relative positions of expertise with respect to the thermal model 
  
Events in the following sequence demonstrate how a senior project architect navigates 
collaborative work in order to achieve acceptable balance between process and practice. 
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Consequently, there is significant space to observe symptoms of memory-like processes 
as architects interpret architecture in light of ArchitectureCo’s interests. The vignette is 
presented in two parts: 1) emergence of distinctions between agendas of different 
practitioners and 2) the use and production of experiences from negotiating process and 
practice. The first part begins when issues caused by the thermal model were first 
brought up in an email exchange between ConstructionCo, ArchitectureCo and the rest of 
the design team (see email trails below). The conversation centred on a request for an 
overdue item from EnginnersCo: 
  
Email from Construction Manager (ConstructionCo) to the Design Team: 
ArchitectureCo is desperate for all remaining info to be forwarded to them for issue 
to Building Control, at the moment we are constructing the building at risk as they 
have not signed off any of the calcs etc. We asked for this info for over four weeks 
ago and each agreed date has been missed. Therefore can you please issue all 
information as requested by end of this year. 
  
Simultaneous email from ArchitectureCo to EngineersCo: 
We really need to issue your thermal model that is in line with your design [for 
mechanical and electrical services]. The ConsultantsCo results are not conclusive 
and cannot be submitted as this will cause confusion down the line with Building 
Control. 
  
Reply by EngineersCo to ArchitectureCo: 
[…] we need to evaluate and check all the revised AV [Audio Visual equipment] 
requirements issued last Thursday, also we need to complete our preliminary 
lighting design. We also need to carry out full due-diligence checks. We apologize for 
any inconvenience this may cause, but we need the thermal model to be as correct 
as possible and not lead us into a false sense of security. 
  
As is evident from the above exchange, the thermal model and all associated work has 
been collectively established to be in the domain of the engineers. That being said, the 
submission of the thermal model to local authorities fell on the ArchitectureCo. While the 
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architects had no capability to produce such a complex, technical engineering artefact 
they, nonetheless, bore responsibility for ensuring that the construction process followed 
through all the proper judicial-administrative protocols maintained by the local building 
control. It is for this reason that they requested the thermal model from the engineers via 
the design team as well as directly. EngineersCo declined the request stating that it would 
take another few months for them to produce a satisfactory model that would be able to 
meet contractual and regulatory obligations. Following this initial virtual interaction, the 
construction manager then made another attempt at pressing for the thermal model by 
email, which was formally rebuffed by EngineersCo. All parties then agreed to resolve the 
situation in a joint phone call the following day. During that discussion, mechanical 
engineers from EngineersCo convinced the construction manager and the architects that 
it would be neither possible nor wise to submit an incomplete thermal model to building 
control at this time.        
  
The situation brought to the fore the practical concerns of each group. Obtaining planning 
permissions and keeping in line with regulatory procedures is within the field of 
responsibility of ArchitectureCo, so the architects were obviously keen to submit the 
required documents to local authorities on schedule. However, these documents 
(thermal model results) could be only sourced from mechanical engineers from 
EngineersCo, who were reasonably reluctant to produce anything that might ‘lead us into 
a false sense of security’. Not accountable for the progress of the project as far as contract 
administration was concerned, engineers were determined to continue working on the 
model for as long as they deemed necessary. ConstructionCo found themselves in a 
situation of high uncertainty in relation to ArchitectureCo and EngineersCo, unable to 
expedite the production of the thermal model nor fully appreciating the position 
ArchitectureCo found themselves in with regards to contract administration duties. At 
this point this position enveloped conflicting priorities - from the point of view of 
architectural practice, it was important to make certain the thermal model represented 
energy production and consumption in the best possible way; from the point of view of 
architectural process, however, inability of EngineersCo to produce something they were 
responsible for on time was an unwelcome nuisance that could, potentially, delay other 
work and incur penalties. 
129 
 
  
Fifteen weeks from the initial interaction presented above, the design team was no closer 
to a satisfactory thermal model than before. Minor progress was made towards 
identifying why the existing model seemed inadequate, and the design team was 
approaching a scheduled DTM where a discussion devoted to this issue would take place. 
As anticipated, the aim of that part of the meeting was to assure that 10% of building’s 
energy consumption would come from renewable sources, as per regulations. The fact 
that the current thermal model still indicated non-compliance with the 10% requirement 
was an unexpected finding since, as was discovered by the senior architect, 
ConsultantsCo submitted the thermal performance principles that were approved by the 
planning authorities some time prior to the onset of construction. In light of this, the 
design team attempted to make sense of the data and the assumptions embedded in the 
existing thermal model. Simultaneously, an effort to interpret the terminology of the 
regulatory document in order to understand the grounding of the issue took place. Both 
of these processes resulted in the detailed checking of the validity of the input data in 
EngineersCo’s thermal model. 
  
The initial statement by the quantitative surveyor (ConstructionCo), who was to examine 
the regulatory documents prior to the meeting, suggested that the thermal model results 
should be in line with the required indicators: 
  
[...] the way in which the total predicted energy amount is calculated is based on 
regulated and unregulated emissions ... the predicted energy consumption of the 
building, which seems to be 54.83 Kw/m2, as has been suggested by ConsultantsCo, 
seems to be based on just the regulated amount ... [as for] the renewable energy [it] 
creates 6.28 Kw/h per m2, I guess that would be then 11.4% of the regulated energy 
(Quantitative Surveyor, fieldwork notes DTM13). 
  
Following this, the quantitative surveyor quickly added that the document supplied to 
the local authority did not seem to be correct, as it did not include unregulated energy 
consumption. This was met with widespread approval throughout the design team as it 
confirmed pre-existing apprehensions about regulatory requirements. Accepting the 
130 
 
quantitative surveyor’s suggestion as true for the time being, the design team began to 
interrogate validity of raw input data that went into EngineersCo’s non-compliant 
thermal model as shown by the dialogue below. 
  
Construction Manager (ConstructionCo): … you said here that the output [from the 
thermal model] is from the BRUKL total certificate [energy consumption document 
submitted with the planning application by ConsultantsCo]. How would you 
establish that? 
Senior Engineer (EngineersCo): Through the thermal model. 
Construction Manager: So you drew your thermal model? 
Senior Engineer: ... we drew our thermal model, put in the renewables based all the 
PV [solar energy panels] on the roof etc., and we come up with that figure. 
Construction Manager: So you come up with the same 54.83? 
Engineer (EngineersCo): Yeah, that ... As far as I’m aware. 
Construction Manager: In our view, how you came to that statement is what we’re 
struggling with... 
Engineer: We’ve re-issued our model to you ... 
Quantitative Surveyor: ...it just seems a remarkable coincidence that these [thermal 
model results] would be the same [as those suggested by ConsultantsCo but based 
on regulated energy consumption only]! 
  
Drawing on the information available to all parties (such as the BRUKL certificate 
submitted much earlier in the project, basic knowledge of building thermodynamics) as 
well as construction experience, the construction manager attempted to further 
interrogate professionally inaccessible mechanics of thermal modelling. However, since 
materiality used to create the model was not part of the shared materiality available to 
ConstructionCo, it was not clear to them how EngineersCo’s thermal model was showing 
identical results to the one provided by ConsultantsCo but still remained non-compliant 
with the 10% requirement was unclear. On the other hand, for the engineers from 
EngineersCo, such questioning of the way they did their work was most bewildering. 
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In an effort to defuse the growing tension caused by the failure to reach a common 
understanding of the mechanics behind the thermal model, EngineersCo purposefully 
shifted the thrust of the conversation towards the terminology surrounding the 
regulatory requirement. As far as EngineersCo were concerned, interrogating the way a 
thermal model is put together was irrelevant and what required investigation was the 
data that went into the model. 
  
Engineer: What I would’ve done, if I would be looking at this job as a consultant - I’d 
probably say, “look we’ve been looking at regulated; we can’t work out the 
unregulated, but we can do benchmarks and we can do calculations on benchmarks, 
which then we could give you an indication”. 
Construction Manager: They [ConsultantsCo] just can’t be asked. 
Quantitative Surveyor: In principle, in our documents, are instances when it can 
come down to variations. 
Construction Manager: Yes, it’s somewhere. The caveat where you can say that for 
certain reasons… this is why we haven’t... [met the requirements] I’ve read it 
yesterday 
Engineer: Yeah, I mean, now at this point in time we could do it - we could make 
assessments, footplans, but then we’d have to go to them and say “look, it’s not 10% 
- it could be whatever!” 
Senior Engineer (EngineersCo): It’s a double barrel there because all the 
information ConsultantsCo provided, PV [solar energy panels], etc., that was all 
compliant with that requirement. But now, all of a sudden, we may have to find 
money for extra PV [solar energy panels] to meet that requirement. 
Senior Architect (ArchitectureCo): How much more PV would you require and 
where would we put it? 
Engineer and Senior Engineer: Well, we don’t know. 
Architect: And where would we put it? 
Senior Engineer: Yes, where would we put it!? 
  
While it may appear that up until now there was little to no explicit input from the 
architect in the presented situation, it is important to recognize that architectural 
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practice is only possible in conjunction with other specialists. What was observed thus 
far was a glimpse of architectural practice, but not of architectural process (Brown and 
Duguid, 2000). Performing their work largely in the absence of process, these specialists 
displayed limited structure but heightened contestation (Engestrom, 1987; Nicolini, 
2007) and indeterminacy (Rouse, 2007). Brown and Duguid (2000) suggested that 
practices devout of processes may take on a rather haphazard form. This is observable in 
the data above, especially when considered in light of Schatzki’s (2006) emphasis on the 
purposiveness of both the organizational and practice memory. In the absence of shared 
materiality and of adequate process, it repeatedly proved troublesome for the design 
team to build upon their individual experiences to resolve the matter. These results 
support the thinking that preceded the vignette, where it was anticipated that process 
plays a key role in enabling the translation of individual experiences of and from practice 
into organizational memory. 
   
The following part of the vignette continues observations of the same situation. Here, 
however, the architects introduce a degree of process into collective work with the result 
being a more structured, directed and ArchitectureCo-solicited decision concerning the 
thermal model. The observations presented below not only demonstrate that importing 
process into a practice gets the work done, but also that organization-specific process can 
import organization-specific agendas into the said work. This theme will emerge again in 
Chapter 6, foregrounding how ‘thoughts’ (see section 5.2) making up organizational 
memory of ArchitectureCo shape the way collective work is done even on an inter-
organizational level. Here, however, the introduction of process by the architect allowed 
for the emergence of experiences relevant to the resolution of the thermal model 
problem. 
  
Commenting on the events presented as part of the vignette above, Senior Architect G 
reported the following: 
  
If ConsultantsCo, who have been on this project since day one, are not worried then 
neither am I [...] planners signed it off, and not as a condition but actually signed it 
off, so I wouldn’t be worried about this [...] the whole thing will just go away, but if 
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not it’s up to EngineersCo to sort this out – they are the ones making the [thermal] 
model. […] It is a responsibility of EngineersCo and a conversation between 
EngineersCo and ConsultantsCo, not my problem really (conversation with Senior 
Architect G after DMT13). 
  
When later approached to elaborate on the above statement more, Senior Architect G 
shed further light on his experience of practicing architecture concerning the issues 
around the thermal model: 
  
You have to learn that you are in a very specific place in a project and that you are 
there for a reason. Your job is to make sure other people do theirs and not do it for 
them. I really dislike… there is nothing worse for me then having to get on the phone 
and tell people to do what they’re supposed to be doing anyway. And everybody 
knows what they’re supposed to be doing! We’ve all been practicing this for a while. 
But every so often others will try to put [part of their workload] on you… It’s 
something I had to learn early on when I started out as an architect – I’m really 
happy to be a nice guy and non-confrontational but when you end up spending 
Sunday evening at the office because the other guy didn’t do it and you have to pick 
up the slack… and it’s not his fault, it’s yours for allowing others to put you in this 
position! […] basically I learned through doing this over time that it’s important to 
keep those professional boundaries in place […] not only for my own sake in terms 
of spending time with my family […] but, ultimately, for the good of the project 
because I really can’t be going around doing other people’s work for them 
(conversation with Senior Architect G prior to DTM 14). 
  
The two conversations above shed insight into the role of experience in the 
organizational memory ArchitectureCo. The comments by Senior Architect G repeatedly 
alluded to the distinction between practicing architecture and architecture as a process. 
Specifically, references to “everybody knows what they’re supposed to be doing” and 
“we’ve all been practicing this for a while” point to individual experiences that have to do 
with qualification for the job; while references to do with learning to “keep professional 
boundaries in place” indicate the more functional role of individual experiences of 
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practicing architecture within the bounds of organizational processes. This suggests that 
individual experiences of doing architecture contribute to organizational memory only 
in the context of organizational processes as defined by Brown and Duguid (2000). 
  
This part begins when the construction manager (ConstructionCo) proposed increasing 
the generation of renewable energy by adding more solar energy panels (PV). This would 
alter the design of the building and require procurement of additional units of this 
expensive technology. Yet, it would increase the share of renewable energy that could 
potentially offset the perceived shortfall in meeting the regulatory requirement of 10% 
renewable energy generation. 
  
While adding solar panels would be merely inconvenient for EngineersCo (on account of 
re-doing large amounts of calculations) and ConstructionCo (on account of having to 
purchase the PV panels), it was highly undesirable for ArchitectureCo because it would 
involve many hours of (unwarranted) design and redesign work. For architects, altering 
the design would change the aesthetics of the roof of the new building as well as generate 
numerous additional drawings of these changes and coordinate them with all other 
technical drawings that were already agreed upon and signed off. Furthermore, a change 
of such magnitude would require formal approval from the client. Gaining such approval 
of design changes from the client involved starting a highly formal, lengthy and energy 
consuming process of cross-organizational bureaucracy. In a nutshell, ArchitectureCo 
now faced the challenge of constructing a space that would make their practical concerns 
(to not alter existing design) intelligible to others and, in the event they fail to do so, to 
propose an alternative course of action. 
  
Construction Manager (ConstructionCo): That would mean almost doubling the 
PV’s, going up to 12%. 
Architect (ArchitectureCo): Can’t we take... we can agree with ConsultantsCo that 
they can adjust the equation, because in theory CHP [combined heat and power] is 
a form of renewable as it were. And could we work in the district heating for the 
whole location? 
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Quantitative Surveyor (ConstructionCo): Consulting Engineer (ConsultantsCo) did 
mention that was a possibility. I think the difficulty with that is that he’s got a hell of 
a lot calculation to do to prove consumption of energy by every building. 
Architect: Well, we really can’t have more PV. 
Engineer (EngineersCo): Yeah, we know that… 
Architect: If we put more PV on the new building where the only real place is the 
plant room roof behind the parapet, then we’d have to re-check all the loadings for 
the roof. 
Engineer: Yeah… I mean if you went through all the methods... 
Senior Engineer: One of the problems at the moment is that there is nobody in the 
council who can provide the information on where or if that’s needed. 
Architect: That’s one question that may determine what we’re going to do. The 
council may consider reducing the 10% requirement if combined heat and power 
usage is implemented and the building can demonstrate that this provides sufficient 
carbon savings. Percentage reduction will depend on individual circumstances of 
development and the size of the CHP. So this may be key to getting this 10% to work. 
  
ArchitectureCo purposefully established a firm boundary between themselves and the 
design team on anything that had to do with proposing design changes to the roof of the 
building. The boundary was clearly manifest by active refusal to engage in any kind of 
deliberation, hypothetical or not, on design alterations. This is because from an 
architectural perspective such change was undesirable, so, instead, the architects put 
forwards an alternative course of action. Note that this course of action is consistent with 
what Senior Architect G reported at the beginning of the second part of the vignette 
above. In it, s/he talks about learning to manipulate boundaries in interdisciplinary work 
as one of the key skills of being a ‘good’ architect as far as process is concerned. Drawing 
on their extensive knowledge of the industry, architects proposed that instead of trying 
to make sense of regulatory requirements within the team, the design team ought to 
contact the local authority under a guise and enquire about this one particular clause in 
the regulations (the one about which type of energy, regulated and/or unregulated, to 
include in thermal modelling). This would alleviate uncertainty over potential non-
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compliance with the 10% requirement with minimum effort and, most importantly, no 
additional architectural work. 
  
Senior Architect (ArchitectureCo): I can contact them on another project and 
discuss it. 
Engineer (EngineersCo): As in? 
Architect: To say, you know, what is your opinion? We’re looking to put a scheme 
together in your area. 
Engineer: If I was ringing the council cold, the question I would like to ask is how 
strict are the council about meeting this 10% regulation on unregulated energy? 
Senior Architect: A lot of councils have dropped this. Furthermore, we’re enclosing 
the whole building, we’re reaching BREEAM Excellent and EPC A rating [both top 
environmental performance ratings], and we’ve got PV, lots of it! And OK, the 
calculations are showing 5% but in reality we’re doing a lot more for the 
environment, so will you allow that to be dropped in terms of unregulated energy. 
Engineer: Well that’s the email we had from Consulting Engineer, which we are 
basically in agreement with. We agree that it’s all better than building up to 
regulation. But then there is the contract clause that we should comply with. 
Senior Architect: I did speak to the regional planning consultants on this matter as 
well, and asked their opinion. Their opinion, on the sustainability team, is that they 
had this problem in the past on other big projects and the way they got around it is 
by keeping stumped. Basically, because the planners generally don’t have people to 
monitor this until next year, when they will have to employ a monitoring person who 
could pick up on this, and by then it’s too late to start monitoring this - if it’s been 
discharged and you’ve finished. 
Engineer: Right… 
Senior Architect: So he said if you can avoid having this condition discharged, it’s 
really best not to open this can of worms. So that was his recommendation. 
  
Drawing on a deep understanding of the regulatory framework, Senior Architect 
proposes that instead of engaging in definitional struggles with each other, the design 
team should continue with construction as it is. This proposal was based on the 
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experiences of the architect and a consultation with trusted colleagues who are experts 
on the matter. The conclusion was that because it is practically difficult for local 
authorities to oversee compliance with this particular clause on every occasion it might 
be best to proceed with construction as normal and not attract too much attention to the 
project by asking for clarifications from external parties. In the event the project would, 
after all, be challenged the architect expressed certainty that in light of the generally 
impressive environmental performance of the building, local authorities would overlook 
the violation. In the end, the combined pressure of thermal model submission deadlines 
and uncertainty over a risk-free course of action effectively paralyzed any action by the 
engineering part of the design team – an outcome most eagerly facilitated by 
ArchitectureCo. 
  
In summary, it appears that experiences contribute to organizational memory only where 
practices are performed with reference to organizational processes, as defined by Brown 
and Duguid (2000). This seems intuitively correct, as in order for experiences of practice 
to traverse into the realm of the organization there ought to be some kind of contextual 
framing in place (similar to Tuertscher, Garud, and Kumaraswamy, 2014). Consequently, 
it is key to consider how experiences of practices interplay with organizational processes 
in order to understand the contribution of what practitioners do to organizational 
memory. At the same time, this aspect of Schatzki’s (2006) definition illuminates the 
importance of organizational processes and the coordinating effect they have on 
practices. As Brown and Duguid (2000) pointed out, too much process runs the risk of 
suffocating practices whereas too little process negates the organization altogether. This 
seems to hold true for organizational memory as well – as experiences of practices inform 
organizational processes, organizational processes enable the experiences to contribute 
to organizational memory. However, too little process not only disengages organizational 
memory from individual experiences needed for it to grow and continue, but also exposes 
existing processes to the outside influence of external organizations. This is what 
happened in the vignette above, as ArchitectureCo imported their organizational process 
into the otherwise poorly structured interdisciplinary performance of architectural 
practice in order to press for a favourable result.     
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5.4 ABILITIES AND READINESSES 
  
In this section, I will consider the role of abilities and readinesses in organizational 
memory together. This is because, as was outlined at the beginning of section 4.1, abilities 
and readinesses are closely related; with readinesses being a future state of abilities 
(similar to Nicolini, 2009). The function of abilities in organizational memory is closely 
related to the technology and other equipment available to architects. Because 
organizational memory as a practice is largely reliant on individuals performing 
particular actions in particular ways and in particular environments, abilities to do 
architecture (afforded by the tools of work and shared materiality) form the basis of this 
aspect of Schatzki’s (2006) definition. In turn, readiness, in organizational memory, is a 
measure/quality of whether abilities can be actualized. Empirical data suggests that 
abilities contribute to organizational by legitimizing the practice; and readinesses allow 
for the emergence and submergence of organizational memory. 
          
5.5.1 Abilities as a form of legitimacy 
  
A degree of legitimacy that a practice has plays an important role in indicating the relative 
position of that practice to its direct competitors within the broader social environment. 
Practices are both historically situated and exist in a perpetual state of friction (Nicolini, 
2007, 2012). In thus follows that in order to understand how organizational memory as 
a practice work, the historical conditions of inter-practice frictions ought to be 
considered as these are very likely to have an effect on organizational memory. This is 
what I mean by the term “legitimacy” – the historically informed relative standing of 
complementary practices (e.g. architecture, construction and engineering). 
   
Schlaich (2006) provides an informative outline of an uneasy historical relationship 
between the architectural and the engineering practice. It is noteworthy that this 
relationship was largely predicated on the availability of particular technologies and 
tools of work. The division in the practice of building occurred during the industrial 
revolution when, following advances in techniques for manufacturing iron and steel 
structures of predetermined geometry and strength, the practices of architecture and 
139 
 
engineering emerged. Architects succeeded a large portion of the work previously done 
by the master builder, whereas focused on the physical properties of materials. As a 
result, the engineering practice gained legitimacy over the architectural practice in so far 
as erecting structures was concerned, with the architects retreating to academic and 
decorative roles due to lack of expert power. Schlaich (2006) writes that this initial divide 
still has an effect on the relationship between the two practices (p. 6). 
  
The dominance of the engineering practice continued until the early 1900, when 
developments in the technology of reinforced concrete allowed the architects to bypass 
the restricted and highly specialist knowledge base of structural engineering. Using 
reinforced concrete allowed architects to “free themselves” from the “shackles” bestowed 
upon them by the engineer and push the boundaries of what, at the time, was considered 
to be the limit of building design (Giedion, 1967: 325). Giedion (1967) writes of a 
significant shock sustained by the engineering practice because of this ‘switch’ where 
they ceded knowledge expertise concerning physical properties of building materials 
(the dominant one becoming reinforced concrete). One of the consequences of this 
change is that the prevailing attitude between the two practices today is that the architect 
is responsible for the design and the engineer for structural integrity of the building 
(Schlaich, 2006). 
  
This relationship was still palpable during the period of data collection, with architectural 
practitioners not only exercising formal authority in the area of project administration, 
but also, in the words of Giedion (1967), taking initiative and imposing demands. Chapter 
6 will touch upon some of these issues in more detail, but with regards to how abilities of 
architects to manipulate the materiality of all practices involved – the building materials 
(reinforced concrete) in this case – contribute to organizational memory, tools of work 
deserve particular attention. 
  
The primary tool of work used by the architects was Computer Aided Design Software 
suite (CAD). This particular tool of work was not exclusive to the architects and was, in 
fact, used by all specialists partaking on the project, at least to some extent. However, it 
was the architects who had the ability to use CAD to produce building designs. While 
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evocative of practice memory, not least due to the design-focused process of architectural 
education and socialization, the ability of architects to design buildings using a standard 
tool of practice does not count towards organizational memory, as defined by Schatzki 
(2006). It is, nevertheless, clear that abilities of certain professional groups to skilfully 
perform key parts of practices place them at a dominant position with respect to their 
colleagues. The challenge is then, once again, to untangle the practice from the 
organization in order to understand whether abilities play a part in organizational 
memory or not. 
  
In this respect, a survey of what architects can and cannot do is not particularly revealing. 
Instead, because abilities are tied to legitimacy via historical inter-practice relations and 
technology, it is worth concentrating on what ArchitectureCo does when, during project 
work, responsibilities as to how to use the tools of work are negotiated. As part of that, I 
will also consider which tools of work, exactly, are available to ArchitectureCo. 
  
To begin with which tools of work are available to architects in ArchitectureCo, two types 
of systems are noteworthy. First, the previously mentioned CAD software suite, and, Two, 
a high-end Building Information Modelling (BIM) software package. The former, being an 
established tool of work for a number of different specialists within the construction 
industry was the ‘standard’, whereas the new and emerging BIM system was at the stage 
of implementation. An in-depth description of BIM is not necessary here, but it will suffice 
to say that it functions in a significantly different way from CAD. As Architectural 
Technician J described the difference between the two: “Transitioning to BIM from CAD is 
like going from drawing to coding – it is very different from what everyone here is used to, 
and so many are struggling with this”. The two key differences between the two design 
tools were that: 1) BIM offered a 3-D, immersive way of experiencing a blueprint of a 
building, allowing the designer to “fly” and “walk” through the exterior and interior of the 
building in virtual reality concurrent with designing them, and 2) BIM did not require the 
designer to draw out every single element of the building, relying instead on pre-made 3-
D representations of actual products available from suppliers. Architect K summarized 
this as “playing with Lego’s instead of actually designing”. The significance of this 
information is that, while still in its early days during the time of the study, BIM was 
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considered by a number of practitioners in the area of building design and construction 
to potentially enable the engineers to side line the architects concerning the design 
process. In other words, even though the architects were strategically positioning 
themselves to learn and transition to the BIM infrastructure, this technology posed a very 
real threat to the legitimacy of their practice. 
  
While BIM was not yet an established part of architectural practice at the time of the 
study, ArchitectureCo invested considerable time and resources in developing this ability 
for their staff. Not all BIM software suites are alike, with available ones ranging both in 
terms of price and in terms of things that they can do. Accordingly, there is a limit on 
organizational ability to utilize BIM in their work. This is contingent on personnel 
training and infrastructure (i.e. level of sophistication of the available software). While 
novice architects can only do so much on even the most upscale software available, even 
someone very experienced will be limited by a basic software. With this respect, there is 
the actual ability to make use of what is available, and the potential ability of how far 3-
D building design can be developed within such an organization. In many ways, this is 
very similar to the historical struggles between structural steel and reinforced concrete 
(Giedion, 1967; Schlaich, 2006), and is potentially evocative of how abilities contribute 
to organizational memory.  
  
ArchitectureCo appeared to be most persuaded to develop its BIM design abilities. The 
organization procured a number of BIM workstations (each costing an annual £90,000), 
hired a BIM manager and purchased a series of training sessions from the manufacturer 
of the BIM software they bought. Whereas the BIM manager was already in place before 
I began collecting data, the training sessions and proliferation of workstations became 
readily observable only about a year later. It was evident that ArchitectureCo was fast 
preparing to transition from CAD to BIM as their primary tool of work. 
  
This behaviour, however, was very different when it came to dealing with engineers 
already proficient with BIM. During the early stages of the office extension project (Case 
1), the Design Team was making a decision as to whether to use CAD or BIM for the 
dissemination and circulation of design drawings. Structural Engineers had, by that time, 
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fully embraced BIM and so were keenly advertising the technology to the rest of the 
design team. A particularly heavy emphasis was placed on the real time collaboration 
made possible by that version of BIM, as well as the 3-D representation of the building. 
While other engineers seemed persuaded, ArchitectureCo, despite having invested 
heavily in this capability and undergone considerable training, refused the notion and 
reiterated, in strong terms, the necessity to use CAD. One of the main reasons for this 
given to me post-meeting was that: 
  
“BIM is interesting and a great system but we cannot work with it here. We haven’t 
yet tested what we can do with it and there is no way to know if it will work for 
others. They [Structural Engineers], I think, know what they are doing but we can’t 
know and we will need to stay ahead of all that is being done, design wise. This is not 
the right project for that” (Director J). 
  
“I haven’t worked with it [BIM] yet so I don’t know. It seems very interesting but I 
prefer to stick with something I know at this stage” (Senior Architect G). 
  
In addition to indicating lack of certainty over their ability to work with BIM, these 
interview extracts allude to concern over losing control over the design process. Most 
specifically, anxiety over being potentially side lined by the engineers, or over appearing 
insufficiently knowledgeable about the performance of practice was substantial. Having 
defended the role of CAD in the design process ArchitectureCo also maintained their 
superior degree of legitimacy as a professional practice.  
  
The role of organization in relating abilities of practitioners to organizational memory 
has most to do with making particular technologies and developmental opportunities in 
place. ArchitectureCo recognized the significance that maintaining a leading role in a 
project may have on the design decisions, and were keen to remain in a position of 
dominant legitimacy when CAD is superseded by BIM on a level of practice in the future.  
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5.5.2 Readinesses: how anticipation ‘emerges’ and ‘submerges’ organizational 
memory in practice 
  
In addition to highlighting the concerns over legitimacy borne out of the potential 
application of the BIM system on the offices extension project, the observations I 
presented above also draw attention to a developing a ‘readiness’ to use certain abilities. 
Schatzki (2006) did not specify what this aspect of organizational memory means, nor 
what is the role of the organization in committing ‘readinesses’ to its memory. It stands 
to reason that readinesses relate to abilities in so far as organizations and practitioners 
anticipate (or do not) ways of performing various practices (Nicolini, 2011). In the case 
of ArchitectureCo this was visible as the organization prepared to transition their design 
abilities from CAD to the new BIM technology. 
Considering ‘readinesses’ with regards to their effects on the routine performance of 
organizational practices, two characteristics stand forth: submergence and emergence 
(in this order). Both of these terms refer to the ways in which organizational memory is 
made ‘ready’ by and for the practitioners. The reason for the proposed terminological 
choice is to break up the intuitively linear conception of time (see Chapter 3) in order to 
highlight how practices are situated in the spatio-temporal manifold of the organization. 
This particular linguistic choice was made to capture the processual aspect of these 
processes. The terms ‘submergence’ and ‘emergence’ are intended to invoke an 
association with a semi-conscious/controlled event. Alternative terms that have been 
considered include ‘imprinting’, ‘inscription’, and ‘impression’. However, these were 
considered too strong or too stiff to communicate the two phenomena.     
Submergence of practices “into” organizational memory refers to how particular ways of 
doing and saying things become embedded in the shared materiality and tools of work 
(see Chapter 6), and emergence of practices “from” organizational memory refers to how 
individuals plan and execute new work with reference to regimes of actions, thoughts, 
experiences and abilities enveloped by the organization (Chapter 7). 
With this in mind, the role of ‘readinesses’ in organizational memory has most to do with 
whether an organization can provide the necessary ‘thoughts’ (see section 5.2.) and 
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shared materiality (see section 5.3) to perpetuate ‘abilities’ (see section 5.4.1) into the 
future. When satisfied, these three aspects of Schatzki’s (2006) definition of 
organizational memory make it possible for practitioners to submerge ways of doing 
work into their organizational surroundings, as well as to emerge it from these 
surroundings when conceiving new designs. 
During my time with ArchitectureCo neither the thoughts, the shared materiality nor the 
organizational abilities have been interrupted. This allowed ArchitectureCo to remain 
consistent in its design output even when moving offices 6 years prior to the 
commencement of the study. While archival analysis uncovered that some elements of 
the pre-move ArchitectureCo were discontinued after the change in their physical 
surroundings, these had no visible effect on how ArchitectureCo did architecture. 
Consequently, it is not possible to compare the effects of not- “readinesses” on 
organizational memory using this data. However, the effects of “readinesses” are, indeed, 
readily observable as will be illustrated in the following two Chapters. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Empirical analysis of Schatzki’s (2006) theoretical definition of organizational memory 
revealed a nuanced picture of the relationship not only between the elements of the 
definition but also between the practice and the organization. A persistent effort was 
required to discern which parts of empirical observations had to do with the 
organization, and which with the practice. On the one hand, this illustrated that a 5-part 
definition of organizational memory proposed by Schatzki (2006) is not focused on the 
organization enough, frequently overlapping with those aspects of work most readily 
attributed to practice as a whole. Activities, for example, are almost entirely unrelated to 
the organizational memory. Thoughts, however, play a key role in forming the 
organizational topography of power relations, thus making a key contribution to 
organizational memory. Experiences take part in organizational memory mainly by 
means of shared materiality, and abilities highlight why shared materiality is there in the 
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first place. Finally, readinesses have been observed to be organizational only in an 
analytical sense. 
On the other hand, an empirically sandblasted definition of organizational memory as a 
practice is now able to suggest the three elements in need of further examination: 
thoughts, experiences and abilities. Because only parts of these elements have been 
qualified as relating to organizational memory, however, I will reconceptualise these as 
power, materiality of work, and the site of practice respectively. The ensuing 
investigation of these three elements in Chapters 6 and 7 will first consider them during 
submergence (in Chapter 6) and then during emergence (in Chapter 7). 
 
5.7 SUMMARY 
 
This Chapter subjected the definition of organizational memory proposed by Schatzki 
(2006) to empirical data collected from ArchitectureCo. Each of the five elements of the 
definition has been evaluated separately with one of the elements (Activities) suspended 
and parts of all other elements refined to a more organization-focused understanding. 
The remaining aspects of the original definition have been reconceptualised as power, 
materiality of work and the site of practice in order to avoid analytical confusion during 
further analysis. The final element in the definition – readinesses – will be used as an 
analytical frame in order to present power, materiality of work and the site of practice 
during a more in-depth evaluation of organizational memory in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY AS A SUBMERGENT PROCESS 
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
  
Building on the empirically refined definition of organizational memory suggested at the 
end of the previous Chapter, this part of the thesis will evaluate how practitioners 
perform organizational memory via power, materiality of work and the site of practice 
during the ‘submergent’ type of readinesses. 
 
In order to do so, I will focus on the data from the office building extension project (Case 
1). Focusing on the use of materiality of practice – design drawings – I will demonstrate 
how practitioners ‘submerge’ regimes of doings and sayings into their tools of work. More 
specifically, I am going to explore the relationship between power, esoteric materiality, 
and organizational memory by looking at how tools of work perpetuate (or not) certain 
regimes of doing things (Nicolini, 2013; Schatzki, 2002) through both situations and 
environments. This is broadly what I refer to as the ‘submergent’ part of the 
organizational memory spectrum. The reason why the processes to be discussed here are 
‘submergent’ is because of observable effects that ArchitectureCo’s tools of work had on 
the conduct of work in other organizations. It was empirically observable how objects 
used by the architects had an impact on the working practices of other specialist, even in 
the absence of the architect – hence the metaphor of submerging experiences, thoughts 
and abilities into materiality of work. 
 
An interdisciplinary work setting was chosen to illustrate this phenomenon is because of 
the close relationship between work practices in organizations and organizational 
memory as a practice. As was suggested by Schatzki (2006), as well as shown during the 
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analytical untangling of practices and organization in the previous Chapter, it is very 
difficult to consider organizational memory separately from practice memory. 
Accordingly, in order to study organizational memory of ArchitectureCo in practice, it is 
key to maintain all the aspects of the said practice, other professional groups included. 
 
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows: First, I will expand on what 
materiality of organizational memory is. This will be followed by methodological 
considerations about where the materiality of organizational memory is best observed 
and why design drawings are a suitable unit of analysis/convergence. The next three 
sections will look at the process of submergence of organizational memory and its 
different characteristics. The Chapter will then conclude with a summary and some final 
remarks. 
  
  
6.2. ABOUT MATERIALITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY 
  
The focal point of analysis in this Chapter is materiality of work. There are two ways in 
which organizational memory-related materiality manifests itself: 1) through materiality 
around which practices revolve and 2) through materiality which revolves around 
practices. For the purposes of clarity, I will refer to these representations of materiality 
as exoteric and esoteric objects respectively. This analytical distinction will help me 
highlight important power relations later on in the Chapter. 
 
Exoteric objects are those instances of materiality on which practices are centred. For 
instance, some parts of architectural practice are only concerned with looking at and 
documenting existing buildings. Similarly, landscape architecture is most primarily 
concerned with the existing materiality of the landscape. Exoteric materiality is that 
materiality which is freely available in the world; that which is explicitly public. Esoteric 
materiality, on the other hand, is that materiality which exists as a function of 
organizational processes and is, therefore, exclusive to those organizations and practices. 
These include design drawings and blueprints of buildings for specific projects. These 
instances of esoteric materiality may be more key to the successful performance of 
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practices than those of exoteric materiality, but they are also more restricted and hidden 
from observation. 
 
Making this distinction is warranted primarily because of the current work on 
organizational memory concerned with exoteric objects. As introduced in Chapter 2, 
there has been a recent resurgence in interest for research in organization studies on 
‘places and spaces of remembrance and commemoration’ (Cutcher et al., 2016) where 
power, identity and material relationships of organizational memory are expressed (Dale 
and Burrell, 2008). The objects then bring out the practices and memories located in 
memory. This area of collective memory research is almost exclusively concerned with 
exoteric materiality. 
 
Compared to exoteric materiality, esoteric materiality works in different ways. It is not 
meant to elicit a reflexive response in individuals and collectives (in the same way as 
places of commemoration are). Moreover, esoteric materiality normally fulfils a role 
instrumental to a particular organization and to enabling the performance of practices 
there. Some examples of esoteric materiality found in ArchitectureCo include: design 
drawings, sketches, archive disks, workstations, notes, design review reports, 
photographs, and physical models of building designs. 
 
Practices are performed by applying tools of work to appropriate situations and 
environments (Schatzki, 2012). These environments, as well as the tools of work, are 
examples of esoteric materiality; not only because they would not normally be available 
to individuals outside of spaces where practices are performed (i.e. organizations), but 
also because the performance of practices is dependent on esoteric materiality in the first 
place (Orlikowski, 2007; Orlikowski and Scott, 2008, 2010). The next section will 
consider the circumstances in which esoteric materiality is most revealing concerning 
organizational memory. 
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6.3. INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES AS AN OBSERVATION POINT FOR 
ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY 
  
Throughout analysis performed in Chapter 5 it became increasingly evident that a 
significant amount of memory-like processes in ArchitectureCo occurs with some 
consideration of material objects AND normative regimes, emergent or otherwise. As this 
aspect of organizational memory in practice has been markedly absent from Schatzki 
(2006), this chapter will explore the relationship between objects and power in relation 
to the topic at hand in more detail. 
 
An immediate methodological difficulty arises at this stage – if organizational memory is 
actualized through objects and power in some way, is it going to be possible to reverse 
the link and arrive at organizational memory by looking at power and objects? Out of 
concern for importing too much power and materiality into the concept of organizational 
memory, it seemed appropriate to not attempt a reverse causation and, instead, find a 
space within organizational practice where the issues of power and materiality might be 
most visible. In other words, a Heideggerian ‘clearing’ needed to have been found for 
those aspects of organizational memory which could be observed in situ (Heidegger, 
1978; Dreyfus, 1991). 
 
Looking back on initial empirical investigations from Chapter 4 (section 4.2.3), a suitable 
clearing was already encountered during interdisciplinary work between architects and 
various engineers. In fact, similar struggles among professional groups to establish 
authority and expertise over knowledge claims in collaborative work are well 
documented in the relevant literature (e.g., Carlile, 2002; Kimble et al., 2010; Lindkvist, 
2005; Bechky, 2006; Bruns, 2013). These are normally attributed to misaligned interests, 
understandings, professional norms and practices – many of the same attributes that 
Schatzki (2006) ascribed to organizational memory. A number of different ways to 
mitigate said misalignments have been explored and one particularly relevant to the 
issues of power, materiality of practice and site of practice – boundary objects – was 
repeatedly highlighted by research subjects during data collection. 
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Boundary objects have been found to play a critical role in mitigating the socio-political 
struggles found in multidisciplinary work (Quick and Feldman, 2014; Bechky, 2003; 
Carlile, 2002; Nicolini et al., 2012; Swan et al., 2007; Barrett et al., 2012). Previous 
research has explored the use of objects in problem solving across occupational and 
professional boundaries (Bechky, 2003); the role of objects in reducing conflict and 
enhancing collaboration across professional disciplines (Keshet  et al., 2013); the impact 
of power differences in helping or hindering object-centred collaboration (Levina and 
Orlikowski, 2009); the ways in which boundary objects help to reconfigure boundary 
relations among occupational groups (Barrett et al., 2012); the implications of such 
reconfigurations for the jurisdictions, status and power of professional groups involved 
in interdisciplinary work (Levina and Arriaga, 2014); and the symbolic power of objects 
in legitimizing claims to knowledge and expertise (Swan et al., 2007). Thus, this stream 
of research pays close attention to the ways in which a myriad of objects influence social 
and power relations that unfold around them. There was, however, little to no direct 
study of the role of boundary objects in organizational memory processes (Chapter 2). 
Moreover, little attention has been paid to what kind of work these objects actually do in 
and by themselves (notable exceptions include Osterlund (2008) and Kravcenko and 
Swan (2016)). Given the prominent role that these organizational artefacts play in 
integrating and relating knowledge of work between different practitioners, and drawing 
on Shatzki’s (2006) inclusion of abilities as a component of organizational memory (see 
section 4.2.4) makes investigation of boundary objects with regards to organizational 
memory very pertinent. 
 
Additionally, repeat observations of architectural work (to be outlined below) suggest 
that an emphasis on activity around objects by individuals is unnecessarily restrictive. 
When considered in conjunction with the note on time and temporality presented in 
Chapter 3, section 3.2.1, a considerably more profound contribution of material objects 
to organizational memory is brought to attention. The literature, with some notable 
exceptions (e.g., Levina and Vaast, 2013; Huvila, 2011), tends to present boundary objects 
as more or less stable artefacts that enable social interaction by allowing differences and 
dependencies across interacting groups to be realized and worked through (Carlile, 
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2002). The work they perform is usually depicted as that of helping individuals to 
recognize, smooth and overcome (or submit to) potential sources of conflict and vested 
interests, allowing arrival at shared understandings or monochrome portrayals (e.g. 
Nissley and Casey’s (2003) study of corporate museums or Decker’s (2014) work on 
building design). Despite the fact that it has long been noted that 'creating and reshaping 
boundary objects is an exercise of power that can be collaborative or unilateral' (Boland 
and Tenkasi, 1995: 362; also Ewenstein and Whyte, 2009; McGivern and Dopson, 2010), 
boundary objects are still comfortably situated in the ‘attribute’ perspective on 
organizational theory. In addition to this, the empirical focus of that research which does 
consider such objects in socio-political terms is centred on how actors interact and 
communicate around a focal object, or objects. 
  
6.3.1 Design drawings as both the materiality of work and the site of practice 
  
These characteristics of boundary objects demonstrate a large degree of overlap with 
what Schatzki (2006) suggested organizational memory as a practice should do. The 
empirically distilled definition arrived at in Chapter 4 similarly highlights many of the 
same communicative and normative aspects. In fact, many boundary objects can be seen 
to embody ‘talk and text’ – the comment or ‘red line’ scrawled on a technical drawing, for 
example (Osterlund, 2008; Bechky, 2003). Indeed, this can be a major mechanism in 
performing organizational memory. In complex projects, like the ones I observed, where 
specialists may not always be able to interact face-to-face this holds especially true. Such 
ways of performing practices, ‘from within’ the objects, were regular and commonplace 
throughout the ArchitectureCo dataset. If one is to consider objects as spatio-temporal 
events of the organization – instances of time within which work (or parts of thereof) 
take place – then the embedded power relations of those objects must necessarily echo 
into other parts of the organization, memory included. For example, Huvila’s (2011) 
study of archaeological reports as boundary objects between specialists with conflicting 
interests, shows how these objects acted as devices for creating and maintaining 
hegemonic power and achieving authority over marginal groups. Huvila's (2011: 2537) 
study highlights that: 'boundary objects incorporate articulations of power even if a 
boundary object may appear as a seemingly neutral consensual device'. Precisely how 
152 
 
power dynamics and negotiation occur through objects themselves, however, remains 
little understood (Hardy and Thomas, 2014). Whilst exploring the knowledge integration 
properties of boundary objects is not the aim of this work (this has been done in 
Kravcenko and Swan, 2016), understanding the different ways in which particular visual 
objects – architectural design drawings - embody practices relevant to performing 
organizational memory is key to understanding how organizational memory is 
submerged into the fabric of collective work. 
 
Design drawings in particular tell a rich story because they qualify as ‘ideal’ types of 
boundary objects (cf. Star and Greismer, 1989) and play an important role in the 
enactment of work among geographically and temporally dispersed individuals. In 
multidisciplinary projects, based on a common relevant knowledge base among distinct 
specialisms involved in the building construction and design, design drawings provide a 
practical means of cross-professional communication and negotiation of how to do work 
(Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2004; Levina and Vaast, 2014). They thus constitute not only one 
of the key tools of work, but also a site within which performance of work takes place. 
For example, drawings are commonly passed between professionals to demonstrate 
and/or seek approval for the parts of accomplished work that they are responsible for 
(Boland et al., 2007). Design drawings embody various kinds of communicative practices, 
including visuospatial, technical and aesthetic (intended layout of the intended building), 
but also discursive (written text, sketches, queries and annotations – Ewenstein and 
Whyte, 2009). 
 
To identify a process of submergence of organizational memory into these objects, I will 
focus on design drawings as they pass back and forth between the professionals on the 
design team of the office building project (e.g., architect to structural engineer and back), 
who ‘edit’ them based on their respective knowledge specializations and pragmatic 
concerns (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). Following Osterlund (2008), design drawings that 
incorporate communicative practices in three respects are particularly interesting to 
understanding how organizational regimes of activities are memorized into an 
organizational memory in a setting where multiple organizations and practices are 
present and at play. This is because such drawings act as an object for evaluation, they 
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are expressive communication mediums, and they are part of an ‘actional field’ of 
communication. 
  
  
6.4 HOW ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY GETS SUBMERGED INTO DESIGN 
DRAWINGS 
  
Design drawings are two-dimensional technical depictions of a building project, 
produced to a set of standards and conventions that render them recognizable and 
intelligible to relevant practitioners (i.e. they are the tools of work). As far as their utility 
goes, however, not all design drawings qualify as ‘boundary objects’ in architecture and 
construction and, even those that do facilitate meaningful work among and between 
practitioners, do so not by virtue of their intrinsic properties of a particular kind, but 
because they mediate aspects and patterns of practice-related information that carry 
pragmatic meaning (Levina and Vaast, 2014). In other words, boundary objects and other 
associated tools of work can be seen as ‘restricted agents’ of work in as much as the site 
of practice that they are capable of providing is very specific – design drawings, for 
example, allow limited textual communication around technical issues, thus requiring a 
certain level of experiences and abilities (see sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4.1). Figure 5.1 is an 
example of a design drawing, prepared by a cladding sub-contractor, and commented on 
by the architect, in one of the projects observed. 
 
Design drawings not only provide a site for practice by means of enabling particular types 
of communication. Practitioners can physically interact with design drawings in a variety 
of ways – they are regularly printed out and collated in huge project folders, they can be 
drawn on (as in Figure 5.1), they can be passed around and mailed between different 
individuals either directly or as email attachments, and they can be (and routinely are) 
torn, crushed, damaged or disposed of in any other physically damaging way. In other 
words, they are both an active part of the work process and a work process in their own 
right. For the duration of the project, design drawings are stored in digital and physical 
project folders, but after the project is completed and the building is ‘signed-off’ by the 
client, they remain preserved in the archives of participating organizations either on blu-
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ray disks or in some other form, for an additional ten years as a record of collective work. 
On the face of it, they are different from more abstract objects, such as linguistic labels or 
metaphors (cf. Czarniawska-Joerges and Joerges, 1990), in that design drawings objectify 
the information embedded in them for more than one person and in a time-enduring form 
(insofar as they represent events of work in their own right – more on this below). 
Concurrently, design drawings also embody material manifestations of more abstract 
concepts and labels such as mathematical formulae and building dimensions (see Figure 
6.1). 
 
One way in which boundary objects, and other associated tools of work, were observed 
to commit ways of performing work to organizational memory was by ‘sponging up’ 
information, rules and instructions of one or more particular practices and making them 
available for translation by someone else. This was only possible, however, when the 
object already embodied some commonly held ideas and concepts to which different 
professionals can refer (Forty, 1986) – in other words, if the object in question was part 
of the shared materiality and not completely unfamiliar in the context of work. 
 
Design drawings displayed this by communicating information on the progress of one 
professionals work to another. As discussed above, design drawings are physical objects, 
but they refer to abstract concepts in restricted, concrete ways (i.e. design of a building 
that does not yet exist). Referencing an abstract concept in a concrete way is done by 
constructing a ‘representational space’ where any relevant information can be made 
intelligible, even across boundaries (Ewenstein and Whyte, 2009; Osterlund, 2008). 
  
6.4.1 The two stages of organizational memory as a submergent process 
 
Submerging practice into organizational memory is a two-stage process. First, the 
originating author must adhere to a set of normative conventions that qualify the object 
they produce as a ‘design drawing’. This entails the use of an appropriate software suite, 
a particular page size, and the use of institutionally and, sometimes, locally agreed upon 
symbols and shapes for particular types of materials and arrangements. Second, the 
author must encode information about the specific design work performed, and arrange 
155 
 
it in a way that will be intelligible by whomever the drawing is intended for. As shown in 
Figure 6.1, on the one hand, when the architect made a comment enquiring about 
whether a particular angle 'between the zinc panel and the vertical louvre' is possible, 
s/he did not sketch out the entire section of the building, only the element in question. 
The information embedded in that very specific sketch was deemed sufficient since it was 
provided in a context appropriate for the cladding sub-contractor to understand. On the 
other hand, the sub-contractor did not draw out the entire building to contextually 
position the particular elements depicted in Figure 6.1 for the benefit of the architect. 
Instead, the title of the drawing refers to the location of the relevant elements within the 
building, on the assumption that this amount of information will be enough for the 
architect to make sense of the design drawing.  
 
Assumptions about which information to include, and in which form, rest upon 
perceptions of the relative levels of expertise and authority amongst participating 
parties. These, of course, are equally perpetuated by the use of such tools of work for this 
kind of work as a matter of practice. 
 
In addition to manifesting a site of practice in which communication is to take place and, 
simultaneously, facilitating a temporal environment in which organizational and cross-
organizational work is to occur, communications via design drawings reveal power 
dynamics by showing how, for example, a sub-contractor working on an element of a 
building is in a position of less authority and expertise relative to the architect in the area 
of building design, but is in a position of high(er) expertise (but still lower authority) 
where more technical specifications are addressed. 
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Figure 6.1. Example of a CAD drawing with comments by the architect 
  
Such discrepancy of powers and authorities among participating practitioners, inevitable 
in work practices (because practices are always contested (Nicolini, 2012)), is key to 
understanding how work practices become submerged into organizational memory. 
Power, and issues of power, were repeatedly highlighted in multiple components of 
organizational memory in Chapter 5 (following Schatzki, 2006). From there it can be 
extrapolated that one of the principal ways in which practices qualify as organizational 
memory is through application of processes of power and authority. As I have noted 
before, such processes are most visible during interdisciplinary work. Interestingly, 
however, even though interdisciplinary work taken place ‘away’ from the organization 
(in projects), because projects are still types of organization (Hobday, 2000), an 
organizational memory of projects still, in theory should form from the materiality 
imported by different specialists. 
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In contrast with other types of brand new organizations, which are yet to develop both 
the infrastructure for organizational memory and the memory itself, projects are always 
composed of parts of different existing organizations, or different subsets of the same 
organizations. What this means is that from the very beginning a project setting becomes 
an arena where elements of different memories of different organizations will converge 
in a power struggle. Neither single one is likely to prevail absolutely, of course, as is also 
indirectly evident in the literature on knowledge dissemination in project-based work 
(e.g. Swan et al., 2010), but, as I have repeatedly observed, a greater or lesser degree of 
dominance will be established by one. 
 
Boundary objects, as focal points of communication between different specialists, are key 
to achieving such dominance. This is because boundary objects are fundamentally objects 
and, more specifically, particular tools of work. Accordingly, tools of work are always 
tools of some particular work/practice, which means that they are not only endowed 
with a particular temporal property generated through their application in said practice 
but also with a specific way in which relevant practitioners put them to use. The latter is 
not prescribed by their physical potential but rather by acceptable terms and conditions 
of use. These, in turn, are a normative product of those practitioners in charge - i.e. 
thoughts (section 5.2.2.) and abilities (section 5.2.3). 
 
Tracing normative affiliations of objects to their organizational memories for each of the 
participating organizations comprising a project will reveal, with some overlap (because 
projects are still made up of compatible specialisms, e.g. construction, specific research, 
film, etc.), the shared materiality in which organizational memory may be submerged. 
Recall an example provided in section 5.2.4.1. earlier, where, as part of the office 
extension project, structural engineer attempted to propose the use of a 3D Building 
Information Modelling software (BIM) for design needs of the project team. The 
proposition was welcome by the construction firm but rejected by the ArchitectureCo. 
Mechanical engineers remained indifferent, albeit slightly curious about applying this 
emergent technology. However, because design is a very much architecture-driven 
practice, the proposal was swiftly and decisively rejected in favour of using 2D Computer 
Aided Design (CAD), which was ‘the way things were done’ in ArchitectureCo (Senior 
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Architect G; Director W). Therefore, it was that all design and design-related information 
handled by the project design team (which was virtually all the information) was handled 
through CAD drawings. Interestingly, which the structural engineer did continue 
preparing structural drawings using BIM, anything they produced was always translated 
to CAD before being issued to the rest of the team and, most specifically, to the architect. 
 
Two memory-related factors in this episode are worth noting. One, ArchitectureCo did 
not insist on CAD because they lacked technical capability or knowledge in BIM, quite the 
opposite. As Senior Architect G and Director W pointed out, this was because of how they 
did things. Not because they could not otherwise, but because of a choice of a particular 
way of performing their practice. In other words, because a particular prevalent 
ArchitectureCo organizational memory was there to commit this work to (the one where 
BIM is a dominant tool of work was still emerging). Two, the democratically unfavourable 
odds of not selecting BIM (2 for, 1 against, and 1 indifferent but sympathetic) were of no 
consequence in this situation because of an already existing demarcation of power 
between these practices. In other words, the respective practice memories underlying a 
project were such that it was up to the architect to make design decisions (Schatzki, 
2006). This occurred in the first weeks of work on the office extension project as, 
facilitated by the practice memory, boundaries were being tested and (re-)established 
and the organizational memory of the project team was beginning to form around 
explicitly architectural tools of work – design drawings.   
  
 
6.5 HOW ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY SUSTAINS CROSS-BOUNDARY POWER 
RELATIONS THROUGH MATERIALITY OF PRACTICE 
  
Empirical observations of architectural work indicated that design drawings can carry, 
in themselves, information on which actions are possible for which participants 
(Osterlund, 2008). This means that, far from being an open site of practice, design 
drawings sustain pre-established power relations and constrain ways of performing 
work in a number of ways. First, circulation of the information in the design drawings is 
exclusive to the sender and the recipient. The constraints of project work, and the 
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specialized nature of the knowledge sometimes communicated in design drawings, 
prevent open dialogue around them. For example, a drawing by the cladding sub-
contractor (Figure 6.1) was sent only to the architect and the construction manager - to 
the architect in order to obtain approval that this particular design was in line with the 
general design of the building, and to the construction manager in order to confirm that 
the design was feasible. Other professionals on the design team were excluded a priori 
(likely as a consequence of the ArchitectureCo-centred organizational memory of the 
design team). 
 
Such point-to-point form of communication is not merely a by-product of the technology 
involved (email, in this case); it is an inherent feature of specialized work. The pattern of 
exclusion, along 'who needs to know' lines, is mirrored also in meeting spaces. When 
members of the design team gather to discuss on-going progress and any arising issues, 
all the printed design drawing are openly available for anyone on the design team to 
scrutinize. However, over 120 hours of observations of such meetings on the office 
extension project firmly indicated that those individuals with specialisms not direct 
relevant to the particular issue being discussed would quickly lose interest and, 
generally, refrain from engaging in the discussion. Similarly, the architects would 
generally be excluded from the conversations between different types of engineers, who 
share very technical, often tabulated, information with each other. 
 
Second, there is an implicit hierarchy according to which professionals from different 
knowledge domains engage with the design drawing. When a drawing is sent to the 
construction manager and the architects, as in Figure 6.1, it is the architect who is the 
first to comment. Others follow thereafter (if at all). One outcome of the presence of such 
a hierarchy is that the architects on the project maintain virtually unchallenged editorial 
power (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996), meaning that they have the power to completely close-
off chosen drawings and other acts of communication. I shall henceforth refer to such 
object as a ‘closed-off drawing’ - which is a forceful way of submerging work practices 
into organizational memory - whose use has been made restricted by a powerful party. 
The restriction of drawings does not take place through hostile acts, such as isolation, 
destruction or demarcation of some sort, but is achieved through a final ‘stamp of 
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approval’ – a note, in large capitals, reading 'NO COMMENTS' (see Figure 6.2). Absence of 
comments from the architect has the effect of removing the drawing from the space of 
collective work and returning it to the specialist domain it came from, thus solidifying the 
way in which work is expected to be done. While it can be argued that the whole point is 
that the architect should approve the sub-contractor's work, in fact, once the drawing is 
closed it is no longer functioning as a site of practice. Instead, it becomes an 
accomplishment of architectural practice; or, in other words, an exercise of 
organizational memory of ArchitectureCo onto other members of the project (both 
individual and organizational). 
 
It may be argued here that if sub-contractors work has been deemed appropriate by an 
architect, without contestation or correction, then no effect has been made in so far as 
sub-contractors experience of organizational memory is concerned. From the practice-
theoretical perspective, where work is a performance, a performance that is approved by 
someone else is inherently a performance on someone else’s terms (by virtue of it being 
at an equal risk of disapproval). Thus, a closed-off drawing is not only a drawing deemed 
‘good’ by a particular practice based on their respective normative convictions (as 
determined by their dominant organizational memory), but is also a drawing that can no 
longer be altered. Such a drawing, created by the sub-contractor in this case, is in other 
words, committed to the organizational memory by the architect. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. An example of a 'closed-off' drawing 
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Third, the communicative practices embodied in design drawings are dominated by 
expert power, which can be exercised in quite heavy-handed, coercive ways. This has to 
do with the degree of ownership over this particular materiality of work. As Figure 6.3 
shows, the material space afforded by the object, far from depoliticizing communication 
among specialists (as shown by Carlile, 2002, and others), allows dominant professional 
groups (ArchitectureCo) to express themselves more assertively than might otherwise 
be tolerated within the usual norms of ‘polite behaviour’ and, sometimes, to effectively 
silence others. For example, red pen lines literally cross out, check or correct others’ 
suggestions. Annotations ‘shout’ orders (UPDATE LOCATIONS!!!) and exhibit frustration 
(CLASH WITH STRUCTURE!!), sarcasm (GOING THROUGH SHEAR (sic) WALL? NEED TO 
REROUTE) and so on (see Figure 6.3). Contestation is clearly manifest in these visual 
objects. Yet, despite this, performance of practices occurs through them speedily and 
without interpersonal offence. These visual boundary objects seem to allow for overt 
expression of power and conflict (in the text), but, at the same time, enable continued 
practicing of work. Not only does this suggest that the oft-claimed opposition between 
conflict and collaboration, with boundary objects dampening the former and encouraging 
the latter, is too stark it is also evidence of performance of organizational memory of 
ArchitectureCo (specifically of its normative aspect). 
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Figure 6.3. Examples of assertive communication 
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6.6. WHY ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY CAN ONLY BE SUBMERGED IN THE 
PRESENCE OF A DOMINANT PRACTICE 
  
Submerging practices into organizational memory via design drawings is not an 
inevitable consequence of collective work. On the contrary, empirical observations 
showed that dominance of one practice over other may be required in order to actualize 
this process. This claim is supported by data from when an architect was not present 
during the use of design drawings. Not all work on a project necessarily includes 
architects – different specialists also communicate with one another using design 
drawings. It is interesting to see how the dynamics change when two parties in relatively 
equal positions of power communicate. Figure 6.4 provides an example of 
communication between structural and mechanical engineers. This is a drawing by 
mechanical engineers sent over to structural engineers to ensure there are no issues with 
the way mechanical engineers were planning to install water drainage. The comments in 
pink are the initial response by the structural engineers, delivering some sharp critiques 
of proposed plans (e.g., 'it will be virtually impossible'). Mechanical engineers followed 
up with a response (in blue) to the comments from the structural engineers, asserting 
some of the proposals presented initially, and commenting on the comments. Words such 
as 'need' and 'do not' were underlined for added poignancy, and some suggestions were 
made (e.g., 'would this help?'). The structural engineer's' response to this (in red) appears 
to communicate some form of strong emotion, using heavy red ink and making 
statements such as 'resolve clashes with ground beam/pole caps!!' and writing over the 
mechanical engineers' previous comments.   
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Figure 6.4. Example of communication in absence of a dominant practice 
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Compared to the situations above where an obviously dominant party was involved in 
directing the process of wok, the situation presented in Figure 6.4 far more resembles a 
quarrel than a report. This is because, First, the two groups of engineers had difficulty 
using a tool of work that was not their own. The significance of this is that tools of work, 
as I have mentioned previously, are not just inert ‘stuff’ but loaded concoctions of 
temporality, memory, power and wider practices. Consequently, performing work via a 
design drawing was not inherent to either of the parties (engineers have different work 
tools to those of architects), so the exact intent of communication may have been unclear, 
causing initial confusion as to what was going on or being proposed. 
 
Second, the relative power and knowledge bases of each of the groups of engineers were 
not readily compatible – the mechanical engineers were enquiring about a mechanical 
issue, and the structural engineers were responding from a structural point of view. In 
addition to uninformed use of the tool of work, the environment and the circumstances 
were not aligned so there was no mutually beneficial way out of this situation after the 
initial comments were returned. Third, neither party had, or was seeking, the authority 
to make any final decision on the validity of the ideas and knowledge embedded in this 
design drawing. Unlike the architects, who have a clear mandate for decision-making as 
far as the building design is concerned, neither of the engineer groups had legitimacy in 
this area of work. The situation depicted in Figure 6.4 is a great example of when 
organizational memory, through tools of work, is actually preventative to certain types 
of learning and communication (see Luhmann (1997, 2012) for a broadly similar 
approach). 
 
This is further interesting because performance of work such as the one captured in 
Figure 6.4, suggests the need for power asymmetry between participating practices in 
order for them to be able to perform work collaboratively. There are at least two reasons 
for this: in a situation that includes a dominant party there are restrictions on how ‘their’ 
objects can be used, and in a situation where the distribution of power is most clearly 
established there is little need to (re)negotiate power bases. It should be noted that this 
is subject to particular ways of working, and that these observations are based on a highly 
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professionalized, project-based setting. In the most basic sense, this means that the 
individuals are coerced into collaborative work by the constraints of a project because, 
in the event of delays or defects, the liability is not restricted to any one party. With this 
in mind, however, it does appear that boundary objects actually generate an imbalance 
of power in interdisciplinary work because they carry with them submerged 
organizational memories (of ArchitectureCo in this case). 
 
In a situation where a dominant party is present there are particular ways and 
restrictions in which tools of work that act as boundary objects can be used. Most of the 
time such restrictions and particularities are what comes with the normativity of 
organizational memory of origin, although some limited use of inter-personal power was 
observed during the data collection period too. In the case of design drawings, architects 
enjoyed dominance over other professionals not least because the communication of 
information by way of design drawings is an inherently architectural way of doing work. 
In addition to this, the communication of information in a particular way (e.g. Figure 6.4) 
was an inherently ArchitectureCo’s way of doing work (and even then, of that particular 
subset of ArchitectureCo). Accordingly, as was discussed above (Figure 6.3), architects 
enjoyed ownership over what can be said and in which ways. Figure 6.2 is a good example 
of this – an engineer sent a drawing to the architect with the intention of reporting work 
conducted on a number of details; this use of a drawing was expected and sanctioned by 
the architect who used the ‘No comment’ cue to approve the work and command it to the 
next work stage.  
 
Overall, this seemingly eventless drawing actually served to enact performance of work 
across a professional and spatio-temporal boundary – an engineer applied the object (a 
CAD drawing) in a way deemed appropriate by the architect (to report in this situation) 
who, in turn, received and processed the information and returned it with a ‘stamp of 
approval’. Approval of design issues by the architect secured continuation of construction 
work. Figure 6.4, on the other hand, depicts a situation where misuse of an architectural 
tool of work obstructed and prevented enactment of performance of work. As was 
described above, lack of clear authoritative demarcation when using that object to enact 
work was very counter-productive. The issue discussion of which was attempted in 
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Figure 5.4 had to be resolved later by the engineers over the phone, because the drawing 
itself had ceased to be useful by the time it reached the stage depicted here. 
 
A clear and established distribution of power seems to be an outcome of organizational 
memory as a practice. This ties in very closely with the previous point about acceptable 
ways of using tools of work. This aspect, however, is important to illustrate that (re-
)negotiation of power-relations where new organizational memories emerge out of 
multiple existing ones, like in project environments, occur primarily through objects. 
Elements of sarcasm, shown in Figure 6.3, for instance, are typical of when a new group 
of professionals enters the project, or a new section of work begins. In both cases a 
process of establishing areas and degrees of power would take place. The use of multiple 
exclamation marks, sarcasm and even the red pen were only observed as being employed 
by the architect as a means of reinforcing ownership over the use of particular, memory-
inducing, tools of work. A further interesting demonstration of this, albeit one beyond the 
remaining scope of this chapter, occurred when an architect exercised great displeasure 
at receiving technical information about the ceiling layout produced by the mechanical 
engineer (using engineering work tools, mainly tabulated data), but felt much more 
comfortable exploring, examining and adjusting the same data when it was produced in 
the form of a CAD drawing, thus drawing on the submerged memory of architectural 
power, materiality of work and a site where to practice.  
  
  
6.7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
These observations highlight that the political dynamics and communicative practices 
embodied in tools of work acting as boundary objects need to be understood with 
reference to the wider issues of organizational and practice memories. In other words, it 
is not enough for esoteric materiality to be something around which organizational 
memory can take place – esoteric materiality and its use, in many practical ways, is 
organizational memory in a submergent state.  
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In this chapter, I provided a number of illustrations of how this appears to be so. 
Materiality, in form of design drawings, has served as an imported infrastructure on the 
foundations on which multidisciplinary work could take place, with guidance from those 
familiar with operating said infrastructure, of course. In more abstract terms, esoteric 
materiality of a practice carries with it particular conventions of such practice. When 
applied to the performance of practices in an appropriate way (see section 5.2.2. on 
‘thoughts’) it can commit work to memory and, presumably do the reverse too. 
 
With this in mind, it is important to emphasize that esoteric materiality is not a storage 
device. It is objects that, through their use, instantiate temporality, implicit restrictions 
on (and possibilities of) power relations between practitioners thus guiding performance 
of work in a particular way. They are not vessels for information and knowledge (Walsh 
and Ungson, 1991; and Kransdorff, 1998); neither are they gateways to any such similar 
things (Decker, 2014). Esoteric materiality observed in a new setting, such as a project, 
when married to its functional situation and environment provides a way for practices to 
be performed in ways similar to those of their origin. This is because materiality of 
practice can be very receptive to having organizational memory submerged into it. An 
outcome of this ‘submerging’ is the effect tools of work have on practices and processes 
of both the architects and other practitioners. 
 
In the next chapter, I am going to focus more on these effects. Most specifically, I am going 
to look at how organizational memory works as an emergent process. 
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Chapter 7 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY AS AN EMERGENT PROCESS 
 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how particular ways of performing practices get 
‘submerged’ by organizational members into tools of work that allow for communication. 
This chapter will look at how organizational memory functions as an emergent process. 
Following analysis presented in Chapter 5, particular attention is going to be paid to the 
role of the individual in this process. The relationship between the physical practitioner, 
the practice and the performance of actions is well acknowledged across various 
perspectives within the practice-theoretical approach (Nicolini, 2012). Architecture is an 
especially material practice, both in terms of what the outcome of architectural work is 
and the processes that go into achieving it. Acker (2006) suggested that practitioners are 
never be fully aware of how they perform practices, nor can they articulate or represent 
their performances fully. This is largely due to the embodied nature of practices that 
allows practitioners to practice unreflectively (Fine, 1996; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011).  
 
7.1.1. Emergence of organizational memory through the embodiment of 
practice 
 
When considering organizational memory from the perspective of the practice approach, 
this embodied aspect of practices becomes of particular interest. One, by now 
commonplace, question comes forth as a result – if embodiment of practices in inherently 
individual, what is the role of the organization and what is the role of organizational 
memory? If it is up to the individual practitioner to perform organizational memory, how 
would his/her practice be impeded (if at all) by removing the organization within which 
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this person is based? Building on the analysis of organizational memory as practice from 
Chapters 5 and 6, the role of the organization is primarily centred on the provision of 
sites of practice, shared materiality and dynamics of power. This Chapter will focus on 
investigating these aspects through the lens of emergent ‘readiness’ (see Chapter 5, 
section 5.2.4.2). The reason why special attention is being paid to the physicality of the 
architect with regards to emergent processes of organizational memory has to do, in 
addition to what was outlined in the previous paragraph, with the methodological 
disposition of the study deliberately point at human agency when it comes to bringing-
things-forth-into-the-world (Heidegger, 1978); which is an activity intimately related to 
emerging organizational memory as practice.  
 
The physicality of architectural work became immediately obvious early in the data 
collection period. For instance, in selecting and deciding on the colours and materials for 
the project, architects would request samples from their suppliers. These samples would 
be touched, rubbed, smelled, overlaid on the design drawings and shown to clients and 
interdisciplinary collaborators. In fact, I found considerable amounts of various paint 
swaps and fabric swatches, insulation materials, entire pieces of ventilation, plumbing 
and electrical equipment, and even bricks and other external coating around 
ArchitectureCo offices (Figure 7.1).     
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Figure 7.1. Examples of material samples scattered around the offices of 
ArchitectureCo 
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The embodied relationship between the architect and the materiality of work is difficult 
to describe via observations alone, but is highly evocative when relayed by the 
practitioner. Consider these experiences of Architect R: 
 
“It [the fabric/paint colour patterns] can work in a number of different ways and I’m 
just looking for what tones will give the building that mood that I am looking for. 
Then there is an issue of texture and how the light will bounce off of it. That’s where 
the samples are absolutely key to have - I can touch them, I can see how they interact 
with one another and I can observe how their shading changes based on the time of 
day”  
 
The way Architect R described his/her working relationship with the material samples 
had much to do with embodied perception. The passage above highlights the very 
personal way in which Architect R “wants” a building to feel and look. This visceral aspect 
of the practice is informed by the previous experience of doing architecture – not only 
does Architect R “want” the building to look and feel in a particular way because such is 
the practice of architecture that s/he was trained in, but rather s/he is drawing on 
personal experience of having the work evaluated by fellow organizational members and 
managers against a normative standard of what constitutes good architecture in 
ArchitectureCo (see section 5.2.2). Accordingly, the reason Architect R knows what to 
look for is because s/he is attempting to render the visceral idea of what a building should 
feel and look like through the filter of ArchitectureCo’s organizational memory.  
 
The work that Architect R was engaged in was geared toward materializing that idea into 
a physical object. Such preoccupation with design was frequently alluded to during 
descriptions of interdisciplinary work throughout Chapter 5. For architects, design of the 
building is a material approximation of their senses, aspirations and ideas; many of which 
are tacit, as the passage above illustrates.  
 
Emphasis on the sensory experience of materiality of work is not limited to selecting 
appropriate samples at the design stage only - during the construction process, architects 
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routinely visit the construction site in order to walk around and inspect the building 
progress: 
 
“One of the reasons we do these visits is to get a sense of where everything is going 
to be and also to make sure the contractor is following our instructions correctly. 
This opening, for example, [pointing at a square hole in a concrete slab] is where 
the electrical services are going to feed through to power all the lighting fixtures in 
this section and over there [gesturing at the ceiling where the lights are going to 
be].” (Architect H)  
 
In both cases, the materiality of work (either the samples or a building-in-progress) is 
described by an architect with respect to the intended final product – that idea of a 
building which drives the material representation of design. While this is generally 
analogous to Schatzki’s (2002; 2006; 2012) and Heideggerian (1978) characterisation of 
the purpose of work as ‘that-for-the-sake-of-which’, the examples alluded to above 
highlight the prominence of physicality in enabling the emergence of organizational 
memory through interaction with materiality of work. In working with material samples, 
or while inspecting a construction site, the practitioner is confronted with both his/her 
sensory reaction to the environments as well as with ‘that which is to become’ of the 
objects within it - a final product as a manifestation of organizational ‘that-towards-
which’. The contribution of organization to the process of emergent memory thus centres 
on availability of shared materiality using which architects objectify their ideas. 
 
The way architects understand and use materiality provides insight into how architects 
perceive and view objects and objects of work. Such insight is significant as the 
associating of (sometimes disparate) objects with the final product towards which work 
is directed is suggestive of memory-like processes. On the one hand, the way 
practitioners interact with their physical environment demonstrates a strong degree of 
intentionality. On the other hand, that intentionality is rooted in something that does not 
yet itself exist - a future building rendered through the filter of organizational memory. 
Conceptually, this generates a loop facilitated by organizational memory - the building 
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that exists in the mind of the architect is legitimised by a series of design drawings and 
computer generated images or sketches made of material arrangements available in the 
organization. This then manages to inform the way all building-related objects are 
interpreted relative to it. Empirically, however, this translates into a mechanism by which 
practitioners utilize the material environment of the organization in order to shape their 
ideas into objects. Note that materiality of work, which is what architects use to ‘flesh out’ 
representations of their tacit ideas, also constitutes a site of practice embedded with 
power relations (see Chapter 6). These are the key aspects of organizational memory, 
meaning that any activity of objectification of ideas using organizational materiality is 
inescapably intertwined with organizational memory. Because activities and practices 
get submerged into organizational materiality (Chapter 6), objectifying ideas using that 
materiality enjoins previously submerged memory into the ‘fleshing out’ process thus 
infusing emergent ideas with ‘memorized’ practices.  
 
A further example of how intimate the emergence of organizational memory can be for 
the practitioner is provided by Architect T: 
 
“No two buildings are the same. Even if they look identical each one is unique. So we 
have to approach each one recognising that it is not just another copy. When 
designing a building you know it [emphasis added to reflect tone], you come to 
know it inside out and you know that it is unique and there is no other one exactly 
like it anywhere” 
 
The knowing of a building, as was the case here, is a characteristic of the process of 
emergent organizational memory. The quote above demonstrates two distinct aspects of 
the process: 1) the placing of a design-in-progress into the real world by comparing it 
with the existing buildings, and 2) the visceral familiarity with the design. The former is 
suggestive of organizational memory in that the architect distinguishes the prospective 
building s/he is designing from the existing ones as ‘unique’ and ‘not just another copy’; 
and the latter is indicative of the physicality of the process of emergence. Specifically, the 
recognition of something as unique or not is made possible by prior experience of 
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designing buildings and doing architecture. Moreover, in stating that each building is 
unique, Architect T goes beyond acknowledging a physical fact of the design and 
construction process, rather highlighting a normative disposition towards a way of doing 
architecture (see section 5.2.2). Accordingly, this example demonstrates that normative 
aspect of organizational memory is not merely imposed upon organizational members, 
but can be absorbed and embodied by them in a very fundamental way (Reckwitz, 2002). 
 
The placing of the design in the context of existing buildings compounded by an almost a 
priori recognition of its uniqueness is also connected with a sense of almost nostalgic 
fondness towards it. Such relationship, however, is not only potentially ambiguous, but 
also subject to a certain amount of re-interpretation/closure on behalf of the practitioner. 
For example, upon completion of the office building extension project, I asked Senior 
Architect G what s/he thought of the building. The brief response “ask me again in six 
months because all I can see now are the mistakes they [the builders] made” further shows 
how deeply invested an architect may be into his/her project and how readily this degree 
of investment may elicit an emotional reaction.  
 
To compare this with a similar situation almost a year earlier, when, having found the 
initial design drawings of the office building extension from 2008 (before the project was 
paused for 3 years), I asked Senior Architect G what he thought of the changes 
ArchitectureCo made to some parts of the building. What followed was a much more 
optimistic response: 
 
“I am actually glad that we had these years in between because this time around we 
could go back, look at what we thought back then and to put in more effort into those 
areas which we were not very satisfied with back then. I remember we were not 
happy with the elevation but there was little time at the time to do a major redesign 
so… Now, having had the opportunity to reflect on what we want and don’t want, we 
changed this front section here and I am really happy with how it all fits now”  
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These statements reveal two intertwined aspects that are worthy of consideration: 
ownership of work and emotional response. In terms of the former, during the time 
period when the office building extension project was on hold, everything to do with the 
look and feel of the building remained within the offices and information repositories of 
ArchitectureCo. In this way, by the time the project restarted, no external changes have 
been made to the design drawings since they were last archived. By contrast, as 
construction began in 2013, ArchitectureCo have had to surrender the control of their 
design, in a way, to the construction company. Therefore, while the work to develop 
aspects of the design carried with other relevant parties in the Design Team, the building 
that was now taking shape was doing so at the hands of the construction firm. As such, 
the design is no longer emerged from ArchitectureCo organizational memory because the 
site of practice and the materiality of work are no longer attributable to the architecture 
firm. While power may still be exercised by the architect, this has more to do with 
practice memory than with organizational memory at that stage.  
 
Architectural practitioners appear to be intuitively aware of where the distinction 
between practice memory and organizational memory is. In learning that Senior 
Architect G needed time to see past the ‘mistakes they [the builders] made’, an emotional 
response akin to homesickness is observed, where the long-term investment of both 
effort and intention on behalf of the architect appeared to have been misrepresented in 
the final product. This suggests two things: 1) a physical experience of termination of the 
process of emerging organizational memory, and 2) separation of organizational from 
practice memory as the building leaves the domain of ArchitectureCo and is requalified 
as exoteric materiality by the construction firm (see Chapter 5, section 5.2).  
 
It then follows that emergence of organizational memory can be a highly embodied 
process. As the data excerpts presented above suggest, how architects react to objects of 
their work is closely entangled with the intended outcome of said work. This is closely 
linked to individuals’ memory of previously completed projects. Specifically, repeat 
observations suggested that the clearer the idea of what an architect set out to design 
was, the more embodied the emergence process has been. Such clarity is achieved, in 
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part, through the individual memory of past projects delivered with the organization (i.e. 
it is only by remembering past designs that uniqueness of design alluded to above can be 
ascertained). Given that Schatzki (2006) did not account for the physicality of the 
practitioner in his definition of organizational memory as a practice, this constitutes an 
important addition to the understanding of the concept. While, on the one hand, for a 
person to be a practitioner and to engage in a practice means having a certain peer-
recognised skill and knowledge base, it is just as important for them to be conditioned in 
the ways in which the body of the practitioner is to react to the materiality of the practice. 
This is because not only is there a significant emotional investment that practitioners 
may end up making in the product of their work, but also because the way their work 
becomes influenced by organizational memory has much to do with their physical bodies. 
 
 
7.2 EMERGENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY THROUGH TINKERING 
 
A recurrent observation throughout the data collection period was how practitioners 
objectified their ideas into building designs. This usually took place during the early 
stages of project work, when architects needed to produce a representation of their ideas 
in response to client’s requirements for the building. A key stage in the emergence of 
organizational memory, these initial objectifications of architects’ ideas have actually 
been observed to undergo significant pre-determination by the power and material 
conditions of the organization. Given that objectification of ideas is a materially mediated 
process, and that the materiality at hand always consisted of what architects had at their 
disposal in the office, this activity would be carried out using whichever resources 
available to the architect at the time, even those not best suited or entirely appropriate.  
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Figure 7.2. A conceptual representation of the process of ‘tinkering’ 
 
An apt way to describe how architects attempted to translate their ideas into material 
objects from within the organizational setting is by using the word ‘tinkering’. Tinkering 
refers to a process by which an architect discovers tangible elements of “that-towards-
which” (a future building - usually a shapeless ‘gut feeling’ at such an early stage) as a 
result of trial-and-error experimentation with available materiality, skills, tools of work 
and organizational processes (Figure 7.2; Timmermans and Berg, 1997; Styhre, 2009). 
The availability of materiality, in this case, encompassed all that an architect could find; 
whether through active search or passive reception. On an empirical level, this process 
usually consisted of the following activities: 
 
● An architect typing a search term into Google Images and scrolling through the 
results, saving those images which ‘felt right’; 
● An architect looking through industry literature (most often during lunch); 
● An architect using one of the above, or both, as an inspiration to doodle general 
ideas; 
● An architect doodling in AutoCAD software or ‘playing around’ with Photoshop. 
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Of the four varieties of tinkering identified through observing architectural work, the last 
two have to do with creating something; and the first two in between with looking for a 
trigger, or inspiration, to create something. These varieties of tinkering represent the 
antecedent mechanisms that generate emergence of organizational memory through the 
practitioner. Table 7.1 outlines how the browsing and the creating elements of tinkering 
are empirically manifested at three different stages of architectural work - the conceptual 
design stage (usually a general external look of the building), early design stage (more 
detailed external and internal design with specifics on materials to be used and their 
properties), and design development (highly detailed/technical interdisciplinary work 
with engineers and other specialists performed in Design Teams during construction).   
 
Table 7.1 draws attention to two characteristics of how tinkering functions: First, that it 
is a fairly short-lived practice that gives way to the more technical work as the design 
moves forward, and, Second, that when tinkering is most common (during the conceptual 
design and opening stages of early design), it mostly consists of experimentation on 
behalf of the architect. 
 
 Browsing Creating Organizational memory 
Conceptual 
design 
Much of the time is spent 
looking at images of 
buildings, or building 
elements, online. Some 
input from peers to ‘have a 
look at X or Y building’ 
Very non-technical 
sketches representing the 
general look of the building 
or building element (e.g. 
roof). 
This is made possible by 
abilities provided by the 
organization (section 4.1.4) 
and memories of working on 
prior projects. 
Early design Less time spent on looking 
at large quantities of 
images. Parameters of 
online image search 
become more specific and 
detailed (e.g. glulam beam 
roof).  
Doodling generally 
performed in AutoCAD and 
to a more professional 
standard. Sketches 
frequently printed out and 
amended by hand but all 
data is now stored in a 
As design ideas become 
objectified, architects 
emerge particular ways of 
designing parts of the 
building ‘from’ 
organizational memory.  
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design (.dwg) format on the 
company server.  
Design 
development 
Little time spent looking for 
images, with the exception 
of very particular details 
that architect may not 
readily picture (e.g. a 
specific lamp). Images are 
replaced by material 
samples from suppliers. 
Exceptionally rare 
occurrences of 
improvisational creativity 
as all effort is directed at 
producing design drawings 
for use in the construction 
process. 
Normally having passed a 
normative filter of the 
organization (section 4.1.2), 
the design moves from 
emerging out of past 
experiences to attempting to 
represent the ‘that-towards-
which’ of the organization. 
Table 7.1. Overview of the practice of ‘tinkering’ 
 
Table 7.1 draws attention to two characteristics of how tinkering functions: First, that it 
is a fairly short-lived practice that gives way to the more technical work as the design 
moves forward, and, Second, that when tinkering is most common (during the conceptual 
design and opening stages of early design), it mostly consists of experimentation on 
behalf of the architect. 
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While experimentation may vary in its degree of formality it generally facilitates the 
creation of artefacts during tinkering (e.g. Figure 7.3 – tinkering with the layout of the 
building). These are important as they serve to represent ideas, successful or otherwise, 
in an organizationally accessible medium. 
Figure 7.3. Examples of tinkering 
 
The role that experimentation plays in the emergence of organizational memory is well 
articulated by Architect K: 
 
“what I mostly do is keep looking for something that works. This does involve 
scrolling through many images and photographs which, when I see something that 
I think is interesting… it then allows me to create a representation of what I am 
looking for, if that makes sense. What it is, is that I have a conception of the design 
and I need these [images] to flesh it out.”  
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This passage highlights the role of both the materiality of practice (in form of images) and 
the site of practice (the workstation where the ‘scrolling’ takes place). Architect K 
describes how s/he is looking for material elements that could represent what s/he 
thinks the building ought to look like. This is made possible, as was the case with 
Architect T above, by prior experience of designing buildings with ArchitectureCo. The 
turn of phrase used by Architect K - “flesh it out” - is particularly revealing of the 
emergent side of organizational memory, where not only is it the physical body of 
Architect K that is going through the process of putting together a representation of a 
design, but also the very principle of gradual composition that the design has to go 
through in order to become objectified (Figure 6.4). As Architect K was “looking for 
something that works”, s/he was filtering the mostly exoteric materiality of architectural 
practice (see section 5.1) through the mixture of regimes of thoughts, experiences and 
abilities that make up the organizational memory of ArchitectureCo (Schatzki, 2006). 
This is further highlighted in the following statement by the same architect. 
 
“when the initial sketch or graphic is in place, it is a much more effective way of 
showing others my entire thought process. As architects we are trained to look at a 
blueprint and see how this is there and that is here… it would take too long to explain 
any of that in a conversation though.”   
 
The two statements are illustrative of both the ‘browsing’ and the ‘creating’ aspects of 
tinkering. More importantly, however, they highlight the importance of producing 
artefacts in order to communicate the “entire thought process” with regards to the 
building. Architect K is likely to be alluding to two organizational memory-related 
elements here: First, the ability to communicate and engage in performing practices 
through materiality of work (see Chapter 6), and, Second, an acknowledgement that 
artefacts have to be produced to particular organizational norms in order to be accepted 
as products of architectural work. 
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Figure 7.4. Tracing the objectification of a design idea 
 
It follows thus, that an important aspect of experimentation is the continued practicing 
of it up to the point when an artefact can be finished. Recall the very interesting turn of 
phrase used by Architect K just above, where s/he alluded to how the experimentation 
process helps to ‘flesh out’ design ideas. This not only means that the construction of 
artefacts is an enduring process emergent from and shaped by a series of external stimuli, 
but also that the availability of said stimuli has an effect on what the artefact is going to 
be. The latter point is relevant to organizational memory for two reasons: 1) 
infrastructure for finding the stimuli and 2) language for finding the stimuli, as will be 
discussed next. 
 
7.2.1 Infrastructure 
 
In terms of infrastructure, the primary means of browsing for ‘inspiration’ was, as I 
mentioned previously, via Google Images (Star, 2002). This was the main tool, universally 
available to all staff and generally used at the expense of both the organisational intranet 
and secondary options. These secondary infrastructure options were either the 
professional publications available in the lunch/break-out area, and physical models of 
buildings found around the office. These manifest both the power aspect of 
organizational memory (i.e. who decides access and which publications are available) 
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and the materiality of work aspect of organizational memory (equipment – see section 
4.2).  
 
Use of professional literature was similar to that of Google Images - to look at 
photographs and graphics of buildings and their elements. With the exception of one 
publication made available by ArchitectureCo to their staff - the Design Journal - other 
publications did not go beyond basic photography of exoteric materiality (see section 6.2) 
and, as Architect T explained, were “not very useful as they do not show how anything is 
done. This one [Design] is best because they actually show elevations and cross-sections”. 
What this suggests is that not all materiality found in ArchitectureCo was actually 
relevant to organizational memory. A number of items, such as many of the publications 
available to architects but also things like coffee cups and plates and utensils, did not 
qualify as ‘equipment’ (see section 4.2) into which organizational memory could be 
submerged to shape collaboration (Chapter 6), or from which it could be emerged to 
inform the purpose and direction of the organization (Schatzki, 2006).  
 
This also brings attention to the question of where the boundaries of ArchitectureCo as 
an organization are – is it everything that is found within (and connected to) its physical 
location, or is it only those things which constitute its organizational memory (i.e. 
equipment)? Observing how architects interacted with the physical building models was 
quite evocative in this regard.  Building models are small-scale representations of 
building designs built to scale and using a variety of cardstock. As such, they are 
potentially archetypical objects of organizational memory (e.g. Nissley and Casey, 2002; 
Decker, 2014). However, the actual interaction between the practitioners and the 
building models was extremely limited and I only observed three instances of an 
Architect who was not directly involved in the production of one interacting with a 
model. In fact, most of the models on display were quite dusty and lacked any labels by 
means of which they could be identified. Having asked some members of staff to identify 
a few of the models, I only managed to get positive identification from the Directors. This 
strongly suggests that not all material objects found within an organization are involved 
in the organizational memory. It would even not be unwarranted to go further and claim 
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that because they are not involved in the organizational memory, they are not involved 
in organizational practices and, by extension, in the organization as a practical 
accomplishment itself. Chapter 6 highlighted the importance of a communicative 
dimension of tools of work for the enactment of organizational memory. Accordingly, 
materiality that does not allow practitioners to engage with the practice through it does 
not qualify as stimuli-finding infrastructure of organizational memory. 
 
The situation with professional literature is similar to that of building models - while the 
general practice of looking at visual representations of buildings was akin to that of 
looking at visual representations of building online, because professional literature was 
found outside of the work station and engaged with usually during lunch breaks, it was 
very rare that I would observe an architect make any notes, or preserve the image in any 
way. As a result, most of these objects do not qualify as suitable for the emergence of 
organizational memory either.  
 
Comparing the practices of visual search via Google Images to the use of professional 
literature in experimentation and subsequent tinkering, it emerged that architects would 
only engage in those activities while at their workstations. This is not to suggest that they 
would not move or talk to one another unless it was not work-related, but rather that 
creation of artefacts would only take place at the location of where design work was being 
carried out. Tinkering was not observed in any of the ‘social’ locations within the office 
(i.e. kitchen, printer room, reception, break-out area) or in any third location outside of 
the office. All recorded instances of tinkering took place at the architect’s desk by the 
computer (frequently using the computer as well). 
 
7.2.2. Use of language 
 
The use of language in locating stimuli that would encourage tinkering had most to do 
with the way architects would frame search terms, predominantly in Google Images. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to capture a record of ArchitectureCo’s keyword search 
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history due to technical limitations. Instead, I asked different architects what they looked 
for and why: 
 
“I generally have an idea what to look for - a building I know of, or a practice I am 
familiar with. Sometimes I would type in a description of what I am looking for and 
work from there. For instance, if I am looking for how a specific shape fits with a 
specific environment I might search for ‘curved aluminum roof, urban’ or something 
like that…”  (Senior Architect G) 
 
“I don’t know if I use any specific words more than others… I guess it’s mainly about 
using terms for the things I’m looking for… such as “UPVC soffit” or “birch door” for 
example… Mainly just typing in what things are called” (Architect K) 
 
“Since I mainly do this [browse for images] to only find samples for the designs, I 
just type in what I need and pick the one I think is most appropriate and fitting” 
(Associate Director R) 
 
“I suppose it largely depends on what I am doing, right? Google, for one, only shows 
what you are looking for. So it will give me whatever I ask of it. So if I look for a brick 
wall, or anything else, that is what it will show me. You get what you ask for, you 
see?” (Architect J) 
 
In addition to these responses some of the more senior Directors did not understand the 
question at all. This is significant as it points to something so central and taken for 
granted, within the practice of architecture (in ArchitectureCo), that it is performed 
without notice or reflection. The four excerpts above, from the total sample of 19 
employees that I asked, disclose a varied degree of confusion with the question. All, 
eventually, state that the language used in browsing for images is technical and almost 
exclusively aimed at finding a representation of an already formed idea. Not one response 
mentioned cues or advice from/of fellow architects or anything ArchitectureCo-specific. 
This suggests that the language used by architects in the performance of their practice is 
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a characteristic of a practice – it is something they learn during the training period, as 
part of professional events, and from specialist literature. From this I conclude that the 
language of search is not a characteristic of organizational memory, but rather of practice 
memory.  
 
Considering the language and the infrastructure in concert, it appears that 
experimentation is not a component of organizational memory, but rather of practice 
memory. However, it must also be pointed out that experimentation, and, more 
importantly, tinkering, at no point took place outside of the architect’s work station. 
Architects did not doodle or preserve found images during lunch or while travelling - they 
only did so whilst at their work stations in the offices of ArchitectureCo. It follows that 
while tinkering is not a process by means of which organizational memory emerges, it 
does require organizations to provide an appropriate environment within which 
tinkering can take place. In other words, an architect is likely to perform tinkering 
regardless of which particular architectural firm s/he may work in (as tinkering is a part 
of the architectural practice), but it is up to a specific organization to provide a space that 
would be conducive to fostering tinkering.        
 
 
7.3 THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATION 
 
In the preceding sections, I described and analyzed processes by which organizational 
memory was being emerged by architects by means of their physicality and tinkering. 
The empirical data has shown how the anticipatory experience of “that-towards-which” 
in architecture is manifested through the physical and emotional behaviour of architects 
as they perform the emergence of organizational memory. The intended design of the 
building is actualized through the materiality of work and in conjunction with 
organizational ‘thoughts’, ‘experiences’, and ‘abilities’ (Schatzki, 2006; and Chapter 5).   
 
Emergence of organizational memory is operationalized by means of tinkering. 
Experimentation plays an important role in this process as architects formulate the 
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external look of their design idea using the objects and the organizational infrastructure 
available to them. Accordingly, experimentation aims to import new objects, samples, 
and other modes of representation into the tinkering process. This allows the design idea, 
most often conceived of as a ‘sense’ or ‘vision’ to gain validation and representation in 
the world.   
 
There was nothing in the collected dataset to suggest tinkering was an ArchitectureCo-
specific method for emerging organizational memory. This means that, alongside the 
physical experience of doing architecture (refer to section 6.1), tinkering is first and 
foremost an aspect of practice memory of architecture (Schatzki, 2006). That being said, 
the performance of tinkering produces objects and outcomes very specific to 
ArchitectureCo, suggesting some relation to organizational memory. Discerning the exact 
nature of this relationship is crucial towards practice-based understanding of 
organizational memory. Why do different architectural practices use marginally different 
ways of annotating drawings? Observations presented in this chapter suggest that 
individuals engage in emerging memory (of how to produce an annotated design 
drawing, for example) subject to material assemblages of the tools of work provided by 
individual organizations. For this reason, while tinkering is likely to be found across a 
variety of different architectural firms, the outcomes of tinkering will differ subject to 
power and material conditions comprising particular organizations.  
 
It is worth noting that the role of organization as presented in this Chapter is mainly 
limited to the material arrangements and the landscape of power (Chapter 5 and Chapter 
6) that it bestows on the practitioners. The reason that social aspects are missing from 
this consideration is because none have been observed in the form that would suggest 
any significant contribution to the emergent process of organizational memory. To 
elaborate, when I arrived to collect data in ArchitectureCo, it was my expectation that I 
am going to find individuals talking to one another, asking each other technical questions 
and collaborating to solve problems. Rather surprisingly, after the first two months of my 
ethnography I witnessed nothing of the sort. Instead, employees of ArchitectureCo 
remained by their individual workstations only communicating with each other to either 
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give directions (e.g. “do this”, “change that”, “this is not right”, “this is good, carry on”) or 
to engage in non-work related banter in the kitchen area of the office. Much later I have 
come to understand that much of the communication central to the performance of work 
was performed through the materiality of work (mostly through design drawings), where 
individuals expressed their ideas and manipulated visual representations of their 
practice in order to produce a design compliant with the “that-towards-which” of 
ArhcitectureCo. 
 
Accordingly, I did not consider the role of organization to be limited to employing 
practitioners only (although the social aspect of this had to be discounted as not 
significant) - as data on tinkering suggested, a space within which artefacts can be both 
found and created is very important. Boland et al. (2007, 2008), for example, described 
communal spaces for artefact creation in the architectural practice of Frank Gehry. 
ArchitectureCo was radically different in that no artefacts were used or created outside 
of the individual work stations (also Star, 2002). This is not to suggest that no 
communication took place within the organization, but rather that any and all processes 
that would directly culminate in artefacts were performed at the individual working 
spaces. The provision of such areas where tinkering – a process consistently observed 
throughout the firm – could be performed was a distinctly organizational matter because 
it constituted an ‘ability’ of organizational memory (see section 5.2.4.)  
  
A key attribute of ArchitectureCo workstations was the degree to which it was 
compatible with the application of tools of work. Most specifically, the space to record 
and to re-create (doodle), as well as to browse for examples of exoteric materiality was 
required. Within ArchitectureCo, the browsing took shape of using an online search 
engine, but this need not have been exclusively so. For example, ArchitectureCo also 
maintained a library which contained architectural books and a collection of material 
samples from previous projects. That being said, this space was seldom used as it was far 
too removed from the work stations where recording and re-creation could take place. 
Consequently, this area was an under-utilized resource for enabling the emergence of 
organizational memory. 
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The importance of the work station is especially pertinent given the way in which work 
was performed in ArchitectureCo. Most specifically, the primary output of architectural 
work – design drawings – was created using a computer software. The software was 
available only on the desktop computers which, coincidentally also allowed access to the 
central server where all project information was stored (Figure 4.2). These two functions 
were restricted to desktop computers only, both for security reasons and also because 
architectural software is quite demanding in terms of processing power and storage. 
However, because all project-related information was stored on the central server, it was 
a matter of convenience for architects to record any images found via Google Images onto 
there as well. All in all, ArchitectureCo provided all the relevant tools of work needed by 
the architect in one location – the work station (Figure 7.5). 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Standard ArchitectureCo workstation 
 
Because all the tools of work were centred at the work station, this is also where the 
emergence of organizational memory took place. The pragmatic nexus of all the required 
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tools of work, space to tinker, and the sheer convenience of co-location rendered the 
work station perfectly suited for emerging organizational memory because of the 
teleological-affinitive structures that they imported into the work (Chapter 5; Schatzki, 
2006). The role of organization is thus to enable the emergence of organizational memory 
by providing material settings akin to the work station of ArchitectureCo, where the 
process that is already embedded in the architectural practice can be applied in an 
organizational setting.  
    
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, some important nuances of organizational memory as an emergent 
process were highlighted. First, the role of the physical body of the practitioner in 
bringing organizational memory forth was highlighted. Observational and interview data 
indicated that practitioners experience organizational memory in a visceral way as they 
attempt to translate their tacit and semi-formed ideas of building design into material 
objects. The physical and emotional involvement of practitioners in their work, via 
emerging organizational memory, is a contribution to Schatzki’s (2006) definition of 
organizational memory, where neither of these aspects was acknowledged. Second, the 
mechanism by which organizational memory becomes emergent – tinkering – was 
described. Tinkering refers to a set of activities performed by architects as they attempt 
to utilize available materiality in order to objectify their tacit and semi-formed ideas of 
building design. Experimentation was found to be a significant part of tinkering, divided 
into two themes: the browsing and the creating. These were then corroborated by an 
audit of key tools of work and the language of work involved in the emerging of 
organizational memory. It was found that not all materiality, including that which seems 
overtly mnemonic, is relevant to the performance of organizational memory. Finally, the 
relationships between the organization, the practice of architecture, and organizational 
memory were discerned. This placed specific emphasis on assemblages of relevant tools 
of work in spaces and areas accessible to the practitioners.  
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Identification of the above nuances completes the evaluation of organizational memory 
as an emergent process. The results indicate that the site of practice is least important in 
the emergence of memory, whereas materiality of work is most important; power is 
actively present in so far as practitioners objectify their ideas with regards to the element 
of ‘thoughts’ (Schatzki, 2006). Moreover, emergence of organizational memory requires 
a more direct and deliberate input from the organization than, for instance, submergence 
of organizational memory. By implication, considerable attention ought to be paid to 
understanding which are the key tools of work that practitioners use and how these can 
be assembled in a complimentary way, as ArchitectureCo have done.    
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Chapter 8 
 
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION AND FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY AS A 
PRACTICE 
 
Chapter 5 focused on developing a conceptual underpinning for understanding 
organizational memory as a practice. Building on Schatzki’s (2006) distinction between 
practice memory and organizational memory, as well as on an intriguing five-part 
definition of the latter, I proceeded with a qualitative inquiry into the practice-theoretical 
interpretation of organizational memory using empirical data from ArchitectureCo. This 
analysis resulted in re-categorization of Schatzki’s (2006) definition of organizational 
memory as the “complex of actions, thoughts, experiences, abilities, and readinesses” (p. 
1870) into three key themes. These are: the role of power, the role of materiality of work, 
the role of the site of practice, and the distinction between practice memory and 
organizational memory; as well as, by extension, the episodic nature of organizational 
memory as a practice. The episodic nature of organizational memory is conceptualized 
through an event-centred understanding of temporality (see Chapter 4, section 4.2.1) and 
will be highlighted in each of the sections below.   
 
8.1.1 The role of power 
 
Schatzki (2006) hypothesized the role of ‘thoughts’ in organizational memory, which I 
found to be closely connected to normative attitudes about what qualified as ‘good 
architecture’ in ArchitectureCo (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2). The effects of normativity 
on the constitution of organizational memory were observable in how attitudes would 
affect the philosophy of an architectural practice – i.e. restricting and, to a degree, 
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prescribing the kind of architectural work that would be expected of ArchitectureCo and 
its employees. 
 
Three mechanisms were identified by which normative attitudes were found to act upon 
the organization: awards and distinguished cases, the process of bidding on design 
contracts, and internal design reviews. Each of these exposed the significance of formal 
authority. Architects in positions of formal authority, whether on permanent or ad hoc 
basis, worked to ensure that ongoing design work met the standards of what 
ArchitectureCo stood for. This was clearly observable during the design review process, 
where architects had to validate their work to the panel consisting of management and 
senior peers. The purpose of such peer-review was twofold: 1) to ensure technical quality 
of the design, and 2) to ensure aesthetic quality of the design. Because the former is a 
function of architecture as a practice (i.e. all architects are expected to design safe 
buildings), the latter is a local preference developed and maintained by and within 
particular organizations (i.e. what constitutes ‘good architecture’).  
 
It is through this process that practitioners in positions of formal authority perpetuated 
adherence to particular norms in ArchitectureCo. By exercising their power to either 
validate or invalidate some ways of designing building over others, these practitioners 
had a direct influence on the products and outcomes of the organization. The 
organizational significance of combining normativity with power is further amplified if 
accounting for how the authority to participate in the process of reviewing and 
commenting on the internal work-in-progress is granted. In addition to a selection of 
Directors (each of whom was also a business partner), the people invited into this role 
were very senior architects with proven tenure at the Company or highly specialized 
technical subject area experts (e.g. 3D Building Information Modelling). By extension, 
such individuals played a direct part in deciding the kind of architecture ArchitectureCo 
did, and how it was perceived by its peers from the wider practice.  
 
With respect to power through normativity, the primary criterion against which 
organizational memory can be discerned from practice memory is the extent to which 
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normative attitudes and actions inform organizational outcomes (Shotter and Tsoukas, 
2014). This is a fundamental question for understanding organizational memory as a 
practice because neither the ability of architects to do architecture, nor their skills as 
designers came from ArchitectureCo - these things were learned by ArchitectureCo 
employees largely throughout their training to qualify as architects or other adjacent 
specialists. Accordingly, these skills and technical abilities constitute practice memory 
within the organization, but not organizational memory. For example, the ability of an 
architect to produce a design drawing using CAD is a prerequisite of qualifying to practice 
architecture, but not anything that would explain why ArchitectureCo displays continuity 
over time in a way that makes it distinct from any other closely related architectural firm.  
 
To consider the effects that normative attitudes have on architectural practices when 
applied from the position of authoritative power, however, highlights the ways in which 
practitioners in a position of formal power perpetuate this aspect of organizational 
memory. They do so by redacting the work of their peers in line with: a) an external image 
of the organization as established in part by a track record of specific awards, and b) their 
personal experience of producing successful architecture (as usually evidenced by 
specific awards). As the individuals capable of enforcing particular norms onto their 
colleagues are also long-term members of ArchitectureCo, the interaction between factor 
“a)” and factor “b)” becomes recursive, thus maintaining a sense of organizational 
continuity of ArchitectureCo to both the internal and the external stakeholders.    
 
In addition to manifesting itself in relation to the philosophical and stylistic dispositions 
of ArchitectureCo’s memory, power was also expressed through the abilities with which 
the organization was enabling its employees by providing the appropriate tools of work. 
A detailed discussion of this was offered in the previous chapter, highlighting how 
ArchitectureCo facilitated emergence of organizational memory by clustering all the 
relevant tools of work in a single location. This is also an expression of power, albeit not 
over the employees or the organizational norms, but rather over the practice as a whole.  
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By facilitating access to the resources required to develop and deploy certain 
architectural abilities, ArchitectureCo directly enabled performance of certain, more 
resource-intensive, practices. Because practices are unevenly distributed and assembled 
in such ways that can restrict some courses of action but not others (Schatzki, 2002), any 
significant investment in advanced tools of work carries with it a potential to facilitate 
growth of otherwise restricted practices. For example, ArchitectureCo invested a 
considerable amount of resources in procuring one of the most advanced 3D building 
design software and in training large numbers of their staff in how to use it. As a result, 
the firm is future proofed and well-prepared to practice architecture in most innovative 
ways. The abilities developed from having high-end tools of work available in an 
organization not only shaped the future norms and ways of doing work, but also impact 
the kinds of clients and the varieties of design that ArchitectureCo will be delivering in 
the future. The combination of power and formal authority that allows for the 
development of such abilities constitutes a key element of organizational memory of 
ArchitectureCo. 
 
A third way in which power contributed to organizational memory is by allowing regimes 
of actions to reverberate through time and space via the tools of work (Chapter 6). One 
of the secondary findings of this thesis was that asymmetric power relations can actually 
advance the performance of work and that material objects play a central part in 
providing a conduit for that. Patterns of communication and implicit hierarchies would 
become inscribed into suitable tools of work (e.g. design drawings). They would then 
provide a type of a scaffold for certain ways of performing work and for organizing the 
practitioners of that work into dominant and subordinate roles. Consequently, it is 
through power that ways of performing work would be inscribed in tools of work 
(Chapter 6). Once inscribed with these, tools of work would harness aspects of 
organizational memory through time and space via the process of submergence. By 
submerging organizational memory into the appropriate tools of work (i.e. the project 
and design leadership role of architects submerged into the primary medium for design 
development - drawings), practitioners transport and translate their preferred ways of 
performing work through time and space. Submergence of organizational memory into 
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the tools of work was also the more salient way in which organizational memory would 
introduce consequence to the way practices are performed, and not the other way around 
as was the case in almost every other circumstance.          
 
Overall, power is a key defining dimension of organizational memory. Power relations 
not only shape the ideological dispositions towards practices within the organization, but 
also inform which arrangements of practices will be available to organizational members. 
Metaphorically speaking, in ArchitectureCo power could be seen as a landscape for 
practices - where the topographical layout of norms, abilities and orientations follows the 
interests and convictions of those in positions of formal influence. Empirically, this was 
operationalized through organizational processes that required work-in-progress to 
undergo formal review by senior management and subject experts. The decisions as to 
what kind of architecture to produce, as well as which abilities to develop and to what 
extent was thus up to a very limited group of senior practitioners. This would have a 
knock-on effect on the kinds of regimes of activities that would be submerged into tools 
of work as well as the types of tools of work that architects would have the ability to use.  
 
In ArchitectureCo, power represented itself in a very streamlined way, flowing from the 
top brass of managing architects all the way to the level of interdisciplinary work and the 
external practitioners involved in it. By virtue of this, ArchitectureCo appeared as a 
“powerful player” capable of “imposing their way of doing things” on the adjacent 
organizations and practices (EngCo Senior Engineer P). Coincidentally, this did not seem 
to impede collaboration in any way nor represent ArchitectureCo in authoritarian terms 
to its partners and peers. Instead, the organization was described as being very good at 
“getting the job done” (Mechanical Engineer S), “not fussing around” (Structural Engineer 
C), being “clear and competent” in their work (ConsCo Manager S), and knowing “what 
they were doing” (Client R). This suggests that asymmetric or even sufficiently 
pronounced power, when not divorced from a well-aligned organizational memory, can 
be conducive to the efficient performing of complex work.   
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8.1.2 Materiality of work 
 
Materiality is a key element of understanding the world through the practice lens 
(Nicolini and Monteiro, 2016; Nicolini, 2012; Schatzki, 2002, 2012). Similarly, 
organizational memory as a practice is reliant on materiality to work. Indeed, materiality 
was found to play a central role in the performance of organizational memory throughout 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Following Heidegger (1978), materiality of work has been 
interpreted as equipment (see section 4.2). This is in contrast to the environment where 
practices happen in general, which has been interpreted as ‘present-at-hand’. In most 
cases, equipment of architectural work presented itself in the form of objects. This is 
likely due to the fact that architectural work is strongly predisposed towards 
objectification.      
 
Accordingly, a significant part of organizational memory had to do with either producing 
objects (section 5.2.2.2) or with drawing on objects to perform work (Chapter 7). 
Importantly, objects were only observed to partake in organizational memory as far as 
they were used as equipment. For example, physical models of buildings found around 
the office of ArchitectureCo did not appear to play any role in organizational memory, 
whereas samples of materials or annotations on building blueprints were found to be 
quite central to it.  
 
Qualification of materiality of work as equipment warrants two considerations: First, 
whether it allows for the ability to submerge organizational memory, and Second, 
whether it allows for the ability to emerge organizational memory. In terms of the former, 
Chapter 6 provided a discussion of how design drawings absorb ways of doing work to 
later impact patterns of communication. This is part of the submergence process. All 
design drawings are an example of equipment in the case of architectural work. This is 
because design drawings move the progress of work forward, have an effect on the way 
practitioners engage with their work, and are used to objectify ideas and other 
immaterial concepts. The two former aspect relate to the submergence process (Chapter 
6) while the latter one refers to the emergence process (Chapter 7). In both cases 
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materiality functions as a conduit. This means that organizational memory was not 
literally contained in design drawings, for example, but rather that design drawings 
anchored certain socio-material arrangements and the associated practices in an ‘event-
space’ signified by them (see section 4.2.1). Accordingly, materiality of work facilitates 
the submergence of organizational memory by pointing at some regimes of activities and 
interpersonal relations and not others. By way of metaphor, submerged organizational 
memory to materiality of work is what a map is to a traveller - it shows various ways of 
navigating the terrain but leaves it up to the practitioner to draw on personal skills and 
experiences to choose the one that is best suited for them. However, as with a map, 
arrangements of practices that are not submerged into materiality of work are also not 
likely to constitute viable options for performing work in that particular organization. 
This aspect of organizational memory accounts for why some practices persist through 
time while others do not.  
 
The case with emergence of organizational memory is similar - observations in Chapter 
7 indicated that while practitioners depend on materiality of work to emerge 
organizational memory, they are only capable of emerging that which they are able (or 
allowed) to re-enact as individual practitioners; whether by drawing on their personal 
skills and experiences or in collaboration with others. The previous section outlined the 
mechanisms by which organizations qualify patterns of work and interpersonal relations 
that are likely to get submerged or emerged through organizational memory. 
 
8.1.3 The site of practice 
 
The site of practice in organizational memory refers to a space where practitioners are 
able to engage with organizational work by means of materiality of work. This can be 
either a physical space, such as a meeting room or a workstation, or a communicative 
space, such as a design drawing or an email. Schatzki (2002) famously noted that practice 
is the site of the social and that practices mediate causal relevance of materiality. Insofar 
as organizational memory is concerned, however, it appears that the role materiality is 
more prominent than suggested by Schatzki (2002, 2006, 2012). This may also be 
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attributable to the nature of architectural practice, where the emphasis on physical 
representation of ideas and knowledge is especially acute.  
 
Much of existing literature on practice theory represents the role of materiality as 
subordinate to practices. It is worth noting that while in this thesis I use the term 
materiality, for methodological reason (see Chapter 4), to refer to ‘equipment’, the 
literature at large tends to use this term to also include physicality, thus rendering 
materiality as everything practice-related that is not cognitive, human bodies included. 
For example, Gherardi (2006) writes of individual practitioners physically adjusting to 
their material environments and Beunza and Stark (2004), as well as Orlikowski (2010), 
similarly highlight how practices are contingent on enabling technologies. Equally, 
Schatzki (2013) proposed that individuals react to materiality and negotiate it, Cooren 
(2004) aimed to understand material effects of discursive practices and Tserekis (2007) 
looked at materiality as an expression of performances. These examples illustrate a 
general tendency to think of materiality in relation to practices as ‘that-around(with the 
help of)-which’. Such way of thinking, however, can create an analytical bottleneck, as 
materiality (as equipment or otherwise) is rendered inert and as an end in itself.  
 
Many of the findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 - on submergence and emergence of 
organizational memory respectively - suggest that a more translucent understanding of 
materiality is in order. Some studies already pursue this line of thought, with both 
Osterlund (2008) and Kravcenko and Swan (2016) demonstrating how material objects 
can act as sites within which practices are performed. Accordingly, findings related to 
organizational memory indicate how materiality (as equipment) can be a sufficiently 
suitable space for the performance of practices. For instance, the case of design drawings 
in Chapter 5 highlighted how some architectural practices gained saliency only within 
the confines of a drawing and nowhere else. Similarly, analysis of the role of 
ArchitectureCo’s workstation in Chapter 6 pointed at the importance of functional 
combinations of specific tools of work for emerging organizational memory. In both cases 
the role of materiality was not to subordinate to or complement the practices, but rather 
to envelop them. It thus follows that when considering organizational memory through 
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the lens of the practice view, a significant emphasis should be placed on identifying and 
evaluating the capacity of certain material arrangements to function as a site of practice, 
be it equipment or entire spaces. 
 
8.1.4. Distinction between practice memory and organizational memory 
 
One of the unique aspects of considering organizational memory through the perspective 
of practice is the introduction of additional levels of collective memory (Chapter 2). Of 
these, there are two: practice memory by Schatzki (2006) and institutional memory by 
Linde (2008). This thesis built upon Schatzki’s work so, accordingly, I had to work 
through the data in order to identify what is the empirical difference between practice 
memory and organizational memory, as well as how the two relate to one another. 
Schatzki (2006) does not give much detail here, and so a simple principle was formulated 
throughout the analysis – the scope and coverage of organizational memory is primarily 
determined by organizational goals and outcomes.  
 
This is a useful principle in that it allows one to discern where practice ends and 
organization begins. Within Schatzki’s work (2006, 2012) it is difficult to understand how 
practice memory and organizational memory could be distinguished in an empirical 
environment, and yet the two concepts are different, both in terms of their aims and in 
terms of their respective functions. Discussed in-depth throughout Chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
the border between practice and organization as hedged against organizational goals (or, 
as Schatzki (2006) would formulate it – telos), proved to be consistent in aiding my 
analysis. One of traditional characteristics of organizational memory (see Chapter 2) – 
skills – was re-qualified as a function of practice memory; and another – awards – was 
returned to the organizational level on account of functional application in that particular 
empirical setting.   
  
For research performed within a practice-theoretical tradition, ability to identify and 
chart such distinctions in an authentic way is very important. Being able to do so allowed 
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me to perform a clear and consistent analysis of organizational memory, leaving those 
aspects belonging to practices (of architecture) bracketed out. 
 
 
8.2 REPRESENTING PRACTICE-BASED THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
MEMORY 
 
Up to this point the core mandate of this thesis was to carry out an analysis of what 
architectural practitioners experienced and practiced as organizational memory. 
Grounded in Schatzki’s (2006) hypothesized concept of organizational and practice 
memory, my analysis resulted in three central elements of organizational memory as a 
practice: power, materiality of practice, and the site of practice. I will now proceed to 
synthesize these into an illustrative model.  
 
Step 1: Temporal context 
 
While temporality was not an explicit focus of this thesis on the basis of not having a 
tangible effect on the phenomenology of practitioners, the guiding event-focused 
philosophical framework set out by Whitehead (1929) and complemented by 
Heidegger’s (1978) concept of ‘care’ (see section 4.2) will be helpful in positioning the 
illustrative model of organizational memory as a practice. This is not because of analytic 
or empirical reasons, but rather due to the limitations imposed by the written language. 
Analogous to the rationale behind the choice of terms ‘submergent’ and ‘emergent’ to 
refer to the two types of ‘readinesses’ in organizational memory (Schatzki, 2006: 1870), 
the event-based interpretation of time is required to minimize confusion likely to be 
caused by the linearity of the written word.  
 
Thus, the temporal context for understanding organizational memory as a practice is 
thus: relative to the traditionally linear thinking of time (horizontally from past into the 
future via the present), organizational memory as a practice works in vertical ‘events’ 
(i.e. sites of practice). Figure 7.1 briefly illustrates this. The horizontal arrow of time 
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refers to the past-present-future continuum, whereas the vertical ‘dip’ represents an 
event of organizational memory. 
 
An event of organizational memory refers to any instance during work when 
organizational memory makes a noticeable contribution, as experienced by practitioners. 
An example of this is, for instance, when established power relations are perpetuated 
‘automatically’ every time a design drawing is used for communication (Chapter 5), or, 
when an architect only engages in design work when a specific set of tools of work is 
available (Chapter 6). Every time organizational memory is either submerged or emerged 
constitutes an event of organizational memory. From this it follows that organizational 
memory may not be a continuous state of the organization, as the literature on stories, 
narratives and memory-as-culture suggests (see Chapter 2). Moreover, it appears as 
though the seminal proposition by Walsh and Ungson (1991) that organizational 
memory gravitates towards some set of the five retention bins is echoed by this finding, 
albeit only to an extent that organizational memory manifests through discrete events 
(but is not ‘stored’ or ‘retained’ in those events/bins). 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Temporal context for understanding organizational memory as a 
practice 
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The inclusion of this section on temporal context contributes to macro-view of 
organizational memory as a practice. More specifically, event-based conceptualization of 
time allows for an interpretative lens that is consistent with empirical, yet counter-
intuitive, findings that organizational memory traces the organization on continuous 
basis. Additionally, such way of thinking about organizational memory renders the 
concept consistent with the practice view, where continuity is largely a consequence of 
persistent repetition of discrete practices, and negates a number of analytical problems 
caused by anthropocentric thinking about organizational memory (where memory is 
considered lost if not successfully retrieved after a period of time - e.g. de Holan and 
Phillips, 2004; Snyder and Cummings, 1998). Fundamentally, understanding the 
temporal context of organizational memory equips those concerned (i.e. managers, 
scholars) with an appreciation that organizational memory need not be ever-present 
present in order to be continuous.    
 
With the temporal context of organizational memory as a practice in mind, I will now 
proceed to outline the synthesized illustrative model of what it is. 
 
Step 2: Effects of power on organizational memory as a practice 
 
As was highlighted in Chapters 5 and 6, power plays a significant role in the practicing of 
organizational memory. There are two aspects to power - normativity and authority. This 
is following Arendt (1970) and Parsons (1963) who observed a positive relationship 
between degrees of authoritative and normative power. Additionally, Heidegger (1978) 
conceptualized power as that on the basis of which individuals understand each other 
and their communication. With this in mind, normative refers to the mandate to perform 
those activities and practices which perpetuate a certain attitude towards how work 
ought to be done, and authoritative refers to the degree with which certain activities and 
practices can take precedence over other/competing actions and practices. The authority 
aspect of power is also closely connected to the submergent process of organizational 
memory. 
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With regards to normativity, analysis of design reviews, contract bids and the 
management of awards and distinguished cases presented in Chapter 5, section 5.2.2, 
brings to attention the efficiency with which ArchitectureCo perpetuated a very 
particular approach to architecture that they thought of as their own. This is not to 
suggest that the entire architectural staff of the organization was unified in their 
architectural tastes and practices, but rather that when it came to delivering projects on 
behalf of ArchitectureCo, it was the products adhering to the principles of dominant 
design philosophy that would get authorized. Accordingly, because the management 
team and the review board of ArchitectureCo would largely overlap, there was not much 
space for contestation available to those individuals looking to remain in the employment 
of the Company.     
 
In the case of ArchitectureCo, the outcomes of work were very much hedged against these 
dominant norms. As a result, the possibility for performing architecture was restricted to 
only that which was compatible with the dominant norms. The norms, perpetuated by 
concentrated formal authority, predetermined many functional and aesthetic 
characteristics of the final product. Schatzki (2006: 1864) briefly referred to this as a 
“teleological-affective structures”, which consisted of “a range of ends, projects, actions, 
maybe emotions, and end-project-action combinations (teleological orderings) that are 
acceptable for or enjoined of participants to pursue and realize”. Indeed, this is in line with 
the empirical observations presented in Chapter 5. These ‘teleological-affective 
structures’ of the organization are largely formed and maintained through the 
combinations of power and normative attitudes to work - the closer power and 
normativity are entwined the sturdier teleological-affective structures appear to be. 
 
Empirical data analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrates the effects of normative power 
on organizational memory. Specifically, normative power in ArchitectureCo did much to 
reduce uncertainty as to what the potential outcomes of work may be. Schatzki (2006: 
1872) hypothesized that a combination of “status, experience, abilities, current position in 
objective time or space, and the people with whom and in relation to whom a person acts” 
would result in an uneven distribution of organizational memory. On the one hand, this 
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is supported by empirical data as far as matters of legitimate peripheral participation go 
(Lave and Wenger, 1991). On the other hand, a closer look at how normative power 
impact the performance of practices in ArchitectureCo suggests that, as far as concrete 
organizational outcomes are concerned (i.e. contracts awarded, buildings built, awards 
received, etc.), the distribution of organizational memory is quite even. This is mainly a 
function of two intertwined elements: managerial process and organizational practices. 
Turning, once again, to Brown and Duguid’s (2000) distinction between practice and 
process (where they suggested that practices ‘stick’ to processes) highlights that because 
practices are both goal-oriented and materially-mediated, strong managerial control 
over both of these aspects bears significant influence on which practices, abilities, 
experiences and actions are available to organizational members. This is also the same 
mechanism by which authoritative power facilitated the submergence of organizational 
memory. 
 
Normative power in ArchitectureCo had such a strong impact on practices, abilities, 
experiences and actions because it, in effect, determined the possibility of organizational 
practices. The range of these possibilities thus generally predisposed some practices to 
submerge and emerge through organizational memory and not others. Accordingly, 
power is a foundational element in the constitution of horizon of teleological-affective 
structures (Schatzki, 2006) of the organization. The exercise of power is a practice in its 
own right (Nicolini, 2012). As such, it is not a constant and is re-enacted with every design 
review, managerial decision, client interaction, equipment procurement, project staffing 
decision etc. Consistent exercise of normative power, as was the case with ArchitectureCo 
and as suggested by Schatzki (2006), established the landscape of possibility of 
organizational practices and, by extension, organizational memory.  
 
To apply this to Figure 8.2, the horizontal line represents the consistent performance of 
normative power by organizational decision-makers. Unlike in Figure 8.1., this need not 
encompass continuity of time necessarily. In a two-dimensional space, power can be 
considered to determine the ‘surface’ from which practices can be submerged into 
organizational memory or emerged onto. Those practices not ‘on the surface’ are either 
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organizationally repressed (i.e. not adhering to dominant norms) or practically 
incompatible with existing organizational practices and work (e.g. virtual reality design 
software against CAD - no practical degree of compatibility). This is because practices are 
performed in bundles (Nicolini, 2012; Schatzki, 2012), making ‘unbundling’ of practices 
adherent to dominant norms a laborious process. Accordingly, the ‘surface’ line in Figure 
8.2. represents practices that adhere to dominant norms and can be submerged or 
emerged through organizational memory. 
 
Figure 8.2. Power and organizational memory as a practice 
 
It is worth noting that the reason the normative power line has been represented as 
uneven is to indicate that normativity does not affect the entire organization in an equal 
way or to an equal degree. By the nature of the process outlined in Chapter 4, normative 
power is exercised as a practice by a certain group of senior practitioners. Accordingly, 
the distribution of normative power in ArchitectureCo was distinctly top-down. 
 
Figure 8.2. also alludes to authoritative power within the process of submerging practices 
through organizational memory. This was considered closely in Chapter 6, where design 
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drawings provided a fairly rigid scaffold of acceptable power relations. Power relations 
submerged into design drawings thus provided a way for individuals to understand each 
other and their practice (Heidegger, 1978). That being said, design drawings do not pre-
determine power relations in some inherent way - that is a function of the submergence 
process.  
 
In order to imbue materiality of work (design drawings in this case) with power relations, 
practitioners need to exercise authoritative power. Section 5.2.3 provided an illustration 
of how authoritative power exercised by architects submerged an architect-centred way 
of performing work into the relevant tools. In that example, architects reinforced their 
decision-making authority over other specialists on the project through restricting any 
change to the commissioned design on the building. This particular power relation 
persisted through to the end of the project in situations where the tools of work into 
which these restrictions were submerged continued to be in use. Accordingly, 
authoritative power drives organizational practices into the tools of work and, where 
these persist over time and recurrent re-enactment, submerges them ‘into’ 
organizational memory. 
 
Step 3: Materiality of work 
 
The previous sections alluded repeatedly to objects, equipment, tools of work and 
materiality of work as that which practices are submerged ‘into’ as part of organizational 
memory. Collectively understood as materiality of work, these serve to ‘ground’ specific 
ways of performing practices. Various examples of how this is done have been provided 
throughout the three preceding chapters. Chapter 5 highlighted instances of when 
materiality of work would submerge normativity, Chapter 6 provided an analysis of how 
authoritative power embedded in tools of work perpetuated a certain hierarchy during 
project work, and Chapter 6 brought forth the importance of arranging and providing for 
specific material arrangements that would facilitate emergence of practices ‘from’ 
organizational memory. Importantly, while particular units of materiality of work may 
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vary according to time and place, materiality as a binding agent of practices remains 
universal (Engeström, 2000; Latour, 2005; Schatzki, 2002, 2005; Fenwick, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 8.3. Materiality of work and organizational memory as a practice 
 
As ways of performing practices become submerged or emerged, they remain bound by 
materiality of work (Figure 8.3). This is represented by a box enveloping the 
organizational memory event and normative landscape of possibilities for organizational 
memory (see Step 2 and section 8.1.1.). The envelopment indicates inherent materiality 
of practices and the bottom line represents a particular tool of work to which a certain 
way of performing work was anchored via the submergence process. A two-dimensional 
way of representing the process begins to falter at this stage as the materiality of work 
and normative power exist in a recursive manner - where materiality of work is partly 
determined by alignment with organizational teleological-affective structures (Schatzki, 
2006; and section 5.2.4.1.), and normative power is partly determined by the materiality 
of work (see section 4.2.2.).  
 
The two usually align, but can diverge during especially rapid evolutions in practices (e.g. 
disruptive technology) or during purposeful changes in the ‘that-towards-which’ of the 
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organization (e.g. change in strategy, M&A, rapid growth or contraction). In such a 
situation it may be that a tool of work through which organizational memory has been 
submerged is no longer available to the practitioners for the emergence process. This has 
not occurred in ArchitectureCo during the observation period, primarily because the 
transition to the new 3D building modelling technology was handled with care in a very 
localized, almost isolated way. However, it is plausible to suspect that should a new set 
of tools of work be adopted in haste (or in some other disruptive fashion), a significant 
portion of organizational memory submerged into the replaced materiality may be 
rendered inaccessible.   
 
Step 4: The site of practice 
 
In order for an organizational memory event to transpire, whether through 
submergence, emergence or both, it has to be performed by the practitioner(s). As was 
previously discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, practitioners do not only perform work 
around or using material objects, but also through (as in, from within) them. In Chapter 
5 this was most evident in the case of design drawings, where entire patterns and 
sequences of communication transpired from within the objects alone. In Chapter 6 this 
was observed by focusing on how practitioners interact with their workstations.  
 
A common theme around observing the processes of submergence and emergence of 
organizational memory was whether the materiality of work could also support the 
performance of it. Design drawings proved to be an archetypical tool of work for the 
architects, allowing for the submergence of practices as well as functioning as a site of 
practice in their own right. Conceptually, this aspect of architectural work can be 
understood following Heideggerian concept of ‘clearing’ (see section 4.2), where the 
practice of architecture can manifest itself to the architects in a meaningful way. 
Empirically, for a practitioner to enact a site of practice would entail engaging with work 
in such a way that would prove to be meaningful to them. The qualification of something 
as ‘meaningful’, following the onto-epistemological tenets of this thesis, requires 
conscious pursuit of ‘that-towards-which’ (see Chapter 4). Concerning architectural 
211 
 
work, that means making conscious architectural choices while being aware of the 
consequences of thereof for organizational outcomes.  
 
Consequently, not all materiality of work qualifies to function as a site of practice for a 
variety of reasons, fluidity of organizational purpose and availability of abilities not being 
the least of them (see section 5.2.4.1). Some examples of materiality that has been 
observed to partake in the process of organizational memory have been presented in 
Chapter 7. Those material arrangements which were conducive to organizational 
memory allowed the communicative space and practical flexibility to enable and 
encourage the practitioners to engage in the ‘that-towards-which’ of organizational work. 
Accordingly, the indication of something as a site of practice is whether practitioners are 
able to perform work through that material arrangement, as opposed to around or with 
it (see Chapter 6). This is illustrated by two intersecting rectangles encompassing the 
organizational memory event in Figure 8.4.      
 
As was noted above, the site of practice includes both the power and the materiality of 
work aspects of organizational memory. Each of the rectangles represents a separate site 
of practice for the emergence and the submergence process. This is primarily an 
analytical separation, although empirical observations of ArchitectureCo did show 
repeated examples of when ways of performing practice were submerged and emerged 
through organizational memory separately. One of the reasons for this may the the 
purposiveness of work - the submergence and emergence processes usually serve a 
different purpose and, hence, require separate ‘clearings’ (Heidegger, 1978).  
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Figure 8.4. Site(s) of practice and organizational memory as a practice. 
 
The rectangles in Figure 8.4. overlap in order to signal that both the submergence and 
the emergence process have to be grounded in the same type (but not token) of 
materiality in order to constitute an organizational memory event. It is not clear the effect 
of the two rectangles not intersecting may be, as attempting to observe such a situation 
was beyond the methodological scope of this study. Empirically this would mean that the 
emergence process would have to proceed through a different site and materiality of 
practice to that of the submergence process. This does not seem impossible if the 
difference between the two is benign, although the extent to which (and how) this can be 
qualified requires further research. It is, for example, not entirely clear whether a real-
time collaborative editing of design drawings facilitated by the 3D Building Information 
Modelling software (akin to how Google Docs works) will prove a sufficiently different 
site of practice to render the ways of doing work submerged into CAD-produced design 
drawings incompatible.  
 
The observation that organizational memory can be grounded in a type of materiality as 
opposed to a token (e.g. design drawings as a tool of practice as opposed to one particular 
design drawing) is a significant point of divergence from the organizational memory as 
213 
 
an attribute theme in the literature (see section 3.3.1.), where organizational memory is 
contained by the same organizational attribute during both the codification and the 
retrieval process. It is not so with organizational memory as a practice - because practices 
are re-enacted from new every time, the role of organizational memory is to channel the 
re-enacted practices into patterns and assemblages that would further organizational 
purposes (as manifested by dominant norms). Accordingly, organizational memory does 
not ground information and knowledge about work or the organization, but rather 
particular ways of performing practices. 
 
8.2.1 Key qualifications of the illustrative model, and concluding remarks 
 
The final image of the illustrative model of organizational memory as a practice 
presented in Figure 8.4 requires some further ex post facto qualification to mitigate the 
linear effect on written language that I mentioned in Step 1. These key qualifications are: 
 
 The illustrative model presented in Figure 8.4 is not continuous through time - it 
represents an event, which may be anachronistic (see section 4.2.1); 
 Organizational memory as a practice is not contained inside the tools of work - the 
tools of work are one of the three elements of organizational memory. Tools of 
work are the more viscerally accessible of the three elements and so translate 
organizational memory in a more immediate way (see Figure 8.5); 
 The model presented in Figure 8.4 is not a literal representation of how 
organizational memory as a practice functions - it is an illustrative 
conceptualization of a series of complex and temporally distributed regimes of 
practice from which patterns consistent with memory-like processes emerged, 
subject to a further cross-qualification with Schatzki’s (2006) proposed definition 
of organizational memory (see Chapter 5); 
 The illustrative model presented in Figure 8.4 applies to organizational memory 
only. This is because of heightened sensitivity to issues of organizational power. 
Not all practices that are performed by organizational members contribute 
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towards organizational memory - only those concerned with organizational 
outcomes and/or are unique to the organization do (see sections 5.3, 6.1, and 7.2). 
 
These key qualifications are intended to highlight the practice-based aspect of this way 
of thinking about organizational memory. Because memory is intuitively understood as 
continuous from past into the present, it is not difficult to think of organizational memory 
as a background process underlying organizational activities. There has, however, been 
no empirical evidence to suggest this is the case. Instead, organizational memory 
understood through the interpretative lens of the practice-theoretical approach is 
enacted from new every time.  
 
The incorporation of the three elements - power, materiality of work, and the site of 
practice - into the illustrative model of organizational memory as a practice is not 
intended to give the impression of some causal three-tier mechanism that will, if applied 
properly, generate organizational memory. Instead, the three elements are included to 
communicate the complex, mutually constitutive ordering of the different elements of 
empirically observed collective memory-like processes (Figure 8.5). As was discussed 
throughout the thesis, these elements are interdependent and mutually constitutive, 
even if some are experienced in a more visceral way than others.  
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Figure 8.5. Examples of where the practices of organizational memory may be 
‘found’ 
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The illustrative model in Figure 8.4 positions these elements in a way that traces the 
preceding discussion and empirical exposition of organizational memory as a practice. 
This model builds on an empirically refined version of a stimulating hypothesis by 
Schatzki (2006), positioning the relevant elements in such a way that reflects the 
phenomenological experience of practitioners. It is intended that this model be of use to 
researchers and practitioners who may wish to gain nuanced understanding of 
organizational memory. Organizational memory as a practice occurs as interaction 
between the types and degrees of power, selection of tools of work and the ability of 
practitioners to engage with the two in the pursuit of “that-towards-which” of the 
organization. 
 
This model, and the analysis and discussion on which it is based, answers the initial 
research question: How, and in what ways, do organizational members experience and 
perform organizational memory? Organizational members experience and perform 
organizational memory by submerging and emerging particular ways of performing 
practices into, and through, the relevant tools of work. More simply put, practitioners 
work out the ways in which they can use some of the tools of work and then continue 
using them in order to achieve desired outcomes. The availability of which tools to use 
and which ways of doing work are acceptable is largely a function of managerial power.     
 
   
8.3 SOME GUIDELINES FOR HOW TO IDENTIFY ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY 
IN PRACTICE 
 
Based on the illustrative model of organizational memory presented in Figure 8.4, I will 
now provide some guidelines on how to identify organizational memory processes in 
organizations. This can be of use either as a research tool for organizational scholar or 
for quick managerial audit. The guidelines will consist of a series of questions that, when 
answered, should point at the state of organizational memory. An earlier version of these 
guidelines was presented to ArchitectureCo as part of the final report. 
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How unique is the work carried out by the organizational members? The more 
unique, novel or generally unorthodox the activity carried out by the organization the 
less likely it is to benefit from a developed practice memory (Schatzki, 2006). 
Observations of ArchitectureCo repeatedly highlighted the extent to which the 
organization was drawing on practice memory to maintain its activities. This was 
because architecture is a heavily institutionalized and regulated practice, which requires 
individuals aspiring to become architects to undergo numerous years of training and 
examination. On the one hand, this can result in a more robust organizational memory 
(because the materiality of practice is well-developed), but, on the other hand, in an 
absence of a distinctly differentiating ‘that-towards-which’ of an organization, 
organizational memory may fail to develop at all.  
 
Thus, a more developed practice memory should increase the likelihood of organizational 
memory being present in an organization. 
 
What are the practices involved? Organizations consist of practices and processes 
(Brown and Duguid, 2000). It may, however, be difficult to discern between the different 
practices because of the highly interrelated and interconnected way in which practices 
work. Faced with this issue during the early stages of data collection with ArchitectureCo, 
I decided to observe how practitioners naturally discern their domains of work (see 
section 5.2.1). Following a continued professional development (CPD) event it became 
clear that they way practitioners understood themselves in ArchitectureCo was as 
architects and as everyone else. This provided valuable information about how further 
investigation should proceed and who were the practitioners of interest. Similar CPD 
events, or other practice-specific activities may reveal what are the practices involved 
and who are the practitioners. 
 
What are the primary tools of work? Tools of work provide a visceral way for 
practitioners to engage with practices through either the submergence or the emergence 
process. The primary tools of work are those material arrangements of practice without 
which it would not be possible for practitioners to perform their work. In ArchitectureCo, 
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these were the design drawings and the internet-connected workstation with a CAD 
software suite. A similarly prominent set of tools of work would warrant closer attention 
to whether practitioners are submerging or emerging organizational memory through it. 
 
An additional consideration with regards to the role of tools of work is whether they 
provide for a site of practice. As was previously discussed in Step 4, material 
arrangements that could be used by practitioners to perform work within them have 
been observed to be conducive to organizational memory processes. During my 
observations of ArchitectureCo this largely meant looking for whether practitioners had 
the ability to communicate within these material arrangements (see Chapter 6).  
 
What is the landscape of power? Power, normative and authoritative (see section 
8.1.1), did most to differentiate ArchitectureCo from the practice of architecture. Power 
also played a significant role in providing some abilities and not others, as well as 
perpetuating a particular “that-towards-which” of the organization. Crucially, power 
made it possible for organizational memory to function as well as it did in ArchitectureCo. 
 
One of the reasons why ArchitectureCo performed their memory as well as they did was 
because the organization maintained a very concentrated power structure (see section 
5.2.2 and Chapter 6). This allowed for little negotiation as to which norms and abilities 
an organization ought to pursue or what kind of architecture it should engage in. Looking 
for degrees of concentration of power, especially at those junctions in organizational 
work where products have to be approved or reviewed by management and/or peers 
will help understand how consolidated or distributed the power landscape is. In 
ArchitectureCo only one such junction existed - the design review process - indicating 
high concentration. This, in turn, allows for a fairly unambiguous communication of 
which norms, philosophies and principles the employees were expected to follow; and 
which equipment to use in doing so. 
 
How developed is organizational memory? This is a measure of resilience, where 
resilience is, on the one hand, determined by comparison with other practices/competing 
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memories and, on the other hand, by the abilities provided by the organization. The 
former is an element of the submergence process and the latter of the emergence process 
of organizational memory. Observing the former entails looking for situations where the 
way of performing work and/or the “that-towards-which” of the organization comes in 
contact with a competing or incompatible analogue. The degree of resilience is then 
corroborated from which way of doing work persists following the encounter (see 
section 5.2.3). In this respect, ArchitectureCo maintained a very resilient organizational 
memory and was thus able to submerge their way of performing work into a variety of 
material arrangements. 
 
Observing resilience of the emergence process involves considering how the tools of 
work provided by the organization either enable or restrict the ways in which 
practitioners do their work. For instance, analysis of the ArchitectureCo workstation in 
Chapter 7 suggested that while the organization did well to assemble all the necessary 
tools of work in a single location, the ensuing trade-off was that the architects would only 
do architecture at those locations (the workstations). This was not an issue for 
ArchitectureCo, as mobility of employees was not a priority, but a similar arrangement in 
a more mobile environment may be detrimental to facilitating the emergence of 
organizational memory. 
 
Overall, using the guiding questions above will be of significant use to the researchers 
and practitioners seeking to gain deeper understanding into the state of organizational 
memory in an empirical setting. Because practices are indeterminate (Rouse, 2007) and 
subject to emergent circumstances, the guiding questions above exclude any attempt at 
incorporating metrics of any kind. Rather, the goal is to provide an interested researcher 
or practitioner with a condensed framework for developing a suitable level of 
understanding independently. 
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8.4 CONTRIBUTIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline the contribution of the study to theory and 
practice. This will be followed by a section on implications and limitations of the study. 
The thesis will conclude with suggestions for further research. 
 
8.4.1 Main contribution of the study 
 
The primary contribution of this study is to highlight that: 
 
organizational memory as a practice occurs in an episodic manner at the 
intersection of power and tools of work, with the end result of supplying 
practitioners with a framework for performing organizationally preferred 
practices.  
 
This contribution advances a theoretical understanding of organizational memory as a 
mechanism by which organizations maintain continuity of substance and identity 
through time. A principle by which it is possible to distinguish practice memory and 
organizational memory is proposed, tested and applied in the development in the 
illustrative model of organizational memory as a practice. The model derived from 
thorough empirical investigation shows solid internal validity and a sufficient degree of 
external validity for its purposes. Consequently, it is suitable for potentially wider 
application, especially in conjunction with the post-humanist view of practice (e.g. 
Schatzki, 2002, 2006, 2012; Nicolini, 2009; Tsoukas, 2010; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011). 
While further research, analysis and thinking is required to elevate the findings of this 
study into a theory, the work performed here does, nonetheless, provide a strong sense 
of direction for future research into organizational memory, knowledge management and 
practice theory. 
 
In keeping with the title, this work proposes a lens through which to gain a practice-based 
understanding of organizational memory. Built from, on the one hand, observations of 
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memory-like processes and, on the other hand, empirical development of Schatzki’s 
(2006) hypothesis of what organizational memory as a practice might be, this study 
brings together an array of schools of thought, theories, interpretative lenses and 
understandings. Many of these are not significantly novel, but compiled into an 
explanatory framework supported by rigorous empirical research, they shed light and 
give shape to a complex set of practices, processes and experiences, thus offering a 
stimulating tool for understanding a very different kind of organizational memory from 
what is currently talked about in the literature.  
 
8.4.2 Implications of the study 
 
Because of the volume and diversity of theoretical thought invested into the analysis of 
rich ethnographic data on an inherently intangible subject, it is inevitably difficult to 
distinguish between implications and conclusions drawn from data, theory, process of 
rational thought, or any combination of these. With this in mind, the practice-based 
interpretation of organizational memory has implications for the study of organizational 
memory, practice of knowledge management and innovation, and the theory of practice. 
 
8.4.2.1. Implications for the study of organizational memory 
 
Literature review presented in Chapter 2 proposed a way of grouping existing research 
into four themes. These focused on the scope and orientation of how the concept of 
organizational memory is used. The theoretical point of departure for this research has 
been designated as the substance/holism theme in the literature, meaning that 
organizational memory is understood as inseparable from the organization and non-
reducible to its component parts (following Schatzki, 2006; Linde, 2008). Schatzki 
(2006), in particular, provided a series of conceptual propositions as to what 
organizational and practice memory may be. While tantalizing, these were significantly 
lacking in explanation or empirical justification. Therefore, a key contribution of this 
work to the organizational memory scholarship is to empirically refine and develop 
Schatzki’s (2006) propositions into qualitative inquiry of organizational memory as a 
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practice. An additional contribution was to clarify the general principles of two-tiered 
collective memory (practice and organization) suggested by Schatzki (2006) through an 
analytical distinguishing method. 
 
8.4.2.2. Implications for the practice of knowledge management and 
innovation 
 
Application of theoretical and conceptual constructs about organizational memory is 
most at home within the realm of knowledge management and innovation (Swan et al., 
1999; Hansen et al., 1999; White, 2002; Newell et al., 2009). This is because retention of 
knowledge is most often considered to be the purpose of organizational memory (Walsh 
and Ungson, 1991). However, despite these theoretically straightforward assertions, 
integration of organizational memory into the knowledge management practices 
remains restricted to the codification/dissemination paradigm (Schulz and Jobe, 2001; 
Lissoni, 2001).  
 
A concrete contribution offered by this study is to provide an empirically grounded 
understanding of how practitioners experience the concept of organizational memory. In 
doing so, the findings of this research circumvent the problematic theory-to-practice 
application process in favour of an immediately recognizable set of guidelines. By 
recognizing that some aspects of organizational memory as a practice are more viscerally 
accessible to employees than others, this thesis gestures towards empirically accessible 
ways for beginning to understand the intricacies of complex interactions that make up 
organizational memory. This, in turn, is intended to enable practitioners seeking to 
manage organizational knowledge to make more informed decisions about the 
distribution of equipment, the role of power and the importance of assemblages of tools 
of work. 
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8.4.2.3. Implications for the theory of practice   
 
While not a unified or even a well-defined body of thinking, practice theory revolves 
around a view that social activity originates from, and transpires through, repeat 
reproduction of mundane actions (Nicolini and Monteiro, 2017). The way practices 
display any continuity is because they are, on the one hand, inscribed into social 
structures (Nicolini, 2012) and, on the other hand, proceed against a historical 
background (Lave and Wenger, 1991). As a consequence, practices are both repeatedly 
re-enacted from new at every instance and have duration and perpetuation.  
 
Considering practices as both historical and instantaneous is conceptually difficult and 
borderline oxymoronic. This is because there is a gap in understanding of how the two 
can be reconciled in an empirical setting. In contributing to the stream of work that 
turned to the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger (1978) for insight (Chia and Holt, 
2006; Schatzki, 2006, 2012; Yanow and Tsoukas, 2009; Tsoukas, 2010; Sandberg and 
Tsoukas, 2011, 2015; Shotter and Tsoukas, 2014), this thesis gives an empirical account 
of how a more human-centric way of approaching practices can shed light on the 
mechanisms behind continuity through time. More specifically, this study shows how 
practices are submerged and emerged enacted ‘into’ organizational memory via the 
materiality of work.  
 
8.4.3. Limitations of the study 
 
The results of this study ought to be interpreted with two limitations in mind: focus and 
scope. In terms of the former, the research outlined in this thesis only focused on one, 
albeit embedded, case study of ArchitectureCo and some of its clients and collaborators. 
A further focus on practices in the context of this case study inevitably contributes to a 
strong bias for micro-analysis. While every precaution has been taken to follow the 
‘zooming in and zooming out’ approach (Nicolini, 2009) in order to mitigate this 
methodological bias, a practice theory-driven investigation is still bound to compromise 
breadth for depth. Accordingly, the findings and suggestions put forward in this work 
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should be understood in the context of the setting from which they were derived - i.e. a 
large-medium size, successful architecture firm in the UK, organized as a limited liability 
partnership.  
 
A scope-related limitation has to do with the generalizability of the claims about the 
mechanics of organizational memory as a practice. While these were addressed in 
Chapter 4, it is worth re-emphasizing that further research is needed in order to validate 
broad applicability of the illustrative model of organizational memory as a practice 
(Figure 8.4).  
 
In both cases, utmost care has been taken to account for these limitations either through 
amending methodology in suitable ways or through deriving additional conceptual 
understandings from the literature in order to guide data collection and analysis in a 
more precise way.  
 
8.4.4 Suggestions for further research 
The research outlined in this thesis develops an initial practice-based theory of 
organizational memory. The theoretical constructs that emerged from this study, as well 
as empirical examples and methodological innovations used to support them can now be 
put to further test by scholars interested in gaining new insight into the complex 
questions of management and organization studies. Some suggestions for further 
research include: broader testing of the submergence/emergence model of 
organizational memory, a more comprehensive look at the communicative properties of 
tools of work, and further development of the phenomenology of practice approach to 
the study of organizations.  
In terms of the broader testing of the submergence/emergence model of organizational 
memory, this thesis has shown that there is much to gain from applying this particular 
lens to the study of organizations. For one, the model, and its key qualifications, enables 
a clearer view of the distinct contributions that a practice and an organization make to 
the process of work. Understanding these distinctions may allow for a more precise study 
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of organized labour. This is because identification of the exact organizational 
characteristics that can be assigned to the effects of practices may allow for a more 
efficient application of management to those aspects of the organization which are not 
dependent on the external factors. Further study of the interplay between dimensions of 
power, materiality of work, and sites of practice would serve to refine the currently 
nascent understanding of organizational memory as a practice-based phenomenon.  
Specifically, more work in heavily institutionalized and regulated settings such as 
architecture would go a long way towards refining the model. Thereafter, investigation 
of less regulated and more fluid settings, such as IT development or algorithmic 
management, would indicate not only whether the submergence/emergence model can 
be applied universally, but also whether different types of industries generate 
conceptually different organizational memories.  
A more comprehensive look at the communicative properties of tools of work will be of 
assistance there. Because tools of work have been found to be the most viscerally 
accessible aspect of organizational memory, it may be prudent to begin a further 
elaboration of the concept by following this path. Chapter 6 presented some of the types 
of communication made possible by design drawings. However, design drawings are 
static objects which only allow for ‘one-at-a-time’ way of communicating. This is set to 
change with the introduction of the Building Information Modelling software. 
Specifically, one of the explicit aims of BIM is to enable collaborative, real-time editing 
access to the building design. This will effectively remove the need for drawings to be 
sent following the hierarchy of power and authority. Accordingly, it would be most 
interesting to investigate whether (and how) representatives of dominant practices will 
still be able to (or not) submerge organizational memory into those new tools of work.  
Finally, I feel that the phenomenology of practice approach can be of great benefit to 
scholars adherent to the practice-theoretical school of thought. This is because 
phenomenology of practice allows for more indirect ways of collecting data without 
compromising the key philosophical underpinnings of practice theory. When used in 
conjunction with, for example, video recordings of performances of work, 
phenomenology of practice may help make more accurate sense of those aspects of work 
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that practitioners find more or less meaningful. This way, a shorter initial period of 
ethnographic, or other similarly immersive, research focusing on identifying the 
phenomena and the patterns of practitioners’ interaction with the phenomena can then 
be applied to larger volumes of indirect observation data. As a result, the practice 
researchers may be liberated from not being able to be in more than one place at the same 
time. However, further refinement and testing of this methodological evolution is needed 
before then.  
It is my sincere hope that some of the insights outlined in this thesis can be taken up by 
other scholars of organizational knowledge, memory, and materiality to generate 
interesting and novel research. Too much of organizational theory is constrained by 
either Cartesian or linear fundamentalism with regards to the continuity of 
organizational performance, even when so much thinking and research exists to show 
that actual experiences of individuals do not adhere to these. Without breaking too far 
away from the traditional way of reciting ideas, I hope to have been able to show that, 
with the help of some philosophical and theoretical constructs, it is possible to 
investigate, understand and relate the complexity of human experience in organizations 
by means of text and diagram. Organizational memory is a fertile concept that does much 
to account for a variety of epistemological, methodological and empirical complications 
not uncommon in the processual study of organizations. For this alone, it is only worth 
developing further. 
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